Social cohesion in Europe: literature review
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The British Academy’s 2019 Cohesive Societies Literature review asks the timely question, ‘How can societies stay cohesive in the face of rapid political, social, economic and technological change?’ This report looks into the issue, briefly examining what causes fracture points to open or widen in European societies, how different research traditions have considered the concept of cohesion, and interventions and trends that have supported the development of cohesion.

There is a general sense that social cohesion faces strong challenges. However, 2018 Eurofound analysis drawn from European Social Survey data found that while ‘social cohesion is often said to be in jeopardy, on an unstoppable downward slide ...[there is] ...little empirical evidence to back up such claims, or indeed to reject them. Single country studies ... have offered conclusive evidence that there is no indication of any such unstoppable negative trend’. So there are reasons for optimism alongside the obvious fracture points, although the perception of lack of cohesion brings its own problems.

This report provides an overview of relevant research and policy literature on social cohesion in Europe. It aims to support the British Council and similar organisations to understand the threats and opportunities to their role of promoting social cohesion. The report looks at academic literature that defines social cohesion, as well as the ways other research traditions can explain this complex, many-sided issue. It goes on to examine policy responses and approaches and how they have been evaluated.

Finally, the report sets out case studies from six European states to understand how these complex research and policy questions play out in real life, considering country-specific and universal issues.

Jacqueline Broadhead, Director
Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity,
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Introduction

Contrary to an initial observation that I had some years ago that there is little research on social cohesion, there is a strong theoretical base to inform projects and actions that seek to promote more peaceful, cohesive societies. Much of it is not labelled as ‘social cohesion’ so you do have to dig a little, but as this report will show, there is a wealth of research in areas such as contact theory and social capital which can underpin how we think about trust and cohesion in society.

Defining social cohesion is not easy and one of the issues is perhaps that there is no accepted definition. It could be (wrongly) thought of as almost Orwellian. A group of people, indistinct, all tasked and driven to pull in the same direction. A state of being where individuality and creativity are not valued and where being different is seen as a problem or worse still, a threat. That is not what we are talking about here. A cohesive world and society would be one where people can, across difference, manage to co-exist and co-operate in a way which benefits all. This is not about uniformity. It is about coming together. It is about building trust and understanding between people and communities, respecting and accepting difference and individuality, while also agreeing shared core values and just as importantly, being able to agree-to-disagree without escalation to conflict.

Co-existing and building this shared understanding and trust across perceived and real differences of culture, ideas and beliefs has never been more important than in the late 20th and early 21st centuries where globalisation and the digital revolution mean that we are all much more closely connected than ever before. As an example, by the age of 16, I had not travelled further than 100 miles from my hometown. There was no internet in people’s homes and as a result, my exposure to and interactions with peers was restricted to those who lived on my estate. Today, I am sure this would be an almost alien notion for most of the young people in the UK and in much of the world, who even if they haven’t travelled any more extensively than I did, now interact with each other through the internet in ways that back then I couldn’t have possibly imagined. It’s clear that this increased interaction brings great benefits but also great challenges.

In the British Council, we often say that we ‘Create friendly knowledge and understanding between the people of the UK and other countries’. This doesn’t mean that we all have to agree! Friends rarely do on all things. What it does mean is we work hard to promote trust and co-operation between people across the world, in a positive way, that provides benefits for all. This report is part of our own journey to examine how we can continue to support people to come together, share experience, share knowledge, develop new skills and build trust and understanding.

Finally, we must mention the Covid-19 pandemic. While this study does not explore the pandemic specifically, it is impossible to read it without applying elements of it to the daily emerging, changing effect of Covid-19 around the world. We are already seeing some research on how levels of societal cohesion have impacted on Covid-19 responses and the impact that the pandemic has had on societal cohesion. Through such research, we will see what, if any, contribution that trust and our ability to come together and work towards common goals has brought to humanity’s response to dealing with the terrible impact of Covid-19. This learning will no doubt be important not least as we continue to battle the effects of climate change.

On behalf of British Council, I would also like to express our thanks to our colleagues at Oxford University’s Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), and particularly to Jacqueline Broadhead for her insights and skill in conducting this review.

Andrew Sheridan, Portfolio Lead Youth and Civil Society, British Council
Defining social cohesion

There is no accepted general meaning for ‘social cohesion’. It’s an often-used term in research and policy and regularly substituted for other terms such as ‘inclusion’ and ‘integration’.

Fonseca et al. (2018), in a review of the known, existing academic studies about the term, identify shared characteristics in academic and institutional attempts to define social cohesion. Namely, that most attempts to define social cohesion include ‘(the) well-being of the members of the group, shared values such as trust, and equal opportunities in society’. The review also identifies three levels of social cohesion: around the individual, communities and institutions.

Saggar, in response to a recent British Academy review of Cohesive Societies (2019), sorts these frameworks into contrasting metaphors of ‘glue’ and ‘sugar’. Cohesion is seen either as the ‘glue’ that holds societies together or found in the ‘cups of sugar which neighbours borrow from each other’. The ‘glue’ metaphor comprises ‘well set, invisible bonds that exist between people, such as common goals or similar values. This kind of cohesion is often only visible in response to a crisis, a resource to be called upon when needed’. In the sugar metaphor, ‘cohesion is active, the collection of often relatively small actions through which people call upon each other for everyday things. A cohesive society is one in which neighbours more readily and easily borrow sugar from each other, a fragmented society is one in which neighbours view each other with suspicion’.

As Saggar highlights, ‘these metaphors represent the extreme ends of a continuum from a conception of societal cohesion as something that is relatively static, macro, societal (glue) to a conception of societal cohesion as something flexible, micro and neighbourly (sugar). Baylis et al. (2019) urge “scholars and policymakers to be mindful of this distinction, and to be specific about what they intend to achieve with their definition: a description of what cohesion might look like in social terms, or a conceptualisation of cohesion as an ongoing societal process”. This is particularly helpful in contrasting the societal with the individual, although it does not fully capture the more place-based elements of cohesion at community level – in particular, the sense of cohesion between neighbouring communities.

O’Connor (1998) distinguishes three dimensions to social cohesion, adding this spatial element by including a prism that focuses on differences as well as similarities, arriving at this definition:

- The ties that bind, such as values, identity and culture
- Differences and divisions such as inequalities and inequities, cultural diversity and geographical divisions
- Social glue referring to associations and networks, infrastructure.

Bernard (1999), building on work by Jenson (1998), includes participation such as political participation into this picture. This is laid out in a schematic typology for cohesion:

Typology of the dimensions of social cohesion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Substantial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Insertion / Exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[labour market]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Legitimacy / Illegitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[of institutions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Recognition / Rejection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[tolerance of difference]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belonging / Isolation</td>
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(adapted from Bernard 1999)
As well as academic work to define social cohesion, there are also policy definitions used by institutions in the European context to guide their work, some of which build on the research approaches outlined above. For example, the Council of Europe defines social cohesion as ‘the capacity of a society to ensure the wellbeing of all its members – minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation – to manage differences and divisions and ensure the means of achieving welfare for all members. Social cohesion is a political concept that is essential for the fulfilment of the three core values of the Council of Europe: human rights, democracy and the rule of law’.

By contrast, the European Union’s definition is more narrowly defined and linked to funding policy aimed at tackling regional disparities between member states within the EU. This states that ‘the bulk of Cohesion Policy funding ...[is] concentrated on less developed European countries and regions in order to help them to catch up and to reduce the economic, social and territorial disparities that still exist in the EU.’ This approach is aimed squarely between member states rather than within communities themselves. It focuses on economic indicators as a primary driver, in contrast to much of the academic literature under consideration.

Finally, the World Bank (2000) uses O’Connor’s work as the building blocks for its own definition. This incorporates an economic understanding into cohesion (in keeping with the EU definition above) alongside the governmental layer, to move beyond definitions that only work at community level. The World Bank defines cohesion very broadly as ‘a state of affairs in which a group of people (delineated by a geographical region, like a country) demonstrate an aptitude for collaboration that produces a climate for change’.

Alongside these examples where research on cohesion has been translated into policy definitions, the British Academy’s review of cohesion (2019) identifies a number of important principles. These can shape, and perhaps support, the application of top-line definitions (in research and policy):

- Societal cohesion can be understood both as a process and as a destination.
- Societal cohesion should be considered at different geographical levels.
- Societal cohesion may be a positive goal in its own right.
- Discussion of societal cohesion is often responsive.
- Ambiguities in understanding societal cohesion can be advantageous, but can also create difficulties.

This final point is pertinent to defining social cohesion. The lack of a stable, generalised meaning can be frustrating to anyone trying to get a handle on the concept, contributing to a difficulty in measuring cohesion and evaluating specific initiatives. But it is also worth remembering that the broad scope of the term can have advantages, allowing a more flexible application and wider-ranging acceptance.

As highlighted above, ‘social cohesion is generally valued in and of itself, as it reflects solidarity and social harmony, while also being regarded as an important resource for economic success and quality of life’ (Eurofound 2014). It is seen as a positive goal in itself, either as a process or a destination – but it also impacts on wider structural and societal drivers. These wider concepts of social cohesion build out a broader definition than the somewhat narrow idea of cohesion as purely social. Baylis et al. (2019), in their British Academy review, identify this as limiting. They highlight the economic, political and cultural drivers which also factor into a multi-faceted appreciation of the drivers of cohesion. This section goes on to consider this within the European context.

The Covid-19 context

It would be impossible to talk about social cohesion without considering the global Covid-19 pandemic, with its impact on the economic, political and cultural factors that are the drivers and barriers to social cohesion. What remains unclear is the proportionate impact that the pandemic will have when compared with other challenges such as climate change or automation in the workplace. As such we will not refer to Covid-19 in each instance but instead consider it as one of several significant factors in the discussion around social cohesion.
The importance of linking social cohesion to economic initiatives is borne out by evidence of the lasting impact of long-term unemployment on subjective wellbeing and therefore cohesion (Eurofound 2014), as well as the impact that unemployment has on levels of trust (Eurofound 2018).

However, there is uncertainty about the role of income inequality, which is found to reduce ‘social trust in institutions and [fuel] political and social instability’ (OECD 2017). Scholars such as Jordahl (2007) find a correlation between inequality and level of trust, echoed in Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2010) work on the role of inequality. Further, Uslaner (2002) attempts to describe a causal link between inequality and levels of trust, showing that these factors aren’t merely correlated. Wilkinson and Pickett maintain that ‘changes in trust and inequality go together over the years. With greater inequality, people are less caring of one another, there is less mutuality in relationships ...so, inevitably, there is less trust’.

However, (Eurofound 2018) finds that, ‘perhaps unexpectedly, income inequality has a limited impact on aspects of social cohesion. It appears that the existence of inequality does not really influence the attitudes, emotions and behaviour of citizens’. This is placed in opposition to overall poverty, which has a clear effect (nations that are poorer overall having lower levels of social cohesion). As discussed below, there is also a spatial element to inequality - most notably the role of gentrification in potentially hindering cohesion. Butler and Lees (2006), for example, describe how ‘super-gentrification’ in large cities (in this case London) may lead to social exclusion in a similar way to poverty and inequality. For example, ‘super-gentrifiers’ may choose to not send their children to local schools and therefore have less interest in community development and place.

It is also important to remember that while Turok links economic and cohesion concerns, for others, the cohesion model was developed as a rejection of (neo-) liberalism and its associated economic model. This is described by Baylis et al. (2019): ‘The concept of social cohesion grew from Durkheim’s solidarism: a rejection of liberalism developed “in a Europe that had been shaken for several decades by rapid social change associated with industrialisation, urbanisation, massive immigration and population movement across the continent, and changing social (including gender) roles”’ (Jenson 1998).

The discussion therefore needs to consider the extent to which cohesion is important for economic growth, in contrast to the ways in which economic models may inhibit social cohesion and the interplay between these two dynamics. Similarly, where policymakers focus on social cohesion solely through the prism of economic inclusion, there is a risk of overlooking the interconnected nature of the subject and becoming too simplistic - i.e. reducing it solely to labour market integration, without considering the wider drivers identified here.

One policy response which attempts to square this circle – inclusive economic growth - is highlighted below. This attempts to link social and economic policy - moving beyond the policy of ‘grow now, redistribute later’ to a model where investment in social infrastructure is an integral driver of growth and where as many people as possible can contribute to and benefit from a new kind of growth’ (RSA 2018).

The inclusion of economic drivers also raises a wider point - that social cohesion does not sit in a vacuum outside economic policy conditions. There is strong evidence of a link between economic performance and cohesion and more contested evidence on the role of inequality.

**Economic drivers**

**Economic growth and income inequality**

As identified by Turok (2006): ‘The key idea that has emerged ...is that social cohesion improves economic performance. This is a more positive way of saying that social division and fragmentation undermine long-term economic success. Communities that pull together may be able to reverse the tide of urban decline creating a stable environment, restoring confidence and assisting each other. A strong social fabric comprising active civil institutions, connected communities and common values is said by some commentators to function better economically. Different elements of society contribute to the collective endeavour through some shared sense of purpose, mutual support or simply agreed norms and rules of behaviour. This helps to limit selfish practices, conflict and instability, and generally improves the durability of economic relationships.’

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Concern about the effects of polarisation on cohesion are broadly two-fold:

- That polarisation reinforces and emphasises divisions in society
- An increased breadth of debate challenges broadly agreed and enforced social norms that can be destructive to social cohesion by allowing, for example, more discrimination.

Polarisation is often characterised as a shift from the left-right axis of political opinion to a new divide between open and closed. Wheatley (2019), in the British context, delineates between an economic dimension (that still roughly runs on a left to right axis) and the cultural dimension that incorporates a range of social issues such as equal opportunities for minorities and the desirability (or not) of the death penalty, as well as a number of issues closely related to globalisation, such as immigration, foreign aid and European integration. This dimension, sometimes referred to as “open” versus “closed”, pits patriotic, Eurosceptic social conservatives against cosmopolitan liberals.

This delineation of open versus closed has geographical and demographic elements as well as ideological ones. The “open versus closed” divide is also posited as urban (particularly large cities) versus smaller towns and rural communities, young versus old, more diverse areas against more homogenous ones.

**Political drivers**

**Political polarisation and shared value**

As outlined above, there is a widespread perception of an increasing polarisation of societal views and that this can cause fracture points in cohesive societies. However, not everyone agrees that increased political polarisation is a negative. Indeed, in times of relative political consensus, there is often a push for increased differentiation between political messages (see Tucker et al. 2018). Polarisation of views can be seen as a greater variety of opinion coming into the mainstream with previously closed-off areas of consensus politics becoming more open to debate.

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This delineation of open versus closed has geographical and demographic elements as well as ideological ones. The “open versus closed” divide is also posited as urban (particularly large cities) versus smaller towns and rural communities, young versus old, more diverse areas against more homogenous ones.
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, levels of education are seen as a key dividing line. There are a number of critiques of this new divide and its impact on social cohesion. Firstly, that it is too convenient a categorisation, highlighting one group as more obviously positive than the other. Secondly, that by sideline the economic aspect, it ignores the most crucial part of the divide - that of the winners and losers of globalisation (Kriesi 2008). In 2018, The Economist identified the true dividing line as education, or ‘the exam passers versus the exam flunkers’, stating that the open versus closed dynamic is ‘a double error. It obscures the deeper forces dividing the world, and spares winners by playing down the legitimate concerns of losers [of globalisation].’

Across countries, the research consistently finds that while there is a group at either end of the spectrum with fairly fixed ‘open’ or ‘closed’ views, this generally (with variations between countries) accounts for around 30 per cent of the population. This means that there is around 50 per cent of the population in what they term ‘the anxious middle’, sometimes known as the persuadable middle.

This view of polarisation is often linked to a perception that social media and online discourse fuel more divisive conversations. The National Conversation on Immigration (2019) carried out online and face-to-face focus groups, asking UK nationals for their opinions on immigration ranking, using a scale of one to ten to determine how positive or negative they felt about it. The online responses were much more likely to include ones or tens; face-to-face responses sat more in the middle.

A literature review by Tucker et al. (2018) identifies a perceived triangle of self-reinforcing elements between polarisation, disinformation and social media use. It states: ‘Of perhaps preeminent importance is the question of whether political polarisation and/or disinformation decreases the quality of policymaking in democracies, as well as whether it might decrease the overall quality of democracy itself. Further accentuating the problem is the question of whether both these conditions might be fueling each other. That is, does political polarisation make people more vulnerable to disinformation, and, in turn, does the increased prevalence of disinformation lead to greater political polarisation? Equally important, however, is the third factor: social media usage, which could also possibly be affecting both political polarisation and the prevalence of disinformation online.’

The review identifies a number of studies and findings which challenge elements of this hypothesis. Namely, a review by Boxell et al. (2017), which shows that, even if mass political polarisation has grown in recent times, this increase has been largest among citizens least likely to use the internet and social media. Their results reveal that ‘the internet explains a small share of the recent growth in polarisation’. Indeed, the review finds that media consumption is becoming increasingly social and this could have a profound impact on societal outcomes, which we are only starting to understand. This impact could even be ‘normatively desirable’, as social consumption is more likely to see people interacting with others who have different views from themselves (see, for example, Bakshy et al. 2015). Fletcher and Nielsen (2017) find that social network users are exposed to diverse news at a greater rate than people who do not use social networks.

Linked to the question of polarisation are people’s values and the extent to which widely differing views can get in the way of social cohesion. However, whether polarisation is a positive, negative or neutral force for social cohesion, Briedahl et al. (2018) highlight that ‘there is no consensus among political theorists about what values we need to share to foster social cohesion and indeed, for example, nationalists, liberals, and multiculturalists provide different answers to this question’. As explored below, it may be that narrative approaches provide a lens through which the segmentation research can provide tools to identify shared values.

‘In countries deeply affected by the 2008 financial crisis and significant increases in refugee arrivals post 2015 ... public opinion on questions of national identity and migration are more nuanced than the polarised vision of open versus closed might suggest’

More in Common 2018
The role of migration in social cohesion and polarisation

While there are a wide range of policy factors which may impact cohesion, migration has emerged as the most significant and immediate. The first results of Eurobarometer 2019 show migration dropping behind climate change as a motivating factor in voting in the 2019 elections. However, migration has been one of the most significant issues driving European voter behaviour over the past decade.

Dennison and Dražanová (2018) undertook a meta review of quantitative data in 17 European countries on attitudes to immigration and emigration since 2010. In keeping with the work on polarisation, they found that ‘In Europe, contrary to popular belief, attitudes to immigration are not becoming more negative. Rather, they are notably stable and, in recent years, have become more positive. What emerges unambiguously is that Europeans everywhere want immigrants who are able to assimilate socially, labour market issues like professional qualifications are considered important but less so, while racial and religious backgrounds are considered unimportant. Unlike preferences about immigration, the perceived importance of the issue of immigration is volatile and has risen sharply across Europe. As such, it will likely continue to dominate national and European elections discourses in 2019. In this context, voters most concerned about immigration – who often already held anti-immigration attitudes – are more likely to vote for anti-immigration parties, even when these parties do not align with other issues they believe in.’

Finally, Dennison and Dražanová identify policy preferences on migration as significant, noting that, ‘Europeans increasingly associate the EU with not enough control at external borders, though far less so than with freedom of movement. At the same time, major Southern host countries must contend with persistently critical domestic attitudes towards the hosted displaced populations of concern’.

From this, three key points emerge around the role of migration as a driver of social cohesion:

• How public opinion on migration drives or hinders cohesion, in particular with regard to polarisation
• The effect of migration policy on social cohesion
• The effect of integration policy and initiatives on social cohesion.

In reference to the third area (considered more fully later in this paper), as Demireva (2017) highlights, ‘a key limitation of the literature is that it remains predominantly focused on diversity and social cohesion, rather than immigration and social cohesion’. This means that the role of migration policy is often lost and the distinction between newcomer-migrant communities and longer-standing (which includes second generation, ethnic minority) communities becomes blurred in a way which may be unhelpful, or even counter-productive, to the aim of promoting cohesion between and within communities.

Political participation and representation

Bernard (1999) and Jenson (1998) identify political participation as a key part of social cohesion. Hooghe and Marien (2012) cite trust as being deeply interlinked with the issue of participation asking: ‘Does it make sense to participate in political life, if one does not trust the political system or political decision-makers?’ This critical question of political sociology has resulted in differing research outcomes. Some claim ‘that political trust is a prerequisite for any form of political participation to occur, whilst others assume that a lack of trust can lead to a more intensive form of citizens’ participation’.

Using the 2006 European Social Survey, Hooghe and Marien establish that there is a positive correlation between trust and voting, which is amplified where people also feel confident in their knowledge and understanding of the system. However, importantly, more distrustful citizens did not necessarily participate less. Instead, their participation is more likely to be in non-institutional engagement, outside of formal routes such as voting. ‘Low levels of political trust do not imply an alienation from the political system as such, but rather indicate a structural trend towards different forms of interaction between citizens and the political system.’ The policy actions discussed below consider how institutions have tried to respond to this challenge.

The question of representation also potentially acts as a driver to cohesion as reflected in the quote, often attributed to civil rights activist Marien Wright Edelman, ‘you can’t be what you can’t see’. Cowley (2013) uses the UK parliamentary context to understand who the public see as underrepresented: ‘if one accepts the case for descriptive representation and the politics of presence – as so much of contemporary political discourse does – then the question of which groups deserve, or require, descriptive representation is far from trivial.’

Cowley finds that public interest differs from academic literature on the topic, for example, suggesting that legislatures should try to be representative by mirroring population level data. Cowley finds that the public takes more interest in representation from their local area than the literature devotes space to (echoing the importance of place to representation and cohesion, as emphasised in this paper).

Cowley also finds that while minority groups are interested in increasing their presence, this desire is not necessarily shared by the wider public. They may still wish to create more representative institutions, but, ‘if one of the aims of pushing for a more descriptively representative House is to increase people’s sense of faith in parliament and politics, then we should at least be aware that promotion of one group could potentially lead to a reduction in support among others’. Similarly, Cowley notes that this reticence is not only from majority groups, observing that ‘there was, for example, opposition to an increase in Muslim representation from working-class respondents; there was opposition to an increase in gay and lesbian representation from Muslim respondents’.

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‘Think of these as the cornerstones of your life and invest time in developing them. Building these connections will support and enrich you every day’.

This supports the idea that social cohesion helps develop wellbeing (an argument for promoting policies to build cohesion), rather than vice versa. For example, Cramm et al. (2017) show that for older adults, social cohesion could act as a ‘buffer’ against negative impacts from poverty and loneliness. However, loneliness is also interconnected with areas such as social mixing and contact theory.

The Connected Communities programme, led by the Royal Society of Arts (2015), found evidence of a number of ‘dividends’ including for wellbeing from investing in cohesion activities. It states that ‘investing in community capital by supporting interventions that support social relationships produces measurable social value [including] greater wellbeing’. Specifically, the research found that ‘people who said that they feel part of a community were the most likely to report high subjective wellbeing, while people who said there was something stopping them from taking part in their community were the least likely to report high subjective wellbeing’. Finally, the report discovered that ‘relationships are the key to wellbeing – more so than social status or life circumstances. People who lack certain kinds of social relationship – such as knowing somebody in a position to change things locally, or having somebody who can offer practical help – were more likely to report low subjective wellbeing than people who have a long-term illness, are unemployed, or are a single parent’.

The British Council’s Active Citizens programme aims to build understanding and trust between communities by establishing an enduring global network of community leaders. Active Citizens uses international cultural relations to help tackle major challenges facing communities. Alongside the benefits to individuals and partners involved, the British Council (2018) has identified a wider contribution to community wellbeing: ‘Communities are engaged through social action — both as social actors and beneficiaries. Social action projects bring together citizens, organisations and networks to improve wellbeing for the wider community and those most marginalised. Long-term, community-wide changes include increased community cohesion, better access to services and support, safer communities, improvements in local living environments and other outcomes that lead to fairer and more equitable societies.’ To date, the programme has reached more than 280,000 people in 77 countries.

‘Relationships are the key to wellbeing – more so than social status or life’

Alongside the drivers of social cohesion outlined above, there are other areas that are either emerging or likely to emerge in response to identified social phenomena. There are also likely to be many unforeseen future drivers that this paper cannot hope to cover in detail, but it seems likely that the following trends will contribute to our understanding of social cohesion. This section draws on work by the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations (2013) looking at the intersections between these ‘megatrends’ and social cohesion in three main, interconnected categories: demographic change, technological change and climate change. These critical areas have been identified in consultation with the British Council as future drivers that may inform future practice.

Current and future drivers: demographic, ecological and technological

The European Quality of Life Survey (Eurofound 2014) looks at life satisfaction and happiness. It finds a clear, positive correlation between life satisfaction and social cohesion concluding that social cohesion promotes wellbeing. The What Works Centre for Wellbeing points to the influential ‘Five Ways to Wellbeing’ (2008), one of which is to ‘Connect’, with the people around you. With family, friends, colleagues and neighbours. At home, work, school or in your local community.
Demographic change

Demographic change as a driver for social cohesion has been overlooked in many forms. This relates in particular to mobility, ageing society and intergenerational divides.

As regards mobility, the Oxford Martin Commission identifies a growing emergent middle class and increased urbanisation as megatrends (alongside the potential for climate-based mobility) identified below. In terms of cohesion, this shift could provide ‘a much-needed impetus for balanced global growth by boosting consumption, investing in health, education and renewable energy, and driving higher productivity, sustainable economic development, and more political stability via increased demand for accountability and good governance’. However, ‘there is also the risk of an increasing divide between the growing middle class and those left behind. At the same time, growth in consumption and incomes will add further pressure to our strained resources and environment’.

The Commission for Future Generations identifies the ageing population as a likely dramatic change. In the UK, the All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Integration identified intergenerational divides as a particularly pertinent question for its 2019 report. It highlighted stark political divisions between the generations, as well as geographic and spatial divisions (as discussed in terms of political polarisation above). In the UK context particularly, it pointed to a lack of shared spaces for intergenerational activity.

Climate change and associated mobility

The Commission highlights sustainability as ‘inherently about the long term. It requires the reconciliation of environmental, social and economic demands necessary for the sustained survival of humankind and other organisms on our planet. Above all, living sustainably means grappling with the “perfect storm” associated with the inseparability of water, food, energy and climate’. However, Eisenberg and J abareen (2017) underline that the social element of sustainability ‘was integrated late into debates on sustainable development’. Their conceptual framework for social sustainability ‘seeks to enhance the protection of people, all people regardless of colour, origin, culture, or socio-economic status, against risk by fostering the adaptation of just and equitable social, economic, and environmental policies’ – in this way embedding sustainability more closely into the cohesion agenda and vice versa.

The role of changes in mobility patterns is well understood as a crossover between climate change and cohesion. Cattaneo et al. (2019) highlight migration as one possible adaptive strategy to climate change. However, they also identify that ‘there is no unified theoretical approach that adequately represents the relationship between climate change and migration’ and that climate change exacerbates as well as promote migration. In relation to social cohesion, they focus on the way migration patterns may change. ‘Climate change may affect income differentials between origin and destination countries, increase economic uncertainty, or influence socio-political factors, all of which have an impact on the probability of migrating’. So we can also suppose that these factors could impact cohesion. The report highlights contradictory research findings as to whether climate change means that more or fewer women are likely to migrate. However, it is clear that poorer people are more likely to migrate because of climate change, as they are less likely to have the resources to adapt in their country of origin. This is in contrast to the trend of an emerging middle class, as mentioned above.

The role of digital technology and automation

The role of digital technology on social cohesion (outside of social media) is an underexplored area in the study of cohesion. The pervasive impact of digital technology and social media makes it difficult to narrow down to a specific scope of enquiry. However, there are a number of key areas that have been researched.

Digital inclusion has been a focus for research and policy making, particularly regarding rural areas and older populations. Ragnedda (2017) identifies three levels of digital divide: access (the first level); how people use the internet and what they use it for (the second level of digital divide); and the returning benefits of using it (the third level of digital divide). These distinctions do not focus on a simple ‘have or have not’ approach to digital divides, but offer a more nuanced approach to links digital use to social capital and to the development of ‘digital capital’.

Ragnedda identifies how digital capital can work, ranging from a trust-based network, building virtual communities founded on strong ties, through to ‘weak ties’ that can enlarge networks through more expansive relationship building. Ragnedda uses the example of applying for a job by cold emailing; on the one hand a ‘weak tie’, but one which grows a network.

Reinforcing Ragnedda’s levels of digital capital, Wallace et al. (2017) use Putnam’s bridging and bonding typology (outlined below) to show how different rural villages use ICT differently to connect; some use it to create a shared common identity, others to reinforce private groups and friendships. Crucially, ‘information and communications technology is intertwined with social life in rural communities in ways that co-evolve’.

Finally, the challenges and opportunities of automation are highlighted by the Commission for Future Generations, which states that ‘globalisation and automation are changing the workforce ...Labour-saving technologies are rendering an increasing number of jobs obsolete ... Technological innovation has driven down demand for low and medium skill labour; Demand for employees to reskill quickly to keep pace with technological change continues to rise. Technology and structural shifts do not necessarily mean there will be fewer jobs in the future, but adapting to the new environment and generating future jobs is a challenge’.

Maria del Río-Chanona et al. (2019) analyze the network effect of automation, looking beyond simple sector analysis. They say that policymakers looking to ‘create effective retraining programs ...[need] to properly understand the bottlenecks to occupational mobility’. For example, according to Frey and Osborne, statistical assistants are more vulnerable to automation than childcare workers. However, since a statistical assistant can also provide automation support to social care, but as Oliver (2018) points out, the ‘alarming prevalence of social isolation and loneliness among older people is precisely because of a lack of human contact. We should never forget that health and social care is a people business and that those people might prefer more, not less, human contact’.

Since many occupations with decreasing demand can transition into childcare worker jobs, the long-term unemployment of childcare workers is likely to increase. In a similar way, one can imagine this process having a knock-on effect on cohesion. This comes across in the observed corrosive effect of long-term unemployment on cohesion, or through the spatial dynamic, where unemployment is targeted to particular places.

Finally, the effects of automation are not limited to the labour market. There are also, for example, proposals for automation to support social care, but as Oliver (2018) points out, the ‘alarming prevalence of social isolation and loneliness among older people is precisely because of a lack of human contact. We should never forget that health and social care is a people business and that those people might prefer more, not less, human contact’.
How can research approaches support understanding and help develop policy responses to social cohesion?

Alongside the definitions and drivers of social cohesion, there has been a long-standing critique that social cohesion has too small a focus. Some critiques see it as too narrow a frame, and one that does not include the wider economic and political drivers outlined above (see Baylis et al. 2019). There is also criticism that the concept does not interact enough with other interrelated but separate research traditions. These are often focused on different disciplines and may offer alternate lenses through which to understand social cohesion, such as political science, migration studies or social policy. While this review cannot hope to cover the full range of disciplines that may speak to the social cohesion agenda if their implications can be harnessed.

Building shared narratives of inclusion

Approaches from political and cognitive science aid understanding by segmenting public opinion and using this as a tool to inform and develop public policy, communications and strategies through more detailed understanding of public opinion.

Both the organisation More in Common and the International Centre for Policy Advocacy have adopted research approaches to public opinion on migration, integration and identity. These focus on shared values and opinions rather than solely divides and divisions. As is clear from the name, More in Common takes an approach founded on using ‘narratives that tell a new story of “us”, celebrating what we all have in common rather than what divides us’.

This approach is grounded in advocacy rather than pure research. Hanel, Maio and Mansted (2019) highlight two important points that can address a genuine bias within research. Firstly, they show that 90 per cent of psychological studies focus on difference. They are often seen to ‘fail’ if they don’t show statistical differences between the groups studied. They argue the case for a study of similarity, suggesting that this may provide valid take-home messages too: ‘Research in social cognition has found that focusing on similarities versus differences fundamentally affects how people interpret information about others. Further, abundant research has found that highlighting similarities between groups improves interpersonal and intergroup attitudes.’

The study presented information highlighting similarity and difference to a group of British nationals and Polish nationals. It found that: ‘Participants who were exposed to the information format emphasising similarity … subsequently exhibited more intergroup positivity on all three dependent variables than did participants exposed to the traditional format emphasising differences.’ That is, participants perceived the values of British and Polish people to be more similar than did those in the difference condition.

‘Participants in the similarity condition also thought that British and Polish people get along with each other more easily than did those in the difference condition. Finally, participants in the similarity condition thought that British and Polish people like each other more than did those in the difference condition.’

Further, they note that presentation of information can also focus unwittingly on difference rather than what is shared. Finding alternative ways of presenting data could be a means of lessening this perception of difference. Allen (2018) looks at the role of data visualisation, stating that visualisations like the presentation of all information are not neutral. People involved in their design and dissemination act as brokers. Allen observes that, ‘whether explicitly (through advocacy or persuasion) or implicitly (through organisational practices or habits), these brokers contribute to the eventual visualisation product [with] users engaging with visualisations through these brokers in two ways, first, people make sense of the data by evaluating the credibility of the brokers … second, people engage emotionally with visualisations, particularly by feeling surprised either at the content or the design features’.

By understanding the cognitive processes people use to process information, public opinion policymakers and others can start to shape their responses accordingly.

In Towards New Gravity (2017) the work of narrative for social change is identified as an inter-disciplinary field, bringing together cognitive science, strategic communications, movement building and storytelling. Lakoff (2004) describes frames as the ‘mental structures that shape the way we see the world’, in which ‘frames articulate our worldviews, which are in turn activated by language: cues in communication that generate unconscious, intuitive and emotional responses’. Lakoff cites the difference between the frame of environmental ‘regulations’ versus ‘protections’, demonstrating how small linguistic shifts can move quite radically how we feel about an issue, even where the substance has not changed. The Frameworks Institute uses this approach to develop toolkits for policymakers, setting out ways to talk about a particular issue. It argues that ‘effective communications can help activate the public’s engagement with complex social issues’. The toolkits identify microfluid analytical narratives, providing strategies to counter or develop these as necessary.

‘Focusing on similarities versus differences fundamentally affects how people interpret information about others … highlighting similarities between groups improves interpersonal and intergroup attitudes’

Hanel, Maio and Mansted 2019
The intersection between cohesion, integration, diversity and the role of migration and newcomers

Often used interchangeably and frequently overlooked (Zetter et al. 2006) by policymakers and politicians, social cohesion and integration come from quite different research traditions. Demireva (2017) identifies that ‘there is significant policy concern about the impacts of immigration on social cohesion. However, most research analyses the relationship between diversity and social cohesion, not between immigration and social cohesion’. Considering the differences and similarities of these traditions can help support an understanding of social cohesion, especially regarding the role of migration and newcomers.

In the UK policy context, Donoghue and Burke (2019) outline a back and forth in the way the terms are used, from a long-standing association of integration as a one-way process of assimilation (for example, Zetter et al.) to one of a community cohesion agenda as a response to the failed laissez-faire attitude of multiculturalism that led to communities leading ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle 2001). This is a narrative that Donoghue and Burke claim has been strongly contested in the research literature and which Schinkel (2018) characterises as a ‘rhetorical break’ rather than a substantive one. The wider-European policy context has been more favourable to integration, but has also drawn criticism.

The narrative approach fits with the well-worn Clay Shirky aphorism, ‘you can’t bring facts to a culture war’. This move away from statistics and facts as a way of persuading (with research showing that facts can support narrative arguments but do not generally change opinions) has led to some uncertainty for public bodies in how to communicate confidently, particularly on issues that can be polarising (Broadhead and Allen 2018).

In their review of the literature on polarisation, Tucker et al. (2018) cite Wojcieszak and Kim (2016) showing that ‘counter-attitudinal messages based on narratives emphasising personal stories and experiences are more likely to be accepted by subjects than messages based on numbers (both generalisable statistics and specific data points)’. Even further, ‘narrative messages are more effective when subjects are encouraged to empathise with the out-group members, whereas messages based on numbers are more likely to provoke attitude change when subjects are encouraged to evaluate the issues objectively in a detached way’.

Intriguingly, this approach can be differentiated between groups, with Tucker et al. (2018) pointing to a study on Muslim immigrants to the Netherlands, Wojcieszak et al. (2017), which finds that ‘Dutch-born, second-generation migrants are more likely to change their minds on gender equality, sexual minority rights, and secularism in public life when they are exposed to narrative messages, while first-generation migrants are more likely to respond to numbers-based messages’. The results of these differences are interpreted as the result of different cultural orientations, as ‘more Westernised second-generation immigrants are more likely to espouse individual-centered narratives, while first-generation immigrants are more comfortable adopting the kind of holistic thinking that statistical evidence encourages’.

Here, we can see again the need for differentiation of approach; there isn’t a one-size-fits-all solution to complex, multi-faceted questions of identity and belonging. It also demonstrates how, in the rush to understand and explore narrative approaches, facts and statistics shouldn’t necessarily be jettisoned. Instead, an understanding of how facts can support existing viewpoints (rather than persuade people to change their minds) can run alongside a nuanced sense of how and when they can best be used.

‘There is significant policy concern about the impacts of immigration on social cohesion’

Demireva 2017
The studies of integration offer important additional frames for the understanding of cohesion. Spencer and Charsely’s (2016) model of integration sets out a number of principles:

- Integration is a two-way process (not a one-way process of assimilation).
- Integration takes place across society (not only through public services) and so requires a range of actors in a process of mutual accommodation.
- Integration happens across a number of domains. The interplay between these is complex and the experience in one may impact upon the experience in another. For example, working anti-social hours can impact on social life and civic engagement may impact on a sense of identity and belonging.
- A wide range of external factors impact on integration across these domains. These include policy interventions, the human capital of individuals and social networks, and the opportunity structures available in society (for example, the availability of jobs and housing).
- Most integration takes place at local level (see below for the discussion of place and spatial approaches).

Some of these aspects chime with discourses on cohesion and others provide additional frames or lenses.

More broadly, integration comes from research traditions related to migration rather than the more dominant ‘equalities’ frame (focusing predominantly on ethnic difference). As a result integration discourses can use a ‘newcomer’ frame focusing more specifically on migration, churn and the pace and base of change at local level to develop new responses.

This is one approach, but it is also important to note an opposing trend to widen the scope of integration – beyond responsibilities focused on ethnicity. The London social integration strategy ‘All of Us’ (2018) broadens the definition, stating that ‘the standard approach often places too much emphasis on integration between people of different nationalities and ethnicities, and fails to examine other important aspects of social division such as age, social class, employment status, sexuality, gender and disability.

This can create the impression that social integration is merely about the actions of specific ethnic or faith communities, whereas social integration is valuable to all of us in many different ways’. In this way, we can see how integration has been influenced by the discourse related to social cohesion and therefore how there may be potential for mutual learning between the two traditions.

Social contact (and capital)

Influential social psychology research by Allport (1954) sets out the hypothesis that face-to-face contact reduces intergroup hostility, given certain preconditions. These include equal status among participants, that they are working towards shared goals and that they have institutional support. A meta-analysis (Pettsigrew and Tropp 2006) confirms this hypothesis, showing the effectiveness of this method and confirming that the preconditions identified by Allport increased the likelihood of success.

Hewstone and Swart (2011), appraising 50 years of the theory, set out how this theory of direct contact works. They maintain that direct contact reduces intergroup anxiety and encourages positive processes such as greater empathy and perspective taking. Beyond this direct contact, they also examine the role of indirect contact – extended or imagined. They find ‘extensive empirical evidence that people knowing about or observing inter-group friendships show less prejudice than those who do not’ (extended contact) and that even imagined contact ‘can reduce inter-group bias and improve both explicit and implicit out-group attitudes, enhance intentions to engage in future contact, and even generalise to other out-groups’; though there is some scepticism about this approach.

The challenge comes in translating contact theory into approaches for societal change. As Hewstone and Swart note, there are two main issues that come into play in practice. The first is the difficulty of meeting Allport’s equal status criteria – particularly when dealing with majority and minority communities. Secondly, they identify that ‘contact research, while focusing on improving majority group members’ intergroup attitudes via greater mixing, should not focus exclusively on prejudice as the main problem of intergroup relations in historically divided and unequal societies. Approaches focused more on social change emphasise structural inequalities and power differences between groups, and factors that inhibit, or encourage, mass mobilisation and collective action as legitimate forms of social protest by minority group members, which also oppose societal inequality’.

Tucker et al. (2018), in their study of the role of social media, highlight a recent study of retweet networks across multiple domains (which) found that politically salient topics often resemble “echo chambers” with high polarisation (Barberá et al. 2015). However, other topics, such as the Olympics or Super Bowl, more closely resemble “national conversations”. It is possible that the best way to achieve crosscutting exposure in political discussions is via inadvertent exposure within non-political discussion contexts. In other words, they suggest that addressing fraught subjects from slightly more oblique angles rather than tackling them head on might be a way to enhance cohesion. Approaches which use the arts, sport or other topics may provide a way to do this.

The new approach to social integration developed by the Greater London Authority (All of Us’ 2018) also sets out an important additional dimension to the role of meaningful social contact. It cites the importance of quality contact, stating that traditional approaches ‘can overlook the nature of social contact between people, emphasising the quantity rather than the quality of interactions. A truly socially integrated society is not just about interactions. It is about people building meaningful relationships, whether as friends, colleagues or fellow citizens … The level of equality and the nature of the relationships people experience make a difference to their interactions’.
This approach chimes with Allport’s original pre-conditions of participants having equal status, but also the difficulty of translating this into real-life situations where there is inequality. Mayblin et al. (2015a and b) explore this concept of ‘meaningful social contact’ noting that ‘fleeting, unintended encounters, where diverse people rub along together as a consequence of accidental proximity, do not necessarily produce “meaningful contact”. This is contact which breaks down silos of difference and translates beyond the moment to produce a more general respect for others. Rather, there is a growing interest in the nature of contact, instead of the fact of encounter’. The research identified contact through a spatial lens, exploring the role played by ‘contact zones’ (the everyday spaces and micro spaces that facilitate contact). This has most commonly been applied to classrooms, alongside other public spaces and some workplaces.

The researchers identify two notable aspects to the idea of contact zones. The first is that the zone does not have to be a specific place. They state that “it is a zone rather than a space of encounter precisely because contact must occur on multiple occasions, in multiple sites, and with a variety of intensities in order to become “meaningful”’. They also identify three different types of contact: ‘contact to bridge across difference; contact predicated on facilitating shared or common interests; and banal everyday social contact.’

The first two types of contact echo research literature on social capital focused on ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ (see, for example, Putnam 2000), Coffe and Geys (2007) set out the difference between the two: ‘the former is associated with closed networks (e.g. organisations that mainly encompass people with the same background), whereas the latter entails crosscutting or overlapping networks (e.g. associations that bring citizens into contact with people from a cross-section of society)’. Marshall and Stolle (2004) add that ‘positive experiences with dissimilar individuals will have greater effects on the development of generalised trust than will the relations with individuals who are similar to oneself in terms of their characteristics, attitudes, or behaviours’. The researchers conclude that bridging activities are seen as more favourable to developing trust than bonding ones. However, both Coffe and Geys and Mayblin et al. suggest how difficult it is to differentiate between these two types of contact. Indeed, some activities can do a bit of both at the same time. Mayblin adds that the third category, ‘banal’ social contact, may be the most important, noting that ‘it was time spent “hanging out” alongside instead of in the purposeful activities when the participants identified their own natural affinities and found particular shared identity positions which have contributed to destabilising the significance of differences …opportunities for all these three forms of contact were present in the contact zone, we found “meaningful contact” was greatly enhanced’.

Studying the post Covid response amongst local authorities in the UK, Lalot et al. (2021) found a ‘greater sense of social cohesion in…six local authorities [who had received dedicated funding and support towards social cohesion and integration] (at the micro, meso and macro levels) than in other areas. This was manifested as higher levels of reported social activism, interpersonal relationships and trust, greater political trust and more positive attitudes towards immigrants.’ Their findings were consistent with the idea that ‘investing in social cohesion underpins stronger and more connected and open communities, better able to cope with crisis situations.’ In this way proactive investment in social cohesion is seen as a precautionary protection from the pressures of potential post crisis divisions. Whilst it is noted that ‘social cohesion can rise in the aftermath of natural disasters or mass tragedies’ this ‘coming together’ is often short-lived’ and cannot mask long term underlying divisions. Using nationally representative data, Borkowska and Laurence (2020) show that overall levels of social cohesion are lower in June 2020 compared to pre-pandemic data. Notably, the decline of perceived-cohesion was particularly high in the most deprived communities, among certain ethnic minority groups and among the lower-skilled, suggesting ‘that the pandemic put higher strain on social resources among vulnerable groups and communities,’ again emphasising the role of inequality in perceptions of social cohesion.

Societal trust

Linked to conceptions of social contact is an understanding of how social contact can potentially lead to increased levels of trust. Delhey and Newton (2005) define social trust as ‘the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm. If they can avoid it, and will after our interests’ and identify that ‘generalised social trust in large-scale urban-industrial society is a puzzle. Particularised (thick, personal) trust is more easily understood because it is strongest in small, face-to-face communities where people know each other, and social controls are strong …instrumental or calculating trust is, by definition, explained in terms of rational self-interest. But the origins of generalised trust (“thin” or impersonal trust between strangers and acquaintances) are more difficult to grasp. Why should we trust people we do not know well or at all? Yet generalised trust is particularly important in large-scale society where social ties can be weak but extensive, and where society is mobile, differentiated, heterogeneous, and individualistic’. There is little understanding of how trust towards strangers develops (Ulsaner, 2000) and Delhey and Newton highlight the difficulties of proving what brings it about, even where there is strong correlation – as a result of the number of interconnected variables that could also be at play.

However, using World Values Study data, they are able to show a number of correlated points. For example, that despite what many think, it’s not true that agricultural rural communities have higher levels of trust and ‘that it is usually stronger in societies with high scores on indicators of modernisation – wealth, education, longevity, and a small agricultural sector. At the same time, generalised trust is not significantly associated with measures of urbanisation, population size, or population density.’ Secondly, levels of generalised trust are resilient. They do not tend to alter based on the underlying socio-economic factors other than the crime rate. Thirdly, ‘trust is associated with a tight syndrome of religious/cultural, social, economic, and political characteristics …and …an absence of ethnic cleavages is also important …Wealthy and economically egalitarian societies are trusting societies, although wealth seems to matter more than equality. Finally, good government is an essential structural basis of trust. Corruption free and democratic government seems to create an institutional structure in which individuals are able to act in a trustworthy manner and can reasonably expect that others will generally do the same’.

In keeping with this emphasis on good government, Brewer (2018) looks at the role of social trust in post-conflict societies. The report highlights the importance of shifting from the kind of political trust needed to generate peace through to the broader trust needed to generate long-term social trust, highlighting how ‘victims of conflict offer an example of how social trust can be slowly built’. The report underlines that levels of social trust were enhanced by participation in intergroup networks. It highlights that ‘this suggests that social trust can be facilitated by social institutions and by politicians creating conducive environments …Social networks of trust are facilitated by policies and practices in civil society …All too often, careless use of language and senseless behaviour can erode social trust and polarise rather than heal divisions’.

‘Social networks of trust are facilitated by policies and practices in civil society’

Brewer 2018
Shared values

Alongside a focus on contact and trust between groups, often implicitly if not explicitly highlighting differences, research has also examined areas of shared values. However, as outlined above (Briedahl et al. 2018), there is little agreement.

Moral Foundation Theory, as defined by Haidt and Graham (2012), uses the typology of taste (sweet, sour, salty etc.) to set out five moral foundations which drive people’s moral concerns:
- Care: cherishing and protecting others; opposite of harm
- Fairness or proportionality: rendering justice according to shared rules; opposite of cheating
- Loyalty or ingroup: standing with your group, family, nation; opposite of subversion
- Sanctity or purity: abhorrence for disgusting things, foods, actions; opposite of degradation.

In this theory, these foundations are innate. They are refined by cultural norms, with moral decisions happening intuitively and reasoning happening later. They have evolved with human society. However, even within these shared values, politicisation is present. Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) found that liberals valued care and fairness more than conservatives, whereas conservatives valued loyalty, authority and sanctity more than liberals did.

Alongside these moral foundations, Briedahl et al. (2018) identify four specific conceptions of ‘community’ values derived from political theory:
- Conservative nationalists believe ‘social cohesion is best promoted by sharing an entire, or at least large part of a national culture ...with a thick, pre-political, community, where community members identify with each other on the basis of a common history, common culture, and (more generally) common way of life, underpinning a sense of a shared fate’.
- Liberal nationalists ‘share ...commitment to a national culture ...However, liberal nationalists suggest that national identities are not static but transformed over time and need to be sufficiently open so that, for example, immigrants can realistically access them’.
- Liberal citizenship ‘has both liberal and republican elements. The republican element pertains to “active citizenship” and more specifically to democratic participation and being an active member of one’s community ...The liberal element in liberal citizenship involves a commitment to a set of basic (liberal) principles of justice. Such principles may include freedom of speech, freedom of religion, toleration, and equality of opportunity’.
- Multiculturalism, which holds that ‘social cohesion is best (or adequately) promoted by sharing a commitment to the recognition of difference’.

Identity, belonging and collective memory

Baylis et al. (2019) show that much scholarly progress has been made over the past three decades in finding ways to explore how collective memories influence and are incorporated into everyday experiences. They highlight that ‘as social beings, it seems that humans have a need to create, or connect with, the shared past of our social groups. However, the way in which this is done varies: from stories, rituals and performances, to national memorials and ceremonies. The social aspect of memory is multidimensional, depending on the level of analysis, and on whether the focus is on the social experience of memory, the social production of memory, or the way in which individual memories are mediated through social contexts’.

As explored below, arts and culture have an important role in shaping this collective memory. An example that illustrates this is British Future’s ‘The People’s Centenary’ (2019), which tracked UK public attitudes towards the First World War around the time of its centenary. This showed while there was ‘a powerful sense of the foundational importance of “the world wars” in shaping our society, our identity and our world [this] was combined for most people with a very shaky grasp of almost any information at all about the First World War and a common inability to separate the two wars’.

The tracker found that, along with raising awareness in general, the centenary significantly raised awareness of the contribution of Commonwealth soldiers in the First World War. In 2012, 44 per cent were aware of the contribution made by Indian soldiers; by 2018, this figure had gone up to 71 per cent. This was matched by an understanding of the link to contemporary society, with 72 per cent agreeing in 2018 that ‘The British war effort included Empire and Commonwealth Soldiers from countries including India and the West Indies, Australia and Canada. It is important for integration today that all of our children are taught about the shared history of a multi-ethnic Britain’.

In this way, collective memory (and specifically remembrance) becomes a way to generate a more expansive sense of ‘we’ or ‘us’. This in turn may enhance cohesion in a more deep-seated, genuine way than the perhaps more superficial level of some cohesion activities.

This widening of scope may come about through embracing intersectional, post-colonial or feminist approaches to history and storytelling. By adding more layers and stories to collective history, the sense of a collective memory can be broadened, allowing for a wider sense of inclusion and deeper cohesion through shared narratives.
Cohesion is known to take place at individual, community and structural levels

Fonseca et al. 2018

The role of place and community – spatial approaches to social cohesion

As identified by Fonseca et al. (2018), cohesion is known to take place at individual, community and structural levels. However, this plays out in complex, multi-faceted ways. It can be difficult to understand where best to locate policy responses most effectively. Similarly, research into multi-level governance can help us better understand the cohesion ecosystem, first in a vertical way (exploring competencies at local, national or transnational level) and second horizontally (the role of partners such as civil society, local civic institutions, private businesses and grass-roots communities and individuals).

Spencer and Charsley (2016) identify the importance of the local level in understanding integration. They say that the majority of the lived experience of integration (and by inference, cohesion) takes place at the local level, so this should be a focal point for interventions. Surprisingly, Eurofound (2018) states that developing a sense of community is less important. There is no positive relationship between this and subjective wellbeing. There is perhaps even a negative correlation between citizens’ attachment to their neighbourhoods and satisfaction with life. However, as explored above, this may be due to a sense of insulation and tackled through bridging approaches.

The role of community and place is not only structural; research traditions in geography, architecture, urban planning and social policy have also explored a spatial approach to social cohesion. Schreiber (2016) identifies four practical ways in which urban planners can support social cohesion:

- Land-use policies for balanced development, which embed cohesion into the sale of land
- Transit-orientated development to encourage pedestrian-friendly and cycle-friendly spaces
- Upgrading street networks to enhance connectivity and reduce residential segregation
- Designing public spaces to act as meeting points and ‘neutral’ spaces.

Cultural value and the role of the arts in social cohesion

Otte (2019) draws out the link between cultural policy and social cohesion, stating that ‘in cultural policies, art is often linked to social cohesion (but) …there is not sufficient evidence that there is a connection between cultural participation and social cohesion, or more specifically, between art participation and social cohesion …(where this is) understood as participating (both actively and passively) in activities consisting of at least one artistic “language”’. Otte uses the framework of bridging and bonding explored above to show how active arts participation (workshops etc.) often facilitates more bonding behaviour within groups. More passive appreciation (for example, improving access to pre-existing art) may be more likely to encourage bridging behaviours.

Belfiore (2002) also sees an ongoing tension between two different visions of the arts and ‘shows the need for new definitions of quality and value in arts projects, in order to solve and surpass the sterile dichotomy of these two very different notions of quality, in particular in relation to participatory arts’. That is to say, there is often a division between two seemingly opposed views, ‘a “universalistic-normative” identification of quality, with the traditional fine arts (the basis of post-war democratisation projects, a relativistic “anything goes” position in which quality is not really an issue’. Alongside this pull between quality and value, there is also the question of priorities. Are approaches artist led, placing more value on artistic endeavour, or are they more concerned with affecting social change? Or is it a bit of both?

Heritage centres and museums can also play a role, although Belfiore challenges this because of their previous role in reinforcing particular narratives. This means ‘that the political, social, economic and especially cultural dimensions of social exclusion are often reflected in museums. For instance, we might argue that the exclusion that minority groups experience in many aspects of their lives is reflected, at the cultural level, in the museum that fails to tell the stories of those groups and hence denies their validity’. This means it is hard to see, without a sustained programme of engagement, how museums can become neutral spaces for social cohesion.

An example can be seen in attempts by the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Brussels to ‘de-colonise’ its collection over a five-year period. This involved placing articles in context and handing over parts of the museum and its story to African communities. However, this move has not been without criticism, with renewed calls for the return of artefacts, including from the President of Congo and advisors in the community, who feel the changes don’t go far enough.

As discussed below, there are a wide range of policy responses for social cohesion that engage with the arts. However, there is a question mark over how well these approaches work and the rationale for them, with Belfiore remarking that ‘culture is not a means to an end. It is an end itself. Many attempts have been made to demonstrate that culture is a peculiarly successful means of promoting social cohesion, inclusion or regeneration, but they miss the point if they regard culture as one means to social regeneration among various possible others’. Cultural approaches may, however, work well as part of a suite of policies; reconciling artistic quality with social impact rather than seeing one as being disruptive to the other.

Fonseca et al. 2018

How have policymakers responded?

Donoghue and Bourke (2019) identify several common challenges for policy making in social cohesion. These include, for example, that the term is imprecise and lacks measurement strategies; the challenge of including socio-economic inequality and understanding the impact this has on cohesion; that policy often has a problematic focus on ethnic difference and security and is focused mainly in urban areas; and that it is hard to square the circle of the complex interplay between spatial, temporal and political dimensions with the need for simple, clear policy.

When placed in the context of the wider cultural relations role of the British Council, we can see the challenges in defining and measuring appropriate policy interventions. The British Council (2018) defines cultural relations as ‘interventions in foreign cultural arenas with the aim of enhancing intercultural dialogue and bringing about mutual benefits connected to security, stability and prosperity’. This complements the three aims of cultural relations as defined by the EU (2018) which can each be seen to a greater or lesser extent to be relevant to the social cohesion aims defined in this paper:

- Supporting culture as an engine for sustainable social and economic development
- Promoting culture and intercultural dialogue for peaceful intercommunity relations
- Reinforcing cooperation on cultural heritage relations.

Alongside the complexity of designing and implementing policy solutions is the need to navigate ‘very different cultural and geopolitical contexts. Good cultural relations necessarily involve flexibly adapting programmes in ways that resonate with these contexts’.

In the face of these formidable challenges, policymakers have developed approaches in thematic areas which broadly address questions of social cohesion. This section does not aim to provide a definitive taxonomy of approaches but simply to illustrate different types of intervention which policymakers have developed, sometimes drawn from findings in tandem with research or in response to on-the-ground challenges. The case studies which follow explore examples of these approaches in specific national contexts.

Thematic areas of policy response

Strategic approaches to social cohesion

One area of policy response is the development of strategies or action plans to address cohesion across different thematic areas. This is particularly prevalent at local government level, with many municipalities developing specific community cohesion or integration strategies. A number of European and other initiatives such as EUROCITIES, Intercultural Cities and Inclusive Cities set out frameworks and guidance to support cohesion policy.

As well as the thematic approaches outlined below, the strategic approach will also include:

- Developing strategic infrastructure and capacity
- Embedding social value and cohesion explicitly within commissioning and procurement of services
- Building strategic partnerships with the public sector, civil society, the private sector and others
- Developing strategic communications to tell the story of cohesion.

Community connectedness

As outlined above, the concepts of meaningful social contact and bridging activities between communities have been areas of research and policy response. Community connectedness programmes often fall into a number of categories:

- Community events and festivals to promote intercultural awareness
- Inclusive social clubs, hobbies or associations
- Proactive outreach or liaison to increase inclusion and participation
- Mentoring or buddy programmes between different groups (such as intercultural, intergenerational and interfaith)
- Leadership and empowerment activities (including youth leadership).

Each of these approaches aims to engineer contact zones for meaningful mixing, or to identify, promote and provide outreach to existing spaces that are open to all. See also below for similar approaches that use spatial, place-based approaches and the role of arts, sport and culture in these.

Civic representation, participation and inclusion

A second policy response focuses on increasing participation and inclusion in marginalised or minority groups, including approaches that also involve bridging activities, as outlined above. Interventions fall into several categories. There are those that relate to formal democratic participation and enfranchisement:

- Voter registration drives to increase participation
- Increasing the voting franchise (for example, to include migrant communities), particularly at local level
- Citizenship ceremonies to celebrate new citizens or more localised ‘celebration’ events for specific communities
- Advisory councils to increase representation of specific groups (such as migrant council in Germany or youth councils)
- Local registration, identification cards and passes².

Other approaches focus on consulting and involving residents to ensure representation through participation. Beyond traditional consultation, these responses include:

- Participatory budgeting
- Community grant making
- Co-productive design of services
- Citizens’ assemblies and other forms of deliberative democracy.

2 The IDNYC programme offers an example of how a municipal ID card open to all can forge cohesion. A 2016 evaluation of the programme showed that 77 per cent of card holders felt an increased sense of belonging to the city (https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/idnyc/downloads/pdf/idnyc_report_full.pdf).
As established above, making the link between economic drivers and social cohesion has been a continued push and pull. Some see economic development and its impacts as intrinsic to social cohesion; others see it as at odds with the solidarity-based roots of the term. Generally, cohesion policy (with the exception of promoting entrepreneurialism) has remained largely separate from economic development, especially in terms of engaging with employers as agents in facilitating and developing social cohesion. That said, the recent trend towards inclusive economic growth policies has shown the appetite to tackle the question of economic growth and inclusion, particularly when it is focused on understanding the role of inequality in community and societal cohesion. Policies related to this wide-ranging topic cut across several areas. The most prominent initiatives focus on:

- Inclusive economic growth policies, including sector-specific development and pre-distribution
- Development of skills policy, including language learning for newcomers
- Employer-led initiatives to increase representation and promote cohesion in the workplace
- Social economy initiatives, including time banks, volunteering schemes, cooperatives and mutuals
- Initiatives to promote social entrepreneurship, including micro-financing, entrepreneurial ‘hubs’ and affordable workspaces.

Spatial approaches to cohesion have tended to focus on urban environments. With the notable exception of digital inclusion, spatial approaches to rural communities seem less well developed. Approaches include:

- Using planning frameworks to tackle residential and other kinds of segregation
- Developing community spaces (including gardens), community centres (for specific groups and shared spaces to promote contact) and community houses
- Co-housing projects that encourage social mixing between different groups
- Policies to promote access to space, including via public transport.

Health and wellbeing

Health and wellbeing are covered in many other policy areas. Work has been done on the social dynamics of health, recognising the range of factors that impact on health and the need to develop a whole-of-society approach. This incorporates (as identified by WHO Europe) a wide range of initiatives, including community empowerment and participation. Many of these are addressed in the community connectedness theme. That said, there are specific health-based approaches to cohesion that have already been trialled:

- Social prescribing (or community referrals)
- Community connector programmes, which train volunteers to link others in their local community with activities and organisations that can help improve their quality of life. These aim to create connections that can provide a safety net of social support.

Arts, culture, heritage and sport

As discussed above, there is some strong pushback from research on the idea of the arts as an instrumental tool. However, policymakers have adopted a wide range of approaches to promoting cohesion including:

- Participatory arts (co-produced workshops with artists to create community art)
- Improving access to cultural institutions
- Programmes to involve communities in the development of collections and make them more representative (see theme above on participation)
- Arts as a methodology (life story, narrative and storytelling workshops)
- Accessible sports initiatives (see also connected community activities)
- Spatial approaches (developing arts and culture resources and institutions in communities, including ‘culture walks’ in local areas).

Measurement and evaluation

The difficulty in defining and conceptualising social cohesion is mirrored in the difficulty in measuring levels of cohesion and evaluating initiatives. Jenson, whose influential definition of cohesion has informed much research on the subject, suggests a series of indicators to help measurement:

- Cohesion as social inclusion – inequality measures, access to economic activity, access to education and human capital, access to health, access to technology
- Cohesion as cultural and ethnic homogeneity
- Cohesion as trust
- Cohesion as participation.

These reflect the academic research categories outlined above. Peace et al. (2005) use policy literature to identify similar indicators (more in line with the thematic policy indicators outlined above):

In most projects of the Council for Europe and the EU, the key indicators are:

- demography
- inclusion in the labour market
- employment/training
- social benefits
- housing
- education
- participation in social, cultural and political life.

These are often accompanied by indicators of racism and discrimination, reflecting the European concern with extreme and institutionalised forms of racism and discrimination. These indicators typically include the following:

- data on racism and discriminatory acts
- data on racially violent crimes and harassment
- number of complaints of discrimination and convictions
- data on patterns of discrimination in government
- data on direct and indirect discrimination.

Sullivan (2011) identifies the theory of change (ToC) method as one way of evaluating social cohesion. This has the advantage of matching the multi-dimensional nature of social cohesion as a ‘systematic and cumulative study of the links between activities, outcomes and contexts of the initiative’ (Connell and Kubisch 1998), that is, the ability to link the macro measures identified by Jenson to the more initiative-specific indicators identified by Peace. The ToC approach, as defined by Sullivan, helps with measurement and data collection because it clearly indicates what is important for evaluation.

However, Sullivan notes how hard it can be to define the so-called ‘golden thread’ of causality from desired outcome to observed change, particularly when you consider the multi-scalar nature of social cohesion. Are the interventions (and therefore their measurement) happening at the individual, community or structural level – or indeed across all three? Finally, Sullivan stresses the need to ensure this methodology is co-produced so that it acknowledges diversity and difference. This is critical when looking at an issue like social cohesion.
This points to two approaches to dealing with the complexity of measuring social cohesion. The first is to look at examples from other sectors (in this case mainly migration and integration). The second is to consider other emerging forms of evaluation that take a different tack. In the first category, there are several approaches:

- Using national level existing data sets such as the European Values Survey, European Social Survey and Eurofound to compare levels of cohesion against variables outlined above (both macro indicators defined by J enson and the more applied areas of Peace et al.)
- Indices which combine output and outcome data at national level to look at trends related to a particular area (such as the Global Peace Index)
- Evaluating policy responses at national or local level that look at policies already in place (that is, mainly outputs rather than outcomes) as in the Migrant Policy Integration Index (MPIEX)
- Diagnostic tools that allow public authorities (often, but not exclusively, at local level) to self-assess progress (such as the Cities of Migration Inclusive Cities tool) that match self-assessment with external validation from experts (such as the Council of Europe’s Intercultural Cities programme)
- ToC models that allow for evaluation of specific interventions and link to wider outcomes-based programmes (such as the Home Office’s Indicators of Integration).

There is an important difference between diagnostic tools that are mainly for helping set policy priorities and drive change, and others seeking to measure existing programmes and their impact. Models such as ToC attempt to link these.

Finally, there has been a move to explore new models away from the dominant paradigm of outcome measurement, as defined under New Public Management. Lowe and Plimmer (2019) set out a new way of responding to ‘complex social challenges’ based on working in a way that is human, prioritises learning and takes a systems approach. The rationale behind this is that ‘our lives are complex. We are complex individuals, living in assorted communities, dealing with varied challenges – which are particular to us and yet may also be universal’ – and yet may also be universal’

- Starting with purpose
- Understanding the system
- Making the system visible
- Building relationships and trust
- Establishing shared purpose
- Developing principles, values and behaviours
- Co-designing
- Experimentation, reflection and redesign
- Putting learning at the heart of governance
- Embedding and influencing.

Similarly, approaches that focus on social return on investment (SROI) and social value try to understand ‘the value that people place on the changes they experience in their lives’. In order to do this, Social Value UK has identified seven core principles that can shape a social value approach:

- Involve stakeholders – Inform what gets measured and how this is measured and valued in an account of social value by involving stakeholders.
- Understand what changes – Articulate how change is created and evaluate this through evidence gathered, recognising positive and negative changes as well as those that are intended and unintended.
- Value the things that matter – Make decisions about allocating resources between different options needs to recognise the values of stakeholders. Value refers to the relative importance of different outcomes. It is informed by stakeholders’ preferences.
- Only include what is material – Determine what information and evidence must be included in the accounts to give a true and fair picture, such that stakeholders can draw reasonable conclusions about impact.
- Do not overclaim – Only claim the value that activities are responsible for creating.
- Be transparent – Demonstrate the basis on which the analysis may be considered accurate and honest, and show that it will be reported to and discussed with stakeholders.
- Verify the result – Ensure appropriate independent assurance.

Alongside more traditional attempts to define and measure social cohesion, these more iterative approaches may help find a way through the complexity and interconnectedness of initiatives. In particular, they could support policymakers and practitioners in avoiding being led by measurable factors in their definitions of cohesion and practice development, and by embedding co-production within the process.

‘We are complex individuals, living in assorted communities, dealing with varied challenges – which are particular to us and yet may also be universal’

Lowe and Plimmer 2019
The aim of this section is to place the approaches outlined above in a nationally and sometimes locally specific context by providing exemplar projects and approaches aimed at building social cohesion through policy intervention. Projects have not been evaluated and inclusion here is not a comment on their success. It is simply an attempt to illuminate the theory outlined above through practical examples that demonstrate the breadth of approaches available and focus on the conditions needed for change.

The six countries were chosen in consultation with the British Council to provide a breadth of different European contexts and match areas in which the British Council works.

Case study one
Promoting social cohesion and life-skills development in Latvia

Case study two
e-Estonia and ensuring intergenerational cohesion

Case study three
The arrival city and how housing and community spaces may promote cohesion in Germany

Case study four
Solidarity and grassroots initiatives in building cohesion in Greece

Case study five
Using the ‘City of Culture’ programme to build identity, wellbeing and cohesion in Hull, UK

Case study six
Social investment, tackling poverty and social cohesion in Romania
Case study one
Promoting social cohesion and life-skills development in Latvia

Promoting cohesion in and between communities involves addressing particular societal fault lines in a sensitive, long-term and informed way. The British Council developed the People to People project which focuses on action that addresses the root causes of these fault lines by using a positive, cultural relations approach. The project uses bridging theory to bring together people from different backgrounds and communities in order to build trust, increase understanding and co-operate to deliver positive community level change.

The project works with a variety of sectors and institutions such as schools, universities, colleges, civil society organisations, arts institutions, festivals, theatre and music events, community sports teams, youth clubs and the social economy sector. It aims to reach diverse audiences and demographics, including those seen as the hardest to reach and engage. The project delivers interventions related to skills such as debating, critical thinking and media skills as a means to learn together across community or other social divides. It also works to develop people’s agency and ability to make changes collaboratively with peers. It gets to the heart of issues that matter to different communities, supporting cross-community social actions and using arts and sports for social inclusion.

The theory behind the project highlights various important considerations. The first is that projects like these must take a long-term view on building trust, particularly in isolated, harder-to-reach communities that may be sceptical of such initiatives. Crucially, the project sets out to answer the question of who the cohesion is relevant to. It was vital that the project did more than focus on one or two communities on the basis of economic, social, ethnic or cultural divides, and instead highlighted common values and shared beliefs between diverse social, economic and cultural communities across the country. This mirrors the research base for both integration and social cohesion outlined above, from which it is clear that for success, these approaches depend on a shared two-way or multi-way endeavour. Focusing on one particular group or a one-way process of assimilation achieves little. It also highlighted a significant risk for the project that if one group feels singled out, this can jeopardise the entire programme and reinforce the very narratives the project set out to counter.

An independent evaluation of the programme found that initiatives like this remained relatively rare in Latvia. Eurofound data (2018) shows Latvia has one of the lowest levels of civic engagement in Europe. The project therefore worked to build engagement and informal networks through a flexible programme that allowed new approaches to be trialled. This flexibility was integral to the project, which aimed to set out clear objectives while taking advantage of opportunities as they arose. This demonstrates several important considerations; the need for an approach to cohesion which focuses on the individual, the community and the societal level; the need for long-term processes in building connections (particularly where civic engagement and infrastructure are less well developed); and the need for a culturally contextualised approach to social cohesion, rooted in an understanding of the communities involved.

‘If one group feels singled out, this can jeopardise the entire programme and reinforce the very narratives the project set out to counter’
Case study two
e-Estonia and ensuring intergenerational cohesion

Integrating Estonia 2020 sets out the Ministry of Culture’s plan for integration and social cohesion in Estonia. Its aims are that ‘Estonian society is integrated and socially cohesive; people with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds actively participate in society and share democratic values.’ The programme also sets out policy initiatives aimed at developing a sense of national identity, promoting contact, increasing tolerance and encouraging ‘adaptation training’ for new arrivals.

The ministry notes that progress has been made in certain areas, stating that ‘Estonian language proficiency has increased among people with other ethnic backgrounds ... [and] ... the sense of identification with the Estonian state by people of other ethnic backgrounds has strengthened.’ Many of the initiatives covered in the strategy focus on integration between Estonian- and Russian-speaking communities, for example the Youth Meeting Programme, launched in 2015, which aimed to encourage ‘communication, understanding, and personal development among 11- to 19-year-olds with different native languages living in Estonia.’

‘The broader objective of the programme is to increase cultural awareness, openness, and tolerance among participants and in society. Integration policies and research have shown that in order to participate in social life in Estonia, Russian-speaking young people need to practise speaking Estonian. However, opportunities for practising vary greatly depending on the region and are especially limited in north-eastern Estonia.’

The programme gave grants to 50 community groups to facilitate cooperation among young groups in Estonia from different cultural backgrounds. Each project is set up and run by the young people themselves and mainly consists of a three- to six-day get-together that follows a thematic timetable. An evaluation of the programme in 2017 found that it had fostered contacts between young people of two communities, encouraged cooperation and courage in communicating with young people from other nationalities and increased openness and tolerance.

A plan that is being developed to run up to 2030 aims to increase the scope of the strategy beyond this division, including activities designed for native Estonians as well as the long-term non-Estonian residents of Estonia. Also, more attention will be paid to new immigrants and refugees, as well as compatriots living outside Estonia. The plan identifies a number of new priorities including education; bringing communities together; language learning; and, in particular, an increased focus on technology and digital and a push for ‘advancements in technology and innovation to play a more prominent role in integration’.

This focus on technology, innovation and education comes through in several initiatives in Estonia to promote cohesion. Estonia has become known for its innovation in digital technology, dating back to the ‘Tiger Leap’ initiative in the 1990s. As part of this ongoing development, Estonia has developed the Estonian People’s Assembly and Rahvaalaline, the latter exists to promote digital democracy, allowing citizens’ proposals to be put to parliament to encourage participation.

A more radical initiative has emerged through the e-residency programme, which provides e-citizenship (citizenship without the need for residency) alongside i-voting, e-cabinet and e-health systems. Though lauded, these initiatives can present challenges for social cohesion, in particular from an intergenerational standpoint. A report of the Commissioner for Human Rights for the Council of Europe (2018) focusing on the rights of older people showed that, despite an institutional focus on young people, Estonia is a rapidly ageing society and that the adoption of these e-initiatives ‘can help older and isolated persons with restricted mobility to obtain administrative services, as well as to participate in political elections from their homes (provided they have an internet connection)...[It]... requires a specific effort on the part of the authorities to ensure that older persons are literate in the use of internet, so that they are not left behind in a rapidly evolving society’.

The report further notes: ‘getting acquainted with the internet may represent a challenge. The Estonian authorities organise free ICT training courses targeted at older persons, notably to teach them the e-government services. These courses are held in Estonian and in Russian in the areas inhabited by Russian-speaking minorities. Yet, according to Eurostat, the proportion of persons between 65 and 74 using the internet in Estonia is still much lower than the general population (47 per cent of 65-75 use internet once a week against 85 per cent of the general population in 2016) ...[and]... that there is no available data regarding the use of internet by persons above 74.’

Given Estonia’s commitment to digital technology and the trend towards automation, as outlined above, it seems, as identified in the report, that ‘the use of robots and artificial intelligence in caring services for older persons is likely to increase rapidly ... On the positive side, robots could enable older persons to live longer in autonomy and independently, they could also help provide control and privacy (in hygiene procedures for example), and fight social exclusion ... such technology should also be accessible to all without discrimination and without deepening social inequalities.’ As the report further identifies, ‘older persons had a range of attitudes vis-à-vis the deployment of new technologies for their care, but some underscored that what they missed most were the informal chats with the carer or nurse who would have otherwise provided health and care services. It is critical that the use of robots in long-term care be considered from the perspective of the benefits for older persons and not solely for the purpose of reducing the cost and burden of care for the society.’

While Estonia is formulating its policy on integration and social cohesion for young people and newcomers, it needs to be aware of intergenerational cohesion too, and the ways that its policies can help with this.
Case study three
The arrival city and how housing and community spaces may promote cohesion in Germany

The arrival of over a million refugees into Germany in 2015 provided a significant challenge for planning, as well as for citizens, government and civil society, and a concern regarding social cohesion. A wide variety of initiatives were launched to bridge the gaps between the newly-arrived and longer-standing communities.

The 2016 German Venice Biennale entry ‘Making Heimat: Arrival City’ looked at approaches to inclusion in this context. By asking what conditions need to be met for immigrants to integrate successfully, it introduced co-production, involving Syrians in the design of the programme to flatten the power dynamics and inequality that can stymie Allport’s conditions for contact.

Beyond this however, the project was also involved in redefining shared stories and collective identities. Weber, in his concept guide to the project, describes how ‘the guides select their own museum, their objects and brought in their own biography and life experiences. The museum deliberately highlighted objects and narratives that may be relevant to the refugees. The refugees were invited to make sense of, and reflect on, the collections in the context of their own history. For example some topics from German history that proved to be very interesting for the Arab visitors:

- The story of war and destruction in Germany: 1945 was not the end of history, it was a beginning
- German emigration to the US in the 19th century, or from the east after the Second World War: we all have in our history people who fled from war or poverty
- The wars of Protestants and Catholics and especially the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48): was it only about religion?

Similarly, the Multa project, or ‘museum as meeting point’, trained Syrian refugees as tour guides in Berlin museums, both for visitors and for other refugees. On one level, this was acting as the ‘contact zone’ or intercultural meeting point. The project also co-produced, involving Syrians in the design of the programme to flatten the power dynamics and inequality that can stymie Allport’s conditions for contact.

These topics led to four themes: migration, shared heritage, common threads of history and identity.

‘We want to show the way toward a modern urban society in which extremely diverse groups can live together peacefully in a relatively densely populated space’

Finally, this spatial approach also extends to a wide range of housing innovations, from short-term accommodation on first arrival, through to longer-term solutions. In particular, there have been several initiatives to develop co-housing models. Grandhotel Cosmopolis in Augsburg, though launched in 2013, provides accommodation for asylum seekers, living space for artists and hotel rooms for tourists. The concept identifies that while there was a pressing need for accommodation for asylum seekers, ‘at the same time, we want to show the way toward a modern urban society in which extremely diverse groups can live together peacefully in a relatively densely populated space’. The initiative is a demonstration of social cohesion as well as an attempt to foster it, with projects such as Multaka and Grandhotel Cosmopolis aiming to create narratives of social cohesion and embed them within spaces as much as responding to existing challenges.

Grandhotel Cosmopolis 2013
Case study four
Solidarity and grassroots initiatives in building cohesion in Greece

Research by More in Common (2019) on attitudes towards national identity through the prism of migration in Greece showed that the country ‘has been profoundly affected by the economic fallout from the financial crisis that began in 2008, the subsequent sovereign debt crisis and then by the large-scale arrival of refugees in the mid-2010s, in which Greece operated initially as a transitory country and then as a host country. Few Greeks have been left unaffected and after a decade of crisis and austerity, progress still feels painfully slow. This contributes to a deep sense of disaffection among Greeks, but a key finding of this study is that for most Greeks, this disaffection has not been turned against those who have come to Greece seeking refuge’.

The study found that:

• Greeks are deeply dissatisfied, overwhelmingly feel that their country has lost out from globalisation and have little confidence in their government or institutions.

This distinctive tradition of solidarity and compassion is contrasted with the wide distrust of civil society groups and the media, with the report stating that 62 per cent of Greeks believe that some NGOs are benefitting from the refugee and migration crisis by taking money, and are not in reality helping refugees’.

The report identifies ways in which this picture might be developed, advocating the need to positively address financial hardship and rebuild trust in NGOs and civil society. In particular, more transparency in the use of funds and better-structured programmes that ‘benefit the host community as well as migrants in order to avoid one group being played off against the other and counter perceptions that refugees receive better care or more assistance than Greeks themselves’.

Low levels of trust in larger NGOs contrast with the emergence of grassroots and more informal initiatives, embodying this sense of solidarity. Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2014) state that ‘in Athens … social solidarity has expanded, organisations have developed and have adapted to the new social needs of the population … the crisis may have become a catalyst for the empowerment of the erstwhile weak Greek civil society’. This previously weak civil society meant that the country had little culture of voluntarism and little infrastructure to support it.

This is mirrored by British Council (2018c) research into the social and solidarity sector – that is, initiatives outside the voluntary sector, but cited within the social economy. This is both an old and new phenomenon in Greece, deeply linked to long-standing roots in the cooperative movement, but also very recent, with 68 per cent of organisations covered in the research set up within the past five years. In keeping with the grassroots and informal model preferred for NGOs, the research shows that most of these endeavours have small turnovers, work at neighbourhood level, and are people focused, with an emphasis on tackling unemployment.

These organisations tend to be more inclusive and are optimistic for the future, but lack funding and infrastructure coordination and support.

Greece’s resilience in responding to its challenges can be seen through this increase in grassroots organisations and the nascent social economy and civil society.

The British Council’s social economy project provided technical expertise to support the development of this ecosystem. The project established a network of more than 500 social entrepreneurs, stakeholders and policymakers, with the aim of establishing a culture of trust and cooperation across Greece’s emerging sector. The project also helped the Greek government with policy creation, developing supporting structures and tools in finance, education and training, social impact measurement methodologies and aligning legal frameworks in the social economy sector.

An external evaluation of the project found that Greek policymakers became better equipped to implement the national strategy on social economy efficiently. The project also made important recommendations to the Greek government in the harmonisation of social economy legislation. Beyond its specific scope, the project encouraged social economy education and developed a wider culture of understanding, 88 per cent of participants in education workshops supported by the project stated they were likely to apply the learnings in their everyday work within the next year.
Case study five
Using the City of Culture programme to build identity, wellbeing and cohesion in Hull, UK

The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Community Life Survey (2018) identifies that ‘the percentage of people agreeing that their area is a place where people from different backgrounds get along well together has remained fairly consistent over the past six years, with 81 per cent agreeing in 2018-19 and 82 per cent agreeing in both 2017-18 and 2013-14. In 2018-19, 58 per cent agreed that people in their neighbourhood pull together to improve the neighbourhood. This is similar to 2017-18 and 2013-14.’ However, ‘people living in the least deprived areas were more likely to agree than those living in the most deprived areas (86 per cent compared with 72 per cent)’. Levels of trust have declined (from 48 per cent to 40 per cent) as has neighbourhood satisfaction overall (from 80 per cent to 76 per cent).

This overall picture contrasts with strong regional and local identities identified by Jennings and Stoker (2018), who underline that the Brexit vote revealed a country divided by place, reflecting the diverging trajectories of economic development and politics taken by locations that have prospered in a globalised knowledge economy predominantly cities contrasted with places on the periphery, in towns and rural areas.

In describing the decision to award the UK City of Culture title to Hull, the British Council noted that ‘Hull is a city that has often been overlooked. Following decades of economic hardship and industrial decline, many Brits were surprised when the city won the bid for the much-coveted City of Culture accolade back in 2013. However, new visitors to the city have discovered that there’s a lot more to Hull than meets the eye’. In this description,

we can see a number of interconnected aspects related to social cohesion: the importance of cultural identity and belonging; the central role of place to cohesion; and the sense of this divide, the idea of places being left behind or overlooked.

These are not straightforward phenomena and can be based on both perception and reality. Hull is the third most deprived local authority in the country, but the perception of the city as a ‘left behind’ place undoubtedly also fed into a narrative around the City of Culture.

The evaluation of Hull City of Culture (2018) highlighted some significant results around social cohesion, sense of place and relationship to place, brought about by the year of activities. The evaluation also looked at the role of arts in social cohesion in both intrinsic and instrumental terms. As regards social cohesion, the report highlights:

- Nearly all Hull residents (over 95 per cent) attended at least one cultural activity during the year. The evaluation revealed a new confidence in local people, with significant increases (+9 per cent) in residents’ willingness to take part in a range of cultural and non-cultural activities, including volunteering and sport.
- 75 per cent of residents are proud to live in Hull (up from 70 per cent at the start of the project).
- 71 per cent of residents would speak proudly of the city (up from 64 per cent before the project).
- The project increased confidence to take part in activities for local people (rising from 38-55 per cent depending on activity to 47-68 per cent).

The report also sets out the narratives and themes of the programme that aimed not only to emphasise existing values and stories but develop new ones. The ‘four seasons’ of the programme looked at items ‘Made in Hull’ and the ‘concepts of freedom in the birthplace of slave trade abolitionist William Wilberforce’. It also had a ‘Roots and Routes’ theme that focused on Hull as a gateway to Europe, a place of movement in and through, and a celebration of migration, flux and internationalism.

‘We can see a number of interconnected aspects related to social cohesion: the importance of cultural identity and belonging; the central role of place to cohesion; and the sense of this divide, the idea of places being left behind or overlooked’
Case study six
Social investment, tackling poverty and social cohesion in Romania

The World Bank identifies Romania’s transformation as “a tale of two Romanias” – one urban, dynamic, and integrated with the EU; the other rural, poor, and isolated. Romania remains the country in the EU with by far the largest share of poor people ... and ... there are widening disparities in economic opportunity and poverty, across regions and between urban and rural areas.

Romania has significant levels of emigration, ‘with an estimated 3 to 5 million Romanians living and working abroad, in 2010 Romania ranked as the tenth main country of origin of migration flows in the G20, with highly educated emigrants accounting for 26.6 per cent of the total. The shrinking quantity of labour is not compensated for by greater labour force participation, which – with an overall rate of 68.8 per cent and 60.2 per cent for women in 2017 - is one of the lowest in the EU. In keeping with this, Eurofound (2018) identifies significant perceived tension between rich and poor in Romania and a big decrease in interpersonal levels of trust (in line with other central and eastern European states). Levels of civic engagement strongly correlate with GDP: Romania has one of the lowest civic participation rates in the EU (seven per cent).

Questions of social cohesion must also grapple with these wider issues. The National Strategy on Social Inclusion (2015–2020) identifies a number of priority groups for the strategy, namely poor people, children and youth deprived of parental care and support, lone or dependent elderly, Roma, persons with disabilities and people living in marginalised communities.

This focus is linked with broader social cohesion goals, such as improving social participation. The strategy states: ‘participation in voluntary activities for vulnerable groups is almost non-existent and is not encouraged by the current legislative framework. Trust is low and it has been in a declining trend since 2009. Tolerance towards vulnerable groups has grown significantly in Romania in recent years, but discrimination continues to put these groups at risk of social exclusion. The use of new technologies, ICT, or innovative services are scarce in the social sector.’

The strategy also focuses on tackling regional inequalities with a particular emphasis on improving the quality of life in rural communities. As can be seen above, policy at present is largely about poverty reduction and access to services. However, there are also initiatives to encourage cohesion more broadly.

One creative example is Alba Iulia’s participation in the URBACT city branding programme. Alba Iulia is a medium-sized Romanian city of 61,000 people in the heart of the historical region of Transylvania. Alba Iulia became the first Romanian city to develop a professional city brand with the aim of driving tourism and promoting wider social cohesion. The brand positions the city ‘as a place for investors, tourists and citizens [that] reflects an integrated approach between these target groups. A place for investments is attractive for investors, creating jobs and reducing poverty; a place for tourists and citizens includes green spaces, the protection of environment, an attractive place to visit and to live in, efficient public services’.

Central to this approach and vital from a cohesion perspective was that the branding programme was built on participation by locals. ‘In 2009, The Big Hug from Alba Iulia gathered 100,000 people to set the world record for the biggest human hug around the citadel: “The Great Appearance” is an innovative type of marketing event, which was planned by a local photographer and Alba Iulia Municipality. It consisted of the largest photo-image ever realised for the promotion of a city in Romania formed by 1,000 photo-portraits of the inhabitants of Alba Iulia. The giant poster was and is still used in the campaigns organised by the local administration.’

Locals were also involved in creating the city logo, showing that external city branding exercises do not have to be divorced from cohesion activities for residents. The approach demonstrates how poverty reduction and economic growth (including through tourism) do not have to sit in opposition to approaches to support social cohesion.

‘Alba Iulia became the first Romanian city to develop a professional city brand with the aim of driving tourism and promoting wider social cohesion’
Conclusion and next steps

Social cohesion is a wide-ranging and often amorphous area, which encapsulates many of the large-scale ‘wicked’ societal issues which large organisations, governments, NGOs and others are grappling with. This review has aimed to provide an overview of current academic research findings and policy interventions to inform strategic planning – for the British Council, but also more widely.

1. Defining social cohesion
   As established in this paper, it is difficult to define social cohesion and some flexibility can be useful. Rather than setting out a definition, there are a number of key principles which should inform any future development:
   a. Social cohesion covers the development of ‘ties that bind’ between and within communities, the development of wellbeing and satisfaction and the development of equality (including economic considerations, but not exclusively).
   b. Social cohesion operates at three distinct levels – individual to individual, in places and communities and through institutions.
   c. Social cohesion cannot be divorced from broader economic, political and social trends; these must be factored into policy and practice responses and initiatives.
   d. Social cohesion is both an ongoing process and a policy goal, which can be a good in and of itself as well as a means of reaching other goals.

2. Learning from the evidence:
   a. Perception matters – conventional wisdom says that we are more divided and polarised than ever. But the research on a number of topics, from public opinion to understanding online communities, shows this is not the whole picture. While recognising areas for development, organisations should be careful not to overstate the fracture lines. They should recognise their role in defining narratives which encourage cohesion – promoting areas of shared ground as well as areas of difference.
   b. Human connection matters – the strong evidence base on contact theory and examples from policy show how, even in a landscape of increasing digital interaction and AI, human contact is central to ideas of cohesion. Thinking about how this can be promoted and sustained is central to fostering cohesion. This can be online or also face to face.
   c. Place matters – the spatial element of cohesion is often lost in approaches which focus on either one-to-one connection or institutional-level approaches. However, the evidence shows that much of cohesion and integration happen at the local level. The role of cohesion from one town to the next or from a larger city to a nearby smaller town is also underexplored.
   d. Economic conditions cannot be separated from social cohesion – in particular, the role of poverty in inhibiting cohesion. However, cohesion is much broader than economic conditions and cannot solely be reduced to these factors, it must be considered in its social and political context.
   e. Representation matters – institutional capacity to promote cohesion is strengthened when organisations are representative and take collaborative and co-productive approaches to developing whole community responses.

3. Measurement and evaluation
   Measuring and evaluating social cohesion remains challenging, but defining the indicators of social cohesion will help to develop new approaches and understand how they work. Theory of change and more traditional quantitative output-based approaches may be helpful for individual interventions. However, it is often impossible to infer causality, in particular at the population level. In these cases, new approaches which look to clarify the conditions that promote change may provide a more successful way of understanding how social cohesion is functioning, particularly at the local level.
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Images in this report
The pictures in this report come from a series of British Council Active Citizens workshops held in London and Cardiff in 2009. Active Citizens is an approach, developed by the British Council, which enables people to develop and practice skills for intercultural dialogue and take action in their communities to address issues they care about. Picture copyright: British Council / Mat Wright.


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