Soft Power Today
Measuring the Influences and Effects

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Conceptualizing Soft Power Outcomes in International Cultural Relations
Executive summary

1. Soft power, a country’s ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce others, is hard to define conceptually and validate empirically. This report addresses these shortcomings.

2. Soft power matters. It is an important influence in international relations, global cultures and political economy.

3. Soft power encompasses the work of governments and non-governmental actors and citizens and includes economic, political, and cultural institutions and values.

4. Soft power overlaps but is not coterminous with, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and cultural relations.

5. Calculations of soft power assets (or influences) can help to determine outcomes (or attractions) in another set of economic, political and cultural domains.

6. The conceptualisation of influences and attractions moves beyond the weaknesses of past approaches that focused on fuzzy, hard to measure outcomes such as perceptions and understandings, or measurable impacts such as positive media coverage that could not be translated into tangible benefits for the country.

7. This report proposes a framework that measures the conditions under which a broad set of soft power influences translates into economic, political, and cultural benefits.

8. Soft power takes place in a fast-changing global context. We need a sharper analytical capability and methodological rigour to inform and underpin soft power strategy development. For example, digital communication media play a role in citizen-to-citizen diplomacy and the changing cultural meanings of diplomacy.

9. This is the first statistical study of soft power across political, cultural and economic dimensions. It finds that many soft power assets or resources are statistically significant in explaining outcomes. These results are borne out through several statistical model specifications, figures, and tables presented in the report.

10. Political pluralism is a strong value and exercises institutional pull. High levels of democracy and low levels of political rights restrictions attract international students and tourists, foreign direct investment, and they moderate voting patterns at the United Nations. The latter aspect speaks to the use of soft power in public diplomacy.

11. Provision of foreign aid also has a positive influence on the influx of students, tourist, and FDI, and increases a country’s political influence.

12. Citizen prosperity is attractive. Every 1% increase in per capita incomes acts as a soft power pull factor for anywhere from 0.35% to 0.98% increase in international students.
13. This study measures the strong influence of three cultural factors: cultural institutions, global cultural rankings, and people’s Internet connectivity. The following outcomes for cultural variable are important:

- Cultural institutions – such as the British Council or the Goethe Institute – are influential for attracting international students, international tourists, and foreign direct investment. For example, a 1% increase in the number of countries a cultural institution from country X covers results in 0.73% increase in international students for that country on average.

- A country’s cultural ranking in the world also matters for attracting foreign direct investment and for political influence in the world. The overall impact of being in the top 15 culturally ranked countries is important: it translates into moving the ideal point of a country by 0.52 points. The impact of a high culture rank is higher than any of the factors in the models presented for UN voting.

- Lastly, higher percentages of populations connected on the Internet lead to higher numbers of international students and tourists, foreign direct investment, and global political influence. Every 1% increase in Internet users from country X also results in almost one-half percent increase in the number of international students for that country.

14. Pluralist democracies follow a diffused soft power strategy that works its way through various levels and channels, including the activities of national cultural institutions, citizen diplomacy, educational and cultural institutions, and is related to the health of their economies. The literature review shows that top-down soft power strategies of countries like China seem quite attractive. However, our study’s quantitative results indicate that China may be an outlier. On average, the causal factors outlined above make a difference in soft power attractions.
Part 1 – Conceptualising Soft Power Outcomes in International Cultural Relations
Introduction

What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.


Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power has become essential to the theory and practice of international relations and is at the forefront of media, political and practice discussions of how the UK and other countries engage on the world stage. We live in a world of what Keohane and Nye (1988: 81–94) called “‘complex interdependence,’ – a world in which security and force matter less and countries are connected by multiple social and political relationships.” The key insight of soft power is that through attraction, a country can gain influence. There is a causal relationship between influences and attractions. This report illuminates this under-explored relationship, which is often assumed and asserted, rather than empirically demonstrated in most analyses.

The report clarifies our thinking about soft power, distinguishing it from related terms such as public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and cultural relations. Part I of the report puts forward a conceptual logic for distinguishing between soft power, influence, and attraction. We note that soft power influences are a country’s assets and include a gamut of economic indicators, political institutions, cultural processes, and organisations. These soft power influences attract international visitors and students, increase commerce and a country’s political clout globally. The empirical analysis in Part II of the report underscores the conditions under which these influences translate into measurable outcomes or attractions in economic, political and cultural realms. The report analyses key quantitative indicators with a uniquely assembled dataset in making its claims. Appendix A reviews soft power factors in key countries.

**Importance of Soft Power**

Soft power matters for pragmatic and strategic reasons. The Conservative Party Conference on 2 October 2016 provided a platform from which the leading Ministers in the UK Government stressed that the UK’s soft power was central to the UK’s role in the world.

The Prime Minister, Theresa May, stated that:

“A truly Global Britain is possible, and it is in sight... We have the greatest soft power in the world, we sit in exactly the right time zone for global trade, and our language is the language of the world” (CCHQ Press October 2016).

Her remarks on soft power were in the context of her vision of the UK’s global post-Brexit role as a major economy, which both attracts investment from overseas, but also invests overseas. She also stressed the UK’s hard power and the UK’s “friendships, partnerships and alliances in every continent”. Her vision therefore was of “smart power”, another concept developed by Joseph Nye to “counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy” (Nye 2009, 160–163).

Other Ministers went on to make similar
points, and in doing so they listed what they saw as the UK’s soft power assets: its values, democracy, economic and political freedom, freedom of speech, education, innovation, the English language, culture (particularly the BBC), the arts (particularly literature, no doubt reflecting the then focus on the 400th anniversary of Shakespeare’s death), heritage, and sport.

The role of culture was seen as bringing people together and opening doors. It was the main way in which the values of the UK could be promoted and shared. These values were tolerance, freedom of speech, gender equality, diversity, prosperity, and opportunity for everyone.

Finally, the UK’s aid programme was crucial to the UK’s soft power – the Union Jack, it was claimed, being a symbol that people could trust.

These comments are worth highlighting, not only because they summarise the current UK Government’s views of soft power, but also because they restate the theory popularised by Joseph Nye that a country’s soft power consists in the effective deployment of a range of domestic assets (cultures, ideals, values), rather than international policies (except for international aid), and which contribute to the attractiveness of a country.

There are other, more pragmatic reasons why soft power matters. Recent research indicates that soft power increases exports. A country’s exports are higher if it is perceived by the importer to be exerting a more positive global influence. This effect is statistically and economically significant; a 1% net increase in perceived positive influence raises exports by around 0.8%. Succinctly, countries receive a commercial return on their soft power (Rose 2016).

The UK is not alone, however, in emphasising the importance of soft power. Other countries also pursue the goal of maximising their reputations and spreading their values through their language, culture, heritage, sport and broadcasting, political pluralism, and economic prosperity. Some see the benefits as reputational; others see them as economic, while still others are at the harder end of a definition of soft power where persuasion shades into propaganda. Some countries emphasise soft power as a way to address domestic policy concerns, whether for social cohesion or to advance the cause of specific groups in society. Another important development in the last few years is the practice of external soft power being used to promote cohesion within multilateral bodies, especially the EU.

In other words, the practice of soft power is an important way for a country or group of countries to engage with others, in a world where international relationships are increasingly important, but where Governments must compete for attention with other countries, but also with others who are active in the global space. Some of these others are well meaning, but some are not. Culture is central to this competition, as it exemplifies the values of freedom of expression, creativity and innovation associated with open societies. It is essential therefore when talking about soft power, to understand how culture itself works when it crosses boundaries. While culture is central to the soft power toolkit for increasing attraction and influence, it has its own values, practices, issues and audiences, which are not necessarily those of Governments but rather of the societies it represents. It is these freedoms which make culture so important and potentially so potent as a transmitter of ideas. However, as Joseph Nye reminds us, soft power must be credible if it is to “work”. For government and societies, the credibility of soft power lies in the resonance and legitimacy of the society it represents.

While the structural elements that constitute soft power across the world are broadly similar (political values, policies, language, cultural institutions, heritage, sport…), policy goals vary, as do capabilities, constraints, and, particularly, values. As Boris Johnson acknowledged in his 2016 conference speech, around the world today there are serious challenges to democracy, freedom and security.

Soft power approaches reflect these challenges. Soft power can be used negatively, as when it is deployed by non-democratic regimes, which wish to destabilise other countries, or by terrorist groups who draw on culture and social media to attract recruits and intimidate populations. The view is increasingly advanced that economic prosperity can be
achieved without political and social freedom, and rather that the only way to ensure prosperity and stability is to suppress that freedom. Western self-confidence in its values of social, political and economic freedom has, according to some, reduced following the invasion of Iraq and the 2008 financial crash.

There is another view, however. The Foreign Secretary, while acknowledging the challenges, went on to state that the constituent parts of soft power can only truly thrive in free and open societies. If that is true, culture must actually be – as well as be said to be – free. Trust in sport should not be undermined by Government interference. Heritage should be preserved so that we are free to come to terms with our past. This review finds that this view is essentially correct.

We consider how we can advance the debate as to the effectiveness of soft power. We look at models that have been proposed for how we can improve our understanding of how soft power works, the soft power resources we have, and the impact they make. This is essential if we are to create policies and strategies for the effective use of soft power.

Finally, we look at the position of the UK’s soft power in the world today. There are major changes taking place in the international landscape, which require a strategic approach to soft power. The UK, post-Brexit, faces a fast-changing world, which some see as a time in which the post-World War II international order based on global and multilateral institutions, laws, norms and rules is in danger of breaking down. Trade is declining, anti-globalising forces from both left and right are challenging the values that elites had been promoting as universal, and there is a rising anti-establishment sentiment. There is also a perception that the global level of risk is rising, and we can no longer assume that war can always be avoided.

On the other hand, we have today an unprecedented level of global communication between peoples. We also have much greater knowledge of how new policy options such as soft power, can be harnessed to enhance the success of our international engagements. The successful practice of soft power does require openness and freedoms to be in place. It acknowledges, however, that there are two main risks: that we underestimate the impact of more cynical uses of soft power, and that we inadvertently only address people who agree with us, being seen to serve their interests at the expense of others and creating tension rather than collaboration.

The UK is at or near the top of various indices of soft power practice. If that position is to be maintained, we need to be at the top of our game and emphasize the underlying causes of soft power influence. These include the UK’s pluralist politics, levels of prosperity, and cultural assets such as citizen-to-citizen diplomacy and institutions such as the British Council. This report argues for a strategic approach which will help the UK in the next period when the development of soft power will be crucial for our future prosperity, security and prospects.

**PART 1 OF THIS REPORT IS A LITERATURE REVIEW, ORGANISED IN 5 SECTIONS:**

- **Soft Power today:** summarises the latest thinking about the state of soft power in the world of today, with a focus on the G20. This includes the EU as a G20 member.
- **Developments and trends emerging since 2013:** reviews the main global trends that are driving soft power today, and have impacted on it since the publication of the British Council’s *Influence and Attraction* report in 2013;
- **Soft power in the digital age:** looks at the disruptive role of digital communications and social media in the practice of soft power;
- **What works – soft power, behaviour change and measurement of impact:** examines what can we expect from soft power in terms of increasing influence and attraction and how we measure and assess its impact; and
- **The position of the UK:** investigates what are the challenges facing the UK today, and how a soft power strategy can contribute to our ability to face them successfully.

As noted in Influence and Attraction, research in cultural relations faces difficulties. These stem partly from definitions, but also from a lack of information and a reliance on discursive, rather than statistical approaches.
to comparisons between nations. This report tackles these issues head-on. The political saliency of this topic, however, means that more will need to be done to provide more robust research findings. An on-going analytical capability will be required.

*Influence and Attraction* looked at the practice of soft power along several dimensions: through the work of cultural relations institutions, statistics on educational exchange and student numbers and broadcasting. It also noted that there were genuine difficulties with providing reliable figures that describe the state of practice today for a range of reasons including the variety of statistical approaches used by different countries, the impossibility of identifying budgets for soft power within overall budgets and issues of scope – for example, should tourism be included or not?

**PART 2 OF THE REPORT ADDRESSES THE OBSERVATION IN INFLUENCE AND ATTRACTION THAT UNDERSTANDING SOFT POWER TODAY REQUIRES DATA.**

It disentangles causes from effects in the discussion of soft power and provides a quantitative snapshot of practice today. It looks at countries in three groups: the G20 countries, the G20 countries plus other EU countries not in the G20, and then the entire world depending on data availability. By looking at these countries, we aim to give a snapshot of the current state of play, based on a sample sufficiently large to permit some quantitative analysis.

After the quantitative analysis, Appendix A on “Trends in the global practice of soft power” describes thinking and practice on soft power from around the world today. Going beyond a UK or Western-centric view, it draws on original material from a range of major countries to give a picture of the soft power approaches of the UK’s global partners and competitors.
1. Soft power today

Influence and Attraction referred in 2013 to a ‘race for soft power’. Many Governments today pursue soft power as a central objective of their foreign policy. It is important, however, to be as clear as we can about what we mean by “soft power”.

The UK Government, as already noted, speaks about soft power in terms of a series of constituent elements, which can be said to form the “soft power assets” of the UK. In discussions about soft power today, however, the term covers a wide range of meanings and activities, ranging from strategic communications through to cultural exchange, and the underlying political and economic values of a country.

As noted in the Introduction, Joseph Nye defined soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.” (Nye, 2004).

The pursuit of soft power involves both accounting for existing soft power influences and charting their outcomes (or attractions). Soft power’s “sweeping amendment to the traditional field of international power politics… asserts the inclusion of persuasion and culture to the instruments of nation-state power” and envisages soft power as both “…an asset to cultivate and a tool to use” (Hayden, 2011).

*This report considers the relationships between these 2 concepts – soft power influences and attractions, and the way in which the tool is used.*

In Nye’s terms, soft power assets would consist of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies and these should be considered when thinking about what soft power is. If these assets are to be identified and turned into tools for the conduct of international relations, then that is done as part of the process of formulating foreign policy. That foreign policy will itself form part of the asset register of soft power.

Nye’s definition has of course been challenged, with some seeing it as an expression of dominant American cultural production, based on the comparative advantage the USA possesses due to the sheer volume of cultural goods and services it exports globally. (Ang, Ien, Isar, and Mar, 2014). Others point to Nye as the influence that has led many countries to pursue communication-centric policies such as public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, broadcasting and other forms of strategic communication, to improve their credibility, influence media representation and build ties with foreign publics (e.g. Hayden, 2011).

One problem, however, with discussions of soft power is terminology. Several terms are in use, principally public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and cultural relations. It would be helpful therefore to say what we mean in this report by these other terms.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Nye saw public diplomacy as shaping the preferences of others, and therefore influencing their behaviour. He said that: “In behavioural terms, soft power is attractive power.” In his view, public diplomacy was the “...instrument that governments use to mobilize these (soft power) resources (i.e. values, culture and policies) to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments. Public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth.” (Nye, 2008).

In Nye’s terms, then, public diplomacy is how soft power is implemented. Reputation is key, and international struggles are struggles for credibility. Public diplomacy is therefore neither:

- Propaganda, as credibility is necessary to turn cultural resources into the soft power of attraction as “…if the content of a country’s culture, values, and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that “broadcasts” them cannot produce soft power. It may produce just the opposite.” (Nye, 2008), nor
- Public relations (or nation branding), as public diplomacy must go further than conveying information or selling a positive image, if it is to build long-term relationships.

Nye therefore follows Mark Leonard (Leonard, 2002) in advocating a mix of direct government information with long-term cultural relationships, which will vary with each of the three dimensions of public diplomacy – together they form the toolkit of soft power:

- Daily communication, which involves explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions;
- Strategic communication, which develops a set of simple themes much as a political or advertising campaign does, and
- The development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels.

Another often-discussed term, digital diplomacy, describes the practice of public diplomacy using digital communications media. This will be discussed in the next section.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

This is another frequently used term, which is a sub-set of public diplomacy. It is worth taking time to consider this term as it is often used interchangeably with soft power, but its meaning is different. Cultural Diplomacy is most often seen as the process of mobilising cultural assets as attractors, but to be consistent with the term soft power, it would also have to include political ideals and values. Either way, therefore, it is an activity of governments, as is public diplomacy, but it is worth noting that the use of the term cultural diplomacy has broadened considerably over the years to include international interactions among citizens and non-state organizations. It now applies to pretty much any practice that is related to purposeful cultural cooperation between nations or groups of nations (Ang, Jen, Isar, and Mar, 2014), and it is this broadening in the use of the term which creates challenges in empirical terms. The empirical sections of this report therefore attend to citizen cultural diplomacy by taking into account proxy indicators such as internet connectivity for citizens.

The term cultural diplomacy is needed principally because Nye adds culture to political ideals and policies, the other 2
elements of a country’s soft power assets. This was new and required a new term. Political ideals and policies on the other hand are the stuff of traditional foreign policy and the practice of diplomacy. No discussion of soft power can therefore, on Nye’s terms, make sense without it being situated firmly in the arena of traditional statecraft.

One trend in the years since Influence and Attraction was published is one towards a more explicit alignment of cultural diplomacy with foreign policy. This is strikingly evident, for example, in the EU’s strategy for cultural diplomacy. On 8 June 2016, at the launch of the new strategy, EU High Representative and Vice-President Federica Mogherini was explicit and her statement is worth quoting at length (European Commission 2016):

“Culture has to be part and parcel of our foreign policy. Culture is a powerful tool to build bridges between people... and reinforce mutual understanding. It can also be an engine for economic and social development. As we face common challenges, culture can help all of us, in Europe, Africa, Middle East, Asia, stand together to fight radicalisation and build an alliance of civilisations against those trying to divide us. This is why cultural diplomacy must be at the core of our relationship with today’s world.”

The EU’s vision is values based. The new policy will focus on:

“...encouraging cultural cooperation between the EU and its partner countries and promoting a global order based on peace, the rule of law, freedom of expression, mutual understanding and respect for fundamental values.”

This alignment of culture with foreign policy is a notable feature of the cultural diplomacy of the world’s largest states. The EU’s expectations of what culture can deliver are high and have gone far beyond a vision where nations compete for influence and attraction as envisaged by Nye. The question remains, however, as to whether culture can deliver what is expected of it. A few examples are illustrative.

In the USA, Congress oversees the work of the Advisory Committee on Public Diplomacy (ACPD), which, since 1948 has had the role of appraising the work of the Government agencies involved in understanding, informing and influencing foreign publics. The ACPD, in the opening sentence of its 2016 Annual Report, is clear that public diplomacy is central to foreign policy and includes many players beyond the nation-state:

“The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD) believes strongly that people, such as youth,
journalists, civil society and religious leaders, cannot be excluded from the conduct of international relations and U.S. foreign policy decisions must consider their growing influence worldwide. This is especially critical today, as the world is awash with ideological conflict that is at once challenging our national security and the liberal world order” (U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2016).

In China, cultural diplomacy is a high priority for the top leadership. In the late 2000s, the National People’s Congress and the party leadership began emphasising cultural diplomacy as a means of promoting Chinese cultural ideas abroad and enhancing the country’s soft power. In 2013, the Communist Party’s eighteenth Central Committee declared “…public diplomacy should be led by the government and run based on market principles” (Zhang et al 2015).

In Russia, president Putin has taken a close interest in soft power. In 2013, he issued a decree liquidating the state-owned news agency RIA Novosti and the Kremlin’s international radio station, Voice of Russia, and replacing them with Rossiya Segodnya, or Russia Today, creating what commentators have called a “huge machine for propaganda in the West”, in an effort to “break the monopoly of Anglo-Saxon media on the world’s news” (Ennis 2013).

In India, public diplomacy is led from External Publicity & Public Diplomacy Division of the Ministry of External Affairs which is mandated with the “Facilitation of foreign media based in India; publications, documentary films and other publicity material aimed at projecting India’s soft power” (Ministry of External Affairs 2017).

In 2016, it is undoubtedly the case that states continue to play a central role in public and cultural diplomacy, two of the central terms of soft power. There is however, a growing understanding that if culture is to play such a central policy role, then two things must happen:

- We need to understand how culture is transmitted across borders, and
- We need to be able to say more clearly what role culture, as the central element in soft power plays, in bringing about the behaviour changes we want to see.

CULTURAL RELATIONS

It would be helpful at this point to consider the term “cultural relations”. This is because we need a wider term which describes the processes of transnational two-way engagement which includes the actions of all involved, whether they are state actors, or acting in civil society, cultural, educational or non-state contexts. Cultural relations can include public and cultural diplomacy but also refers to understandings and interactions among non-state groups. Cultural relations are therefore capable of encompassing the possibilities for interactivity offered by digital social media, and concepts such as “meta-power” which describe how new cultural meanings are created in interactive digital spaces (Singh 2013) and subsequently inform the work of states and other international actors. These meanings also inform our understanding of international cultural relations:

Cultural relations are reciprocal, non-coercive transnational interactions between two or more cultures, encompassing a range of activities
that are conducted both by state and non-state actors within the space of cultural and civil society. The overall outcomes of cultural relations are greater connectivity, better mutual understanding, more and deeper relationships, mutually beneficial transactions and enhanced sustainable dialogue between states, peoples, non-state actors and cultures (Wikipedia 2017).

Cultural relations are not exclusively a policy of states. Rather they are relations between societies (which can include some of the activities of states). The definition above offers an optimistic understanding of international cultural relations: cultural relations, of course, may not always be reciprocal and non-coercive, and may not lead to greater connectivity, understanding, and dialogues. This distinction becomes useful when you consider what the evidence tells us about how culture is transmitted across borders. Firstly, the production of culture, and cultural meanings, happens at various levels – the local, national and the global. However, generally, the circulation of culture across borders, known as cultural globalisation, happens especially where there are desirable markets for media or where there are sufficient levels of investment in the arts and in art institutions.

Two aspects of cultural globalisation are important for understanding international cultural relations:

- Global media conglomerates produce cultural products for global markets. On the one hand, this process, often referred to as cultural imperialism, can be seen as the imposition of a dominant popular culture (e.g. the USA) on other countries, and it can generate resistance where there is either ideological resistance, or a perceived threat to traditional or indigenous culture (De Beukelaer et al 2015); on the other hand, cultural globalisation of any sort can help to break hierarchies, and spur creativity cultural syncretism (Cowen 2009; Singh 2011).

- Where culture is produced by less dominant regional and national producers it is possible for two-way flows and networks to result. This can also lead to situations where mash-up hybrid cultures develop, although care is needed to ensure genuine reciprocity.

These interpretations of cultural globalisation can fit into Nye’s definition of soft power. Culture will be attractive if others know it. American popular culture for example is certainly global in its reach. The second aspect could be helpful to supporters of cultural diplomacy, and to a range of smaller countries, known as cultural producers. The idea of networks is obviously relevant to the Internet Age.

However, there are two other views. The first, based on reception theory, emphasises that instead of seeing cultural globalisation only as a problem, audiences (as opposed, say, to activists) can respond actively to cultural transmission. The second view emphasises the role of nations’ cultural policy strategies. According to this model, the activities of states and governments in framing and promoting national cultures play a major role in cultural globalisation. (Crane, Kawashima, Kawasaki, 2016).

Influence and Attraction came down strongly in favour of the two-way flow model, not as a description, but as a course of action. In the report’s author John Holden’s (2013) view, it would deliver benefits for the Government that adopted it as a strategy – a relationship-based model was more effective, it would generate trust and develop the global awareness of the population. Holden also argued for working with commercial and third sector initiatives (i.e. conglomerates and companies as well as NGOs) to encourage innovation and reduce costs.
This was a valid conclusion in the light of recent research, but it could be developed as follows:

- **Cultural relations** – two-way, non-coercive models for the practice of soft power are more likely than other approaches to succeed in transmitting culture across borders, being less likely to generate resistance;

- **Networks and exchange** are crucial to the development and sustainability of relationships;

- **Audiences will engage actively** – it cannot be assumed that they will receive culture passively, or that they will not bring their own cultural values into play, and

- **Strategy does have a role to play**, and is particularly necessary for non-dominant nations. It needs to extend beyond the activities of the state, and can originate from non-state actors. Promotion is important for countries that are less well known, but even so, attractiveness and influence are more likely to come about through exchange and collaboration.

Cultural relations are also, in this age where we can all generate and publish our own views, more likely to be credible when they are not primarily pursued in the interests of governments, but for their own sake (Wikipedia 2017).

**CONCLUSION**

Thinking about soft power today is still largely based on the insights of Joseph Nye. There is a growing realisation that soft power is an essential element of foreign policy. It also needs to demonstrate relevance to policy challenges, and to wider developments. Culture is increasingly seen as the core element of soft power. It is important, therefore, to understand how culture works when it crosses borders. The evidence suggests that culture is most likely to increase influence and attractiveness when it is reciprocal, based on parity of esteem, and offers opportunities for the development of cultural exchanges and collaboration that advance cultural, rather than policy goals.

States believe in soft power. They lack, however, a model of change – if attractiveness is about behavioural change, how can cultural influences bring that about?
2. Developments and trends emerging since 2013

There are wider trends and contextual factors impacting on the practice of soft power. As soft power has culture and political ideals, values and institutions at its heart, it is important to situate it within the wider context of independent variables or causal factors which are different from soft power outcomes.

Soft power depends on the mobilisation of soft power assets or resources as part of foreign policy, which necessarily must anticipate and react to change. Soft power assets can include political resources such as pluralist or democratic values, and they can include cultural policies and institutions. Since 2013, when Influence and Attraction was published, what are the main contexts, trends, events, and cultural changes within which thinking about soft power must be situated?

**MEGA TRENDS AND SOFT POWER**

Many commentators argue that the acceleration of the pace of change is the main feature of the world today. International engagement and relationships are becoming faster, cheaper, and more complex, due to the continuing expansion of Internet based technologies, and the rapidly increasing creation and sharing of data. This challenges how we can understand international relations, including how soft power and influence work in the 21st century. We need to take account of the impact of acceleration on societies.

By 2020, there will be over 26 billion internet-connected devices and over 4 billion global internet users. Underpinning this development is data’s role as the new currency. Every day, exabytes of new data are created and transported over Internet Protocol networks. In 2016, the world entered the “zetabyte era” with global IP traffic passing the 1 zetabyte mark, or over 1 trillion gigabytes. By 2020 global IP traffic will reach 2.3 zettabytes.

This data growth is fuelling economies, sparking innovation, and unleashing waves of creativity. (World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology Report, 2016).

Hartmut Rosa (2013) identifies 3 main dimensions of acceleration:

- **Technological acceleration**, reduces the amount of time taken by e.g. transport or communication;
- **The acceleration of the pace of life**, refers to a scarcity of ‘free’ time – driven by technological acceleration, and
- **The acceleration of society** refers to when a society’s rate of change quickens so that there is a ‘contraction’ in amount of time it takes for social change to occur.

This process of acceleration is linked to what David Harvey (1999) calls “time-space compression” where new forms of communication and transport are associated with high-speed lifestyles. Some commentators have also suggested that social acceleration is profoundly affecting the practice of liberal democracy, as many traditional notions about liberal democracy rest on assumptions about having time to deliberate about political ideas, and this is becoming increasingly problematic with the heightened pace of social life (Scheuermann, 2004).
There are many other issues, but *inequalities of wealth and power* are growing. The global economic inequality gap has roughly tripled in size since about 1960. There are many reasons for this, but the picture is starkly illustrated in the 2015 Global Wealth Report:

**GLOBAL ADULT POPULATION AND SHARE OF TOTAL WEALTH**
**BY WEALTH GROUP, 2015**

The picture is complex, however. Milanovic (2016) identifies 3 important developments: (1) the emergence of a new “global middle class”, mostly in China and other countries in Asia, (2) income stagnation for globally rich, locally middle-class groups in the rich world, and (3) the emergence of the global “super-rich”. He also looks to the future and foresees a world in which income inequalities between countries will be less important than income inequalities within countries – a situation which existed in previous centuries.

There is also a rising global *inequality in peace* as the gap between the most and least peaceful countries continues to widen. The 2016 Global Peace Index, which analyses both qualitative and quantitative data from 163 countries, covering 99.7% of the world’s population, reported that overall global levels of peace continue to deteriorate while the gap between the most and least peaceful countries continues to widen (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016).

At the same time, there is a shift towards the Global South. The rich countries of the West have had a concern for more than half a century to help what President Truman in 1949 called “the underdeveloped nations of the world”. The position today is very different from that in 1949, however. The Global South, despite the continuing rise in inequalities, has growing political and economic clout, and deeper relationships between its respective countries. It is argued, however, that despite the rise of the South, the rulebook governing the interrelated global economy was written in the North, and formerly colonised countries often must accept the intellectual, legal and cultural norms of the North. This persistence is crucial for understanding many of the dynamics of the world today (Singh 2017; Hobson 2012).

However, the previously unquestioned cultural dominance of the West is past (Pieterse, 2015) and it is a little-noticed fact that global trade is no longer rising (The New York Times, 30 October 2016). The volume of global trade was flat in the first quarter of 2016, and then fell by 0.8% in the second quarter. It is the first time since World War II that trade with other nations has declined during a period of economic growth. But there are also signs that the slowdown is becoming structural. Both the World Trade Organisation and the OECD are reporting reduced rates of growth.
in global trade. Developed nations appear to be backing away from globalisation. This may increase competition.

Finally, the nation-state is reasserting itself as the primary vehicle of political life. Multinational institutions like the European Union and multilateral trade treaties are being challenged because they are seen by some as not acting in the national interest (Friedman, 31 May 2016).

Many organisations identify other global trends. The National Intelligence Council (December 2012) of the USA publishes Global Trends immediately after the election of the new US President. In 2012, they published Global Trends 2030, and at the date of writing are working on Global Trends 2035. In 2012, they identified 4 mega trends, which are all relevant to soft power today:

- **Individual empowerment** – which will accelerate owing to poverty reduction, growth of the global middle class, greater educational attainment, widespread use of new communications and manufacturing technologies, and health-care advances;

- **Diffusion of power** – there will not be any hegemonic power. Power will shift to networks and coalitions in a multipolar world.

- **Demographic patterns** – the demographic arc of instability will narrow. Economic growth might decline in “ageing” countries. Sixty per cent of the world’s population will live in urbanised areas; migration will increase.

- **Food, water, energy** – demand for these resources will grow substantially owing to an increase in the global population. Since 2013, there has been an increase in the role of soft power in international development.

**Individual empowerment** is perhaps the most important, as the most significant acceleration can be observed in communication technologies. According to the latest data, in 2015 the number of mobile communications users exceeded 7 billion people while in 2000 their number was just about one billion (International Telecommunications Union, 2015).

This clearly has major implications for soft power and the ability of practitioners and commentators to understand and work effectively in digital environments, or in relation to policies on digital communications. There is a great deal of talk of digital diplomacy, and terms such as “Public Diplomacy 2.0” are used, drawing on the language of technology. The impact on soft power of a world where anyone can connect to the Internet and publish their ideas – essentially at zero cost – is one we are still working through.

The achievements of Public Diplomacy 2.0 are significant, but more needs to be done. A tendency still exists to use social media to broadcast messages, which extol the cultural attractiveness and power of a nation. To do so, however, ignores the interactive, multiplicative nature of social media.

Soft power practitioners are attempting to get their message out and to engage with the world, but their competitors are doing precisely the same – often with the advantage of local networks and online communities – and the world is in flux, fragmenting and regrouping into new networks.

Finally, in terms of policies and strategies to make the blessings of the information society as widely available as possible, it needs to be recognised that this process will empower many voices, not all of which will be friendly. (Cull, 2011).

The **diffusion of power** also has clear implications for soft power. As global power becomes more diffuse, smarter, and more asymmetric, there are implications for how countries collaborate with each other, for example in forums such as the EU or the G20.

There are new groups of “middle power” countries (e.g. the Goldman Sachs “Next 11”: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, and Vietnam), the “CIVETS” (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa) or the MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, and Turkey) (Cooper and Mo, 2013).

These groups of states are very different from older collection of middle powers, located largely in Western Europe but also including Canada and Australia. Most, if not all, of these new middle power countries have been described as outsiders or resisters in the international system. However, some are also mostly members of key international economic governance bodies such as the G20 where they gain influence by building coalitions (Singh 2016).

It has been suggested that under these conditions of shifting and expanding
coalitions, countries with network and soft power resources have advantages because a country with network power has more information, communication tools and human networks, so it can convene or put together winning coalitions more easily. Soft power helps because it enables the sharing of the right messages, initiatives and innovations as well as winning the trust of partner countries. One example cited is South Korea, which has benefited in the G20 from its cultural confidence. (Cooper and Mo, 2013)

Also relevant is the rise of non-state actors who have even been described as the “new diplomats” – defined by the way they bring about change, rather than by their affiliation to the state (Bjola and Holmes, 2015). There is a great range of non-state actors, with a vast range of agendas including religion (Haynes, 2016), transnational activism in a global civil society (Kaldor, 2003), sport (Grix, 2014), education (Tuchman, 2014), cultural organisations (Sylvester, 2015), creative businesses (Anheier et al, 2010) and so on.

**Demographic patterns.** The need to respond to the migration of people, many of whom are fleeing the war in Syria is the key international issue of our time in Europe. It has induced a sense of crisis on a number of levels: of values – what were assumed to be shared European norms, appeared to break down under the pressures of the sudden arrival of large numbers of people from the Middle East; of collective action – demonstrated through the inability to collaborate across borders when national interests differ; and of human rights – how to balance the freedoms and rights of migrants without arousing fear of the other and hostility towards minorities and how to accept and integrate people whose cultural expressions are visibly different and perceived as challenging some of the “universal” values of Western Europe.

The migrant crisis has even been portrayed as heralding the end of the EU’s soft power as the EU’s perceived failure to live up to its values not only failed to deliver a joined-up response to the Syrian civil war, it indirectly contributed to the UK voting to leave the EU as the soft power failure was conflated in the popular mind with the migrant crisis (Dempsey 18 October 2016).

The European experience is part of a complex global phenomenon. While research indicates that migrant flows have been economically beneficial for populations in OECD countries (Aubry et al, 2016), the political and social impacts of migration presents perhaps the biggest soft power challenge of our time.

The question of how to respond effectively to crisis on the one hand, and to maintain stability in the international order on the other, is a recurrent theme of today.

There is relatively little academic literature on the relationship between the migrant crisis and soft power, which looks systematically at attraction in the context of migration. Is it a matter of economic benefits, or is the political context also a factor? There is a major study that shows that countries with attractive citizenship policies and a relative lack of right-wing political parties are more attractive to migrants, and that this “conditions a potential migrant’s geographic and economic consideration” (Fitzgerald 2011). A 2010 study also concludes that the features of the UK that are most attractive to migrants are the political system, democracy and respect for human rights (Crawley 2011).

**Food, water, energy nexus** The last of the National Intelligence Council’s megatrends is also the last to be seen in the literature as relevant to soft power strategies, despite the fact that it is described as a high priority research area in the UK, and the United Nations has urged it as a key area for international cooperation requiring enhanced dialogue, collaboration and coordination (UN Water 2014). The reason why soft power has not focused on this is unclear, given that food diplomacy has been written about at least since the 1970s, water diplomacy has been extensively written about for many years, mainly in connection with specific parts of the world from the Middle East to the Bronx, and there is a similar pattern with energy diplomacy.

There has, however, been a clear convergence in thinking between international development and soft power. Commentators frequently discuss the role of individual countries such as China, Turkey, or the UK in this context, but the relationship between international development and soft power in general, is one that needs further work.
CULTURE
There are also wider trends within culture which should be recognised. As has already been noted, it is important to understand how culture works today, independently of the considerations of policy. There are many snapshots of “top 10” cultural trends today. Some have already been described (digital social media, individual empowerment and cultural difference), but there are others, the most salient of which are:

Place: People are more attached to place than we had previously thought. The popularity of mobility after its intensive growth in the 20th century has significantly decreased in the early 21st century. Recent research indicates that attachment to place may contribute to individuals’ well-being (Scannell and Gifford 2016), and the main trend of the 21st century will likely be to become deeply rooted.

Cities: The active development of cities started in the 2000s, but this trend has reached its peak. The world is experiencing rapid urbanisation, but not every city is growing. Population is likely to decline in 17% of large cities in developed regions and 8% of cities across the world from 2015 to 2025, according to a McKinsey report (Woetzel et al, 2016).

Complexity: In the 2000s, there were hopes that cultural elites would be able to change the world for the better. Today we understand that no single elite has sufficient leverage or influence to affect change in a world of complex communications, minorities and informal cultures.

Media: The effects of global media production and consumption are complex and include broadcasters, internet companies, social media and others with the power to contribute to the global media environment. This landscape is evolving fast and the pace of change is impacting on every aspect of soft power, including the market power of global conglomerates, state-led initiatives to use media for propaganda, self-publishing and ‘publishing of the self’. Global media can “…deepen the visceral feelings among millions of people that our world is ‘one world’, and that humans share some responsibility for its fate” (Keane, 2003). Global news networks are the main way in which people around the world experience our ideals and policies. However, it is the case that they do not operate ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ national contexts, but are in many ways nationally rooted and respond to the domestic political culture that prevails in the context in which they are based (Dencik 2013).

Conclusions: A great deal of the change happening today is relevant to thinking about soft power. This could be because culture plays such a central role in soft power, and culture (broadly understood) is ubiquitous (Boli, 2005).

The key trends impacting on soft power strategies are:
- The accelerating rate of change, driven by the spread of internet technologies and the rapid expansion in the creation and sharing of data;
- The emergence of a more multi-polar world where it cannot be assumed that Western culture will be dominant, or Western “universal” values accepted;
- The diffusion of power and the rise in the empowerment of individuals, partly driven by social media, which enables new forms of connectivity and engagement across borders;
- Demographics, especially migration, where there appears to be a link between open, democratic, prosperous, societies and where asylum seekers and migrants choose to go.
4. Soft power in the digital age

There is general agreement that digital communications media are a game changer in soft power, (Cull, 2011) but others argue that despite the promise of digital diplomacy, little is known about how it works (Bjola and Holmes, 2015). It is clear, however, that there is a wide range of areas where digital media have impacted on the practice of soft power.

**Digital diplomacy** is generally agreed to be revolutionary. Traditional diplomacy is seen to have lagged behind the adoption of digital and social media in firms, among individuals, and other areas of Government. Digital diplomacy, defined as the use of social media for diplomatic purposes, is agreed to have the potential to change practices of diplomatic engagement in information management, public and cultural diplomacy, strategy planning, international negotiations and crisis management, all of which contribute to soft power.

Despite its late start, diplomacy is facing what is now commonly called ‘digital disruption’. This has major implications for soft power, as the experience of public diplomacy over the last decade is that traditional diplomatic practices are being tested by the drive to use digital media more and more to communicate with public audiences.

Digital diplomacy is not the same as public diplomacy, but it is obvious that the resources provided by big data and social media networks greatly enhance the range of available strategies, and encourage the use of communications media as a primary way in which to bring about change, at least in perceptions.

This change has major implications for practice:

- Ministries of Foreign Affairs have no choice but to develop digital strategies if they are to survive – and the same goes for other international soft power actors;
- Networking is the basis of contemporary diplomacy and soft power and work processes and organisational structures need to adapt;
- The need to adapt to rapid change: with issues of speed, less control over events and agendas; and with
- The need to be able to manage knowledge and data – including big data – effectively and using resources to best effect, and
- The development of “cyber agendas” such as digital citizenship; Internet freedom, Internet governance and cyber-security (Hocking and Melissen, 2016).

**Communications**: In the digital world, it is impossible for Governments to control every aspect of their strategic communications, let alone day-to-day interactions on social media. What matters more in the information age and the era of “soft power” is not so much messages and ideas themselves, but the consistency between the communication of those messages and ideas and policy action. It is no good having a strategic narrative that is not based on (an easily Google-checked) reality. The idea that soft power can be “delivered” to foreign audiences reflects an over-simple assumption about the way international communication works in the 21st century. (Archetti, 2014)

**Social media, interactivity and trust**: The key difference between social media and more traditional media channels is interactivity – two-way communication and interaction. The Internet catalyses political change by creating new opportunities for cooperation. It does not simply enable faster and easier communication, but makes it possible for people around the world to interact closely, reciprocate favours, and build trust – one of the main goals of soft power (Wu, 2015).

This process of interaction can, however, lead either to understanding or to misunderstanding (Bjola and Holmes, 2015).
One problem is that while social media can be said to enhance social capital and therefore trust (Lampe, 2015), social capital can be problematic in that it tends to facilitate a natural human tendency to divide the world into friends (trust groups or communities) and enemies (Fukuyama, 2001). Care is therefore needed if trust is to be developed – a new and more inclusive approach based more on dialogue and problem solving – rather than a reliance on traditional one-way messaging, which can be divisive.

**Negotiations:** International negotiations are a specific example of a necessarily interactive social process. Negotiations take place in a multipolar world, where the participants have different levels of power and influence, as well as different expectations, agendas and cultural understandings (Singh 2015). Soft Power opens the way to new negotiation perspectives as it promotes the diffusion of social and cultural values and the creation of social networks that facilitate exponential increases in contacts and relationships (Brito, 2010). The aim is to find a mutually beneficial outcome – necessary if these contacts are to be maintained and developed. This happens when negotiations allow for (interactive) dialogues and problem solving as opposed to monologues and threats delivered from privileged heights of power (Singh, 2008). Digital communications media can assist these processes.

**Competition:** Soft power practitioners are attempting to get their message out and to engage with the world, but their competitors are doing precisely the same – often with the advantage of local networks – and the world is in flux, fragmenting and regrouping into new networks. At one level, the then Secretary of State Clinton argued that (digital) connectivity was an absolute good and pledged the United States to work to make the blessings of the information society as widely available as possible. Inevitably, however, the voices digital media empower are diverse and will include some that are critical and even openly hostile (Cull, 2011).

**Networked social movements:** Soft power operates in a world where trust is at a premium. The digital revolution has accelerated the diffusion of power, and enabled citizens to come together within, and beyond, countries in a way that has never before been possible. These citizens are building their own trust communities, often in opposition to Governments, and with a view to influencing outcomes in favour of democracy, the environment, against capitalist institutions or Government corruption. They are very active on the Internet – indeed, it is the Internet which has allowed these groups to come together. While there is mixed evidence as to the nature of the relationship between social media and political empowerment, it is undoubtedly helping generate forms of activism – often culturally biased – which challenge traditional messages and policies (Castells, 2015). The result is a world in which the use of soft power is increasingly important to the shaping of global outcomes – whether they be driven by state or non-state actors. (Bjola, 2016)

**Empowerment of individuals:** These actors can include groups and individuals. The development of networked social movements has been widely noted, particularly in relation to the Arab Spring, but before that, in 2010, it became clear that all it took to challenge the diplomatic order of the day was a single individual with a well-placed accomplice and a little technical know-how. In the wake of WikiLeaks, it became apparent that Governments had largely missed the shift of power inherent in the new technology (Cull, 2011).

**Terrorism:** The internet gives terrorists unlimited, unchecked and limitless opportunities to reach audiences, in ways similar to those employed by global celebrity culture. The use that ISIS and other terrorist groups make of social media is well known and well researched. From the point of view of soft power practice, however, it is worth noting that terrorists use a range of cultural tools: DVDs, video games, rap music offered as downloads, as well as blogs, social media networks, and apps (Nacos, 2016). Indeed, the key elements for becoming viral in social media in this context are: a short length (4 minutes), shocking images, cultural resonance – e.g. from action films like Zero Dark Thirty, and a real, emotional story. (Lesaca, 2015)

**Propaganda:** New technologies have not only made it possible to produce propaganda with astonishing ease – they have also made it far easier to disseminate these films and images (Burke, 2016).

**New analytical tools are needed:** To understand soft power, we need to look at it in a number of often surprising ways. For example, it includes a need to bring together
understandings from a range of disciplines. One good example of this is the question of how we understand how influence and attraction flow across social media.

To do so, we need to return to one of the original ideas in this report, the problem of the accelerating pace of change brought about by digital social media. There is a view, that as people simply do not have time to think before they respond to news, a communication or a message, they are likely to respond emotionally or intuitively rather than rationally. It is therefore important to understand what this emotional response is, and, if possible, how emotions are affecting decision-making.

**Sentiment analysis:** one relatively new analytical tool is sentiment analysis. This can be automated and is used to identify how sentiments are expressed in texts and whether the expressions indicate positive (favourable) or negative (unfavourable) opinions toward the subject. As such it is a tool that can be used to assess opinions, which are usually subjective, and have an emotional component. Emotion is a very neglected concept in thinking about soft power, which is odd, when the concept relies so heavily on the affective power of culture. Emotion and speed are related in that certain emotional circuits in the brain send faster (sub-cortical) signals than do the circuits that involve the cortex (Konstantinidis and Shanks, 2014). This has contributed to the conclusion that emotion can influence cognition and behaviour in powerful ways – in many ways a common sense finding, but one that is surprisingly under researched. It is unlikely therefore that we will be able to know how emotions are affecting on decisions any time soon.

Sentiment analysis, however, lets us study how positive or negative the sentiments expressed about an event on social media are, and is the subject of a great deal of research effort. This matters, as knowing how positively people feel about us, will inevitably help us understand how we are perceived, in relation to our actions. This is important for trust and for the management of risks (Pfister, 2015).

Sentiment analysis is just one tool. To help people respond effectively to shifting sentiments, complexity and rapid information flows we need to find ways to bring the insights of data science into our digital strategies. This trend will not go away – the more we operate in both digital and physical worlds, the more we will need to develop our understanding of both areas of operation.

**CONCLUSIONS:**

- Digital media are transformational, disruptive, and here to stay;
- They are wide-ranging in their impact on practice;
- They are neither inherently good nor bad in their effects, but they matter;
- They are about interaction, not one-way broadcast;
- We need to understand how to build and sustain relationships and trust communities online;
- We need to work outside traditional boundaries;
- We need new analytical tools.
5. What works – soft power, behaviour change and measurement of impact

There is a belief among governments that soft power strategies are effective (Hall and Smith, 2013). Governments, however, believe in soft power without necessarily having a framework for measuring its impact. This section looks at how soft power can be evaluated in terms of how it leads to influence.

In recent years, objectives, outcomes, impact, accountability and efficiency have become buzzwords within soft power institutions around the world, and practitioners are now expected to demonstrate the relevance of their campaigns to diplomatic priorities, the efficacy and value-for-money of their methods, and their concrete impact upon target groups (Hall, 2012; Pahlavi, 2007; Pamment, 2013).

This issue is not confined to Governments (nor to soft power). It is complicated by the fact that there is (as in many other areas of public policy) a shortage of solid research evidence as to what works. This situation is not helped by the fact that while soft power is today firmly established as an academic subject, the evaluation of soft power activities has not been given attention (Pamment, 2014). Rather, it is assumed that soft power will be effective if it is attractive, credible and trustworthy. By displaying these characteristics, resources will be transformed into desired outcomes.

Soft power thinkers have, however, identified two focus points for evaluation (Chitty, Li, Rawnsley and Hayden, 2016):

- How well soft power activities establish credibility and generate trust in audiences; and
- How well the activities of soft power actors are perceived. This matters because the management of perceptions is an important goal of practice.

These alone are not enough. It is also necessary to identify how the preferences and choices made by the targets of soft power have been affected.

Ideas of credibility and trust can vary between contexts and cultures. They therefore carry a risk of misunderstanding. Nor has the concept of credibility been systematically analysed and understood. It is also narrow – to focus on credibility ignores cultural values and policy interests, and there is a risk that a focus on credibility and trust ignores other relevant values and variables.

Perceptions are important and there are well-established techniques for assessing and reporting on them. The attractiveness or otherwise of a soft power activity can be gauged by looking at the impact in the media agenda (visibility) and media emotions (valence), but that is not enough. The limitation of this approach is that it does not do what Nye recommended, i.e. provide a measure of outcomes. It does not describe behaviour change, nor does it take account of the way in which soft power works as a communicative process, generating shared meanings and understandings (Castells, 2010).

There is a long-standing debate in British foreign policy on the most appropriate approach to measure the impact of public diplomacy activities, which have often included the activities of the British Council and the BBC World Service. In the aftermath
of 9/11, Lord Carter’s Public Diplomacy Review, (appointed in 2005), assayed the British Council’s broad approach to cultural relations encompassing perceptions and understandings, while the FCO argued for specific outcome impacts (Pamment 2016). However, the Carter Review’s own report through Riverpath Associates (2006) acknowledged that neither the FCO nor the British Council could really measure impact on their own terms. Riverpath recommended a hybrid approach entailing impact measurement through internal organisational performance criteria and a long-term approach focused on outcomes. Measuring the Riverpath recommendations were not realistic and were enormously time consuming (Pamment 2016).

This report opts for a simpler approach in measuring tangible benefits for the country exercising soft power. This does not mean that perceptions, understandings, or trust do not matter. Instead, this report calculates the benefits of soft power in terms of its influence on specific sets of political, economic, and cultural outcomes: cultural – the number of international students and tourists a country attracts; economic – the effects of soft power on levels of foreign direct investment; political – the impact of soft power on voting patterns at the United Nations. Clearly, these are not the only effect of soft power but as “proxies” they open the way for estimating the effects of soft power.

A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
The exercise of soft power by states, like any other public policy, is a political choice, derived from political argumentation, implemented mostly through existing institutions, whose choices are constrained by previous policy decisions. These political choices may, or may not be, based on objective evidence (Durnova, Fischer, and Zittoun, 2016).

As with other areas of policy, political choices need to be reflected in an agreed strategy, which includes an agreed approach to evaluation. This will require an appropriate policy and institutional framework for strategy development, including fora for debate about what soft power is to achieve, the resources to be applied to it, and clear arrangements for implementation. Soft power needs to be mainstreamed. The roles of the various participants should be clear and coordination arrangements should be in place to make sure that everyone involved is clear about what is to be done. There should be clear accountability for the strategy’s development, implementation and evaluation. The process should also be realistic about what can be achieved. In order for this to happen, it should be based on an improved evidence base as well as on existing expertise.

SPECIFICALLY
The strategy should not be based on an ideal model of practice. It should, rather, recognise that evaluation practices are bound together in complex structures that require pragmatic responses both to the “problem of influence” and the reporting of results (Pamment, 2014). Evaluation of what “works” needs to assess influence by evaluating whether people are saying or doing different things because of a soft power initiative. Attractiveness can be assessed through the various tools of perceptions analysis, and by quantitative analysis of behaviour associated with the specific initiative, e.g. an increase in cultural tourism.

In both cases, the increasing emphasis on the digital in soft power opens new possibilities for evaluation, especially through the use of:

- Data science – to improve the evidence and data available to decision makers and improve its analysis;
Social media analytics – to understand the ebb and flow of discussion and sentiment on social media;
Network analysis to identify and map networks and hubs of influence;
Analytical techniques such as discourse analysis or culturomics.

If we expect evaluations to be able to confirm exactly ‘what works’ in an area of high complexity such as soft power, then we are surely expecting too much. However, the rich tradition of evaluation studies in other areas of public policy, combined with the development of more sophisticated evaluation toolkits designed to make use of data and allow for new forms of, for example, collaborative evaluation, should provide an excellent basis for building insights into policy outcomes, and on the roles of policy implementers in shaping those outcomes.

Finally, it is worth noting that in the new digital world, some traditional approaches to influence still matter. For example, an official review of British public diplomacy activities (Wilton et al. 2002 report) pointed out that “an article written by a foreign correspondent in London has a greater impact than any of our other public diplomacy outputs.” (Archetti, 2014)

CONCLUSIONS:
Soft power is an area of public policy;
For soft power to be mainstreamed, it requires analysis and an evidence base equivalent to other areas of foreign and cultural policy;
This report furnishes evidence of soft power influences in political, economic, and cultural realms;
There are also new digital tools available which have the potential to contribute to the evaluation of soft power. Consideration should be given to a programme designed to develop these tools.
6. The relative position of the UK

Influence and Attraction was published in 2013. Also in 2013, the House of Lords appointed the ad hoc Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence “to examine the use of soft power in furthering the United Kingdom’s global influence and interests”.

The Committee’s report (Persuasion and Power in the Modern World, 2014), noted that:

“Immense changes are taking place in the international landscape. The conditions under which international relations are conducted have undergone, and are continuing to undergo, major shifts which will accelerate and be compounded in the years immediately ahead.

The Committee drew attention to the impact of digital media in providing access to information and empowering individuals. It also noted other trends already mentioned in this report, the increasingly interconnected and interdependent world we live in, and the shift in global power balances.

This analysis is confirmed by this review, as is the Committee’s conclusion that these changes require a commensurate response from those who guide the UK’s foreign policy.

The UK finds itself with a tremendous range of institutions and relationships in politics, economics, science and culture, often amassed over generations, which give it a great deal of internationally recognised soft power.

Reflecting that these soft power assets are mostly to be found in institutions and their relationships, the Committee – following Nye – concluded that in the hyper-connected world of today, the soft power “game” would be played most often in areas where the Government does not have direct control.
and where transnational attractions and connections produce soft power. This is the area of cultural relations. The risk was that if the UK did not do this, it would be “out-maneuvered” by its competitors.

The shift to thinking about soft power assets and their influence is new. As discussed previously, the debate on the impact of public diplomacy from the United Kingdom has been the subject of successive reports (Wilton 2003, Riverpath 2006) but the recommendations that emerged were time-consuming and unsatisfactory. A narrow accountability mechanism would push for specific outcomes, but this overlooked the patient work of building trust and positive perceptions in other countries. More recently, quantitative approaches have developed to examine a country ‘brand’ that goes beyond a narrow conception of public diplomacy to accommodate cultural relations.

SOFT POWER ASSETS
One way in which the success of a country’s soft power is publicly assessed is by looking at its position in the various published indices that claim to measure soft power status. These include Portland 30 (http://softpower30.portland-communications.com), Monocle (https://monocle.com/search/soft-power/) and EY Rapid Growth Markets Soft Power Index (http://www.ey.com/gl/en/issues/driving-growth/rapid-growth-markets-soft-power-index-results–country-analyses)

These indices are almost always based on descriptive listings of soft power assets, following the proposition that if a country has soft power assets, it will therefore have soft power influence. Indices are therefore often taken as describing a country’s relative position as a practitioner of soft power. The Portland 30 is a good example of a soft power index, and is analysed here as representative of other soft power brand indices. According to Portland, the UK could be said to be in a strong position. In 2015, the UK had the number 1 spot and in 2016 the UK was at number 2, with the USA at number 1.

The methodology of the Portland 30 and other indices is based on a quantitative survey of soft power assets, combined with a limited amount of qualitative survey evidence. This is very useful, but it reinforces a tautological view that listing and counting “assets” is the best way to assess the “influence” or strength of a country’s soft power.

A look at what constitutes an “asset” is instructive. The Portland 30 includes Government bodies active in foreign policy and global media (BBC World Service, DFID, FCO and British Council); global brands; large cultural institutions, particularly museums; higher education; civil society; and the charitable sector (especially global charities that contribute to development, disaster relief, and human rights reforms). Relationships consist of memberships in global networks and multilateral organisations, which are also seen as conferring a significant soft power advantage.

Despite the tautology, these indices, if unpacked, can offer useful information for comparing country strategies. The preceding paragraph lists a few of these factors. In its statistical analyses later, while measuring soft power outcomes, this report also borrows from the cultural ranking of the Good Country Index.

The Portland 30 list is not (probably cannot be) an exhaustive list of either institutions or relationships. It singles out a few prominent organisations but does not describe the full range of organisations active in the “cultural” space (and therefore relevant to soft power) such as global media corporations, creative industries, cultural producers, or sports bodies. Neither does it try to quantify or qualitatively assess the relationships these organisations have. It does not assess countries’ connections to global network hubs, the level of mobility or openness of societies through visa regimes, or the attractiveness of their heritage or cultural events.

The major problem with this asset-based approach to measuring soft power, however, is that many of the indices elide assets, perceptions, and influences. Perceptions are assumed to be indicators of influence. Perceptions of country X are also assumed to correlate with the soft power assets of county X. Both assumptions may be true, but a list of assets and perceptions on its own cannot establish cause and effect.

A focus on assets is also static – it does not propose what a country’s soft power policies should be, how they should be developed, implemented or assessed. It is for these reasons that there is a need to move beyond reliance on measures of soft power that focus on brands or assets.

A more productive approach might be to focus on the value of assets first and their effects
later – to discern how much leverage assets actually deliver, how effectively, efficiently and economically they are used, and what value they have. The empirical section of this report undertakes such an effort.

The central issue in thinking about soft power as public policy is how to reconcile the need for a strategic approach and a strategic narrative on the one hand, and the need to respect the independence of the civil society and cultural institutions and relationships on which soft power depends, on the other. Broadly, this is the difference between public diplomacy and cultural relations. This report bridges this gap through an empirical strategy that can account for specific public diplomacy outcomes (international political influence such as at the UN) while taking into account that cultural relations can be independent of the work of government actors. Empirically we examine soft power assets such as countries’ levels of prosperity and Internet penetration rates to take into account, for example, economic values and citizen diplomacy respectively, which go beyond a narrow conception of public diplomacy and soft power as the work of governments.

In doing so, this report addresses 4 gaps in our understanding of soft power:

- **Soft power assets**: we do not have a sophisticated enough understanding of what our soft power assets are in the age of digital communications media. We need a better map of our cultural, political, economic, educational and social relationships, one that takes account of how soft power ideas are generated, shared and co-created in the contemporary world. This report uses a range of ‘variables’ and ‘proxies’ to understand soft power. No doubt there are many other variables to be considered. However, this report seeks to make a methodological and conceptual contribution to thinking rigorously about soft power assets.

- **Contextual relationships**: we need to understand more how these assets relate to the specific countries and contexts with which we want to engage, recognising that each will have different perceptions and levels of receptivity to the UK’s soft power initiatives. Our empirical strategy quantitatively accounts for a large number of countries including the G20 and EU27. Quantitative models encompassing the world (large-n or number in data terms) also best answer the question: under what conditions does soft power result in desirable outcomes?

- **The value of soft power**: we have soft power, but we lack an approach to describing and assessing its value – this value can be economic, political, cultural and/or social. This report assesses economic, political and cultural value of soft power both in terms of causes or assets, and their effects or influences.

- **A policy toolkit for soft power**: we do not have a strategic narrative for soft power, nor an agreed approach to policy development, implementation or evaluation. A rigorous and empirically rich approach is needed to specify specific soft power assets and outcomes to shape policy instruments that may be most effective in the future.
The UK and the challenges of today and tomorrow

The world is changing before our eyes. This report has identified a range of “mega-trends” which will impact on the UK’s soft power, and a range of challenges to the practice of cultural diplomacy. The empirical limitation of this report is ‘past data’, whereas current developments challenge our conceptualisation of what to measure.

**POST-LIBERALISM – HOW TO REACT TO CHANGED POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS**

Some commentators see that the political changes of recent months (Brexit, the election of President Trump in the USA, the strong performance of the political right in European elections) imply that many of the assumptions underpinning the liberal world order may require a new “post-liberal” approach which would be dependent on the strong relationships which soft power helps to engender:

But unlike the freedom ‘from’ liberalism that measures progress in terms of the reduction in constraint, postliberalism... sees people as embedded in relationships, and wider groups, and conceives of their wellbeing as being dependent on those relationships and the state of the wider communities they are part of. (Goodhart, 2014).

**BREXIT AND TRUMP**

On 24 June 2016, the UK woke up to the news that the people had voted to leave the EU. On 9 November, the world woke up to the news that Donald J. Trump would be the next President of the USA.

The long-term implications for UK soft power of either Brexit or the Trump victory cannot be predicted at this stage, but early reactions indicate some of the challenges ahead. Brexit was undoubtedly not well received by the world’s media and the UK’s image as an open, welcoming society was questioned (MacDonald, 2016).

That is a question that remains to be decided, but the UK will undoubtedly have to forge strong relationships with a wide range of countries, if it is to base its future on free trade and a global outlook. To do so will lead us to develop new relationships, which could challenge our values. To do business with some countries, we may need to compromise, be less certain of our own values and less ready to impose – or appear to impose – them on others. As David Goodhart of the think-tank Demos cited above says, such a postliberal approach could imply a greater degree of cultural conservatism as we engage with peoples whose values differ from our own, for example, by emphasising collective attachment more than individual freedom.

A policy of isolationism or a renewed focus on hard power at the expense of soft power carries considerable risks. Responding to President Donald Trump’s initiatives to reduce the U.S. budget for diplomacy and foreign aid by 30 per cent while trying to bolster military
Mr. Trump seems to assume that national greatness comes from the barrel of a gun — he wants to expand the fleet of Navy ships and the nuclear arsenal — rather than from a combination of military might and “soft power” tools. One such tool is the example America sets by adhering to constitutional principles, the rule of law and human rights. Others involve pursuing smart diplomatic engagement and initiatives, including nuclear agreements and disaster assistance for some of the poorest countries.

In 2017, the future of soft power seems complicated. Against this complexity, the statistical results reported in the next section offer some clarity: the soft power of pluralist and prosperous countries brings further economic, political, and cultural gains.

CONCLUSIONS:

- The analysis of the House of Lords in 2014 broadly holds good today – the UK needs to be strong at both soft and hard power. It may have strong soft power assets, but it needs to act urgently if it is not to be overtaken by others;
- We need a more sophisticated understanding of our true soft power position. To do that, we need a better understanding of:
  - How soft power can be used to influence the decisions of others – the causes and effects of soft power in specific contexts – and what we wish to achieve through soft power;
  - How soft power can be led politically, a strategy developed, and implemented at Governmental level in the UK, including a clear relationship with foreign and trade policy which considers the devolved nature of UK governance, and the need for effective mechanisms for governance and accountability;
  - How the UK’s civil society and non-state actors can be involved in its soft power strategy;
  - The key mega-trends which impact on the UK’s ability to gain influence, particularly those related to global communications;
  - How to conduct credible two-way relationships with countries whose values differ from our own.
Part 2 – Measuring Soft Power Outcomes in International Cultural Relations
Introduction

Power is the ability to persuade someone else to do what they would not otherwise do. States traditionally achieved such aims through their economic might or military power. Hard power resources include economic size, demographics, military strength. The instruments of hard power tend to be coercive and forceful.

Countries also possess and deploy soft power. In Joseph Nye’s famous formulation, soft power is the ability of countries to persuade rather than co-opt others through the influence of their political institutions, cultural and political values, and the ability to shape international policies and rules through public diplomacy and communication. Soft power carries legitimacy.

In practice analysts often confuse outcomes with influences: power becomes what power does. The famous circularity of power notes that we often cannot distinguish causes from outcomes. Examples include many country ‘brands’ that often confuse influences ‘from’ and perception ‘about’ country X in another country Y. The solution to this circularity is first to account for the power resources, and then demonstrate an empirical outline of their outcomes.

Our data findings confirm that soft power matters. This is the first statistical study of soft power across political, cultural, and economic dimensions. The few studies of soft power in prior studies either looked at specific factors such as communication (Camber 2014), causes of public diplomacy (Rasmussen 2014), or particular effects (Rose 2016).

This study confirms that many soft power causal factors or influences, are statistically significant in explaining outcomes or attractions. These results are borne out through 28 different statistical model specifications and another two dozen bar graphs, scatter diagrams, and tables presented in the report.

This research strategy entailing multiple specifications of models and data allow our findings to be double-checked from multiple perspectives – known as validity and robustness checks in statistics. The logic is simple – multiple Specifications yielding similar results are better at specifying causal chains rather than one specification by itself.

The data analysis in this study measures the effect of soft power assets or resources upon social, cultural, economic, and political domains or influences. As with any statistical analysis, the four measures chosen are in fact operational measures of a broader category of variables and informed with reasoning from the conceptual literature and availability of data. The actual influences may be bigger and more encompassing than those provided here.

A conceptual measure such as national wealth, for example, can have several measures. Theoretical reasons and data availability would guide the researcher in choosing gross national product or an alternative measure as an operational category for national wealth. Common sense reasoning is also important. When speaking of citizen prosperity, for example, size or distribution of per capita income may be more important than overall national income. Appendix C is the standard statistical “codebook” that explains the label used for each variable and the source for the variable’s data.

This study conceptualizes soft power “assets” or “influences” as independent or causal variables and “attractions” or outcomes as dependent variables. Binary relationships among pairs of independent and dependent variables are explored through scatter diagrams but the full illustration of all factors comes with statistical models with multiple variable analysis, which specify the conditions under which soft assets have measurable influences, thus providing us with a set of causal inference claims.
The short version of the causal statistical story in this report is this: soft power assets or influences matter in statistically significant ways for attracting international students, tourists, foreign direct investment, and for a country’s political attractiveness around the world.

Soft power resources or assets (independent variables) and their measures employed here are:

- **Political values** measured through levels of democracy and levels of restrictions on political rights.
- **Attractiveness of levels of prosperity** measured through per capita income.
- **Cultural assets** measured through international networks of cultural institutions and cultural rankings of countries, and citizen communications measured through levels of internet usage.

The four operational measures for the attractions (dependent variables) are:

- **Social attractions**: number of incoming international students
- **Cultural attractions**: number of incoming international tourists
- **Economic attractions**: levels of FDI
- **Political attractions**: UN General Assembly voting close to the average “ideal point” of voting for all states. In other words, the soft power influence pulls countries toward moderation rather than extreme values.

We also account for the influence of hard power by taking into consideration the total economic size of the country (gross domestic product). Hard power is statistically significant in all the models. However, this study shows the influence of soft power assets over and above that of hard power.

So as not to bias our measures toward a specific year, most of our variables take the average value of data from 2000–2012 for available data. The measures are ‘standardized’ to allow for easy interpretation, therefore allowing us to speak of percentage changes rather than unit changes in variables.

Especially important from a cultural perspective, this study measures the strong influence of three cultural factors: cultural institutions, global cultural rankings, and people’s internet connectivity. The following outcomes for our cultural variable are important:

- **Cultural institutions** – such as the British Council or the Goethe Institute – are influential for attracting international students, international tourists, and foreign direct investment. We constructed a unique dataset showing the international reach of cultural institutions for 27 countries. Therefore, this variable cannot be employed for the “world” (large-n) part of our statistical analysis and appears in only one model specification.

- A country’s **cultural ranking** in the world also matters for attracting foreign direct investment and political influence in the world. We measure the soft power influence of countries that rank in the top 15 culturally for the Good Country Index.

- Lastly, higher percentages of **populations connected on the internet** lead to higher numbers of international students and tourists, foreign direct investment, and global political influence. For this, we obtain data ranging from 125 to 178 countries depending on the model specification.

The statistical models offered in this study are simple and intuitive formulations, but they are robust in that they hold through multiple and successive iterations of the models. The key relationships are illustrated through figures and graphs. However, these are preliminary studies. Now that we have shown that soft power influences and attractions can be analysed and measured empirically, the next step would be to employ further rigour in collection and analytics.

The following analysis is divided into four sections, each dealing with one of the outcomes of soft power assets – in other words, four dependent variables: number of incoming international students, number of international tourists, incoming foreign direct investment, and political influence as measured through United National General Assembly voting.
Data Presentation

Our data are presented in three forms. The bar graphs present the frequency distributions for our major outcome variables. A preliminary look at these bar charts shows that, while a group of countries dominates the top ranks, the individual rankings vary.

However, the United States and the UK rank on top for international students and foreign direct investment, while France and the U.S. lead for international tourists. There is no ‘top’ ranking for the UN vote because it reveals voting patterns only, but the United States and the UK deviate most from the ‘ideal point’ average while, as this report shows, exercising high influence over other states’ ideal points. In other words, soft power here lies not in the moderation of the countries with soft power but countries affected by soft power, or the ability of high soft power states to pull other countries toward moderation. Empirically this also means pulling them toward their own position in most cases for countries such as the UK and USA with positive ideal points versus those with negative.

The scatter charts show key binary relationships (between soft power influence and attractions). Beyond the ones included in the quantitative model, there are other binary relationships shown here. One of these is the influence of foreign aid. Foreign aid has a positive influence on the influx of students, tourists, and FDI, and increases a country’s political influence (see Figure 1A-D). However, foreign aid is a tricky category, which includes several sub-categories such as military aid. The variable’s “influence” is lost when included with other variables. Therefore, foreign aid is presented as a stand-alone category here.
FIG 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROVISION OF FOREIGN AID AND INFLUX OF INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS, TOURISTS AND FDI, AND GLOBAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE

A. STUDENTS

B. TOURISTS

Aid provided, standard
C. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

D. UN VOTING IDEALPOINTS
Finally, the most rigorous results are presented in the regression tables. For each of the dependent variables or “attractions”, there are 7 different iterations or models that help us ascertain the relative weight of each factor. An important statistical criterion is that the fundamental relationship among 2 factors (the binary) must hold even when additional factors or variables are added. The most important finding or binary relationship in each model is that democratic values tend to be positively related to students, tourists, FDI, and international political influence. Appendix A also presents the same set of results with a slightly different ‘democracy’ variable (levels of political rights) to verify the robustness of the results.

A final note on the data. There are three different types of groupings of countries used in the data presentations.

- **G20**: The smallest group is the G20, which includes 19 countries and the European Union. Many bar graphs and scatter charts present data for G20 minus the EU. For the purposes of cross-national comparison the EU cannot be included. Table 1 presents the data for the 19 countries included in the G20 for all the variables included in our statistical models.

### TABLE 1: DATA ON CASUAL AND DEPENDENT FACTORS FOR G20 COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
<th>Total International Tourists (millions)</th>
<th>Average HDI (Billions)</th>
<th>Average UN Idealpoint</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Level of Democracy</th>
<th>Cultural Institutions Countries Engaged</th>
<th>Cultural Rank in Top 15</th>
<th>Cultural Institutions Rank 15</th>
<th>Internet User (per 100)</th>
<th>GDP (USD millions)</th>
<th>GDP Per CAPITA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>3,255</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>16910.54</td>
<td>15410.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>5.55</td>
<td>31.98</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>39932.14</td>
<td>20912.44</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>9,190</td>
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<td>48.76</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13235.37</td>
<td>41994.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>84,719</td>
<td>17.67</td>
<td>46.18</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>40555.71</td>
<td>34094.84</td>
<td></td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>70,632</td>
<td>47.57</td>
<td>158.65</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>-7.00</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7872.524</td>
<td>34094.84</td>
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<td>226,374</td>
<td>78.34</td>
<td>47.84</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>36524.66</td>
<td>34094.84</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>216,185</td>
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<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>40494.53</td>
<td>34094.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>15,222</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>21.79</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3866.168</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>6.26</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,847</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>0.73</td>
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<td>10.00</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4,345</td>
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<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
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<td>1.40</td>
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<td>140</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1,365</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>25.90</td>
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<td>2.33</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24.00</td>
<td>31.20</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>20912.44</td>
<td>20912.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>28,189</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>13.13</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>-10.00</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41994.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>52,986</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>4.41</td>
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<td>1.60</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>569</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>23,373</td>
<td>24.53</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<td>6.88</td>
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<td>105.23</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>22,478</td>
<td>36385.76</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>633,975</td>
<td>55.53</td>
<td>239.56</td>
<td>2.72</td>
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<td>10.00</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14,930</td>
<td>49330.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
**Expanded G20:** A few of the other bar graphs, scatter plots, and the statistical models include all the EU countries, Switzerland, and the other nineteen G20 economies. We call this the expanded G20. Once the number is increased beyond 30, it makes statistical sense to include this enlarged G20 in the regressions models.

**World:** Our regression results also present the analysis for all countries of the world for which data are available. In many ways, these results are more important than the G20 results because they provide a better source of comparison for our variables. Take the influence of varying levels of democracy, for example. In the G20 sample over 90 percent of the countries score high on democracy. With such little variation, the democracy variables are not that meaningful for statistical comparison. However, when we consider the levels of democracy for all countries of the world, we can confirm the argument that democratic countries attract more students, tourists, and FDI than non-democratic countries.
Attracting International Students

Incoming international students represent social and cultural outcomes of soft power, and are highly susceptible to the host country’s soft power resources. Figure 2 shows the number of international students coming into G20 and European Union countries. As can be seen the high-ranking countries are also the original G20 members.

**FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF INCOMING FOREIGN STUDENTS**

- United States of America
- United Kingdom
- Germany
- France
- Australia
- Japan
- Canada
- South Africa
- Italy
- Turkey
- Saudi Arabia
- India
- Korea, Republic of
- Argentina
- Indonesia
- Mexico
- Brazil

Number of foreign students
Table 2 presents data from the top-ranked universities in the world from The Times Higher Education Supplement. Of the top 100 universities 96 are in the G20 countries. The United States and the United Kingdom account for 55 of the top 100 universities in the world, and 107 of the top 200. These rankings correspond with the share of these countries in terms of total international students received shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G20</th>
<th>G20</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>1–100</th>
<th>101–200</th>
<th>201–500</th>
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<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (OTHER)</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL G20:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>275</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Six scatter plots and fitted lines in Figure 3 demonstrate the positive influence of 4 soft power assets and 1 hard power factor (Total GDP) on attracting international students to the expanded G20. The number of countries engaged is the presence of a country’s cultural institutions (Goethe Institute for example) in others. The sixth factor, foreign aid, was illustrated earlier.
FIG 3
EFFECTS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCES ON INCOMING INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS

Democracy, POLITY IV

Freedom House, political rights restriction
As the polity democracy index produces a cluster of democracies to the right in the figure above, the freedom house index is a better measure with variations: as political rights get more restricted the number of students declines.

The scatter plot on numbers of countries engaged with cultural institutions among the expanded G20 set shows that cultural engagement in foreign countries increases international students received. This finding is also borne out in the citizen to citizen diplomacy for which a rough measure is provided from the percentages of internet users in the host country.

Putting this altogether would mean that a country such as the United States or United Kingdom attracts high levels of international students due to the soft power of its culture (cultural and educational institutions, and citizen diplomacy), politics (democracy and lack of political rights restrictions), economics (relative prosperity of the citizens). Furthermore, the overall economic strength of the country, a form of hard power as measured through total GDP, is also meaningful.

The findings above are confirmed through the 7 models presented in Table 3 and in the additional 6 models presented in Appendix A. As mentioned earlier, successive iterations with different models help us determine the relative influence and robustness of each explanatory factor. These models thus help determine the relative causal weight of the variables in explaining the influx of international students. There is a statistically significant relationship between levels of democracy and international students. However, the coefficient is small between 0.03 and 0.10, indicating that every one point increase in the polity score only leads to miniscule increases in students. Notice, though, that the democracy variable becomes insignificant when cultural variables (institutions, internet users, cultural ranking) are added in. This implies that cultural factors mediate with democracy variables in accounting for international students.

The statistically significant and high coefficients for cultural variables is important. Every 1% increase in the number of countries a cultural institution from country X covers results in 0.73 per cent increase in international students for that country on average. Similarly, every 1% increase in internet users from country X also results in almost one-half per cent increase in the number of international students for that country.
High numbers of internet users tend to be connected to social media presence from these countries. The hypothesis here speaks to citizen diplomacy in attracting international students. The social media presence of internet users in democracies acts as a soft power pull factor. Equally it speaks to the influence of the internet as an attraction: in the 21st century, the internet is a necessity. Students go to countries where the internet penetration is high.

Economic factors are also important in attracting international students. Soft power is measured through GDP per capita suggesting that seeing prosperous citizens in another country acts as a motivator for international students to study there. In 4 of the 6 models, GDP per capita is significant showing that every 1% increase in per capita incomes acts as a soft power pull factor for anywhere from 0.35% (Model 5) to 0.98% (Model 2) increase in international students. GDP per capital is collinear with percentage of internet users in a country and thus it is not surprising that its influence disappears when Internet users are added to models 6 & 7.

Hard power, as measured from overall economic wealth, is also a significant causal factor: every 1% increase in overall GDP results in 0.69% (Model 6) to 0.70% (Model 7) increase in international students.

In short:
- Democracy, prosperity, the state of cultural and educational institutions, and citizen diplomacy are all important factors for attracting international students.
- The influence of democracy may be indirect and works its way through cultural institutions and citizen diplomacy.

### TABLE 3
**MODELS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCE ON STUDENT ATTRACTION (WITH POLITY DEMOCRACY SCORES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) # of foreign students standardized</th>
<th>(2) # of foreign students standardized</th>
<th>(3) # of foreign students G20 standardized</th>
<th>(4) # of foreign students standardized</th>
<th>(5) # of foreign students standardized</th>
<th>(6) # of foreign students standardized</th>
<th>(7) # of foreign students standardized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>democracy, POLITY IV</td>
<td>0.10*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.05* (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.03* (0.02)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of countries engaged, standardized (with cultural institutions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.73*** (0.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, standardized</td>
<td>0.98*** (0.13)</td>
<td>0.79* (0.42)</td>
<td>0.95*** (0.32)</td>
<td>0.35*** (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.20)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, standardized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.70*** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.69*** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.70*** (0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of internet user, standardized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Ranking, ==1 if Top15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>7.79*** (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.96 (1.20)</td>
<td>2.25 (4.24)</td>
<td>-1.82 (3.21)</td>
<td>-12.92*** (1.84)</td>
<td>-10.52*** (2.19)</td>
<td>-10.42*** (2.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.634</td>
<td>0.650</td>
<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Attracting International Tourists

The story of attracting international tourists is like that of international students. Both are highly susceptible to soft power factors such as levels of democracy, cultural institutions, citizen diplomacy, and levels of citizen prosperity.

Figure 4 shows a difference though: the United States and United Kingdom respectively attract 3rd and 6th highest numbers of tourists internationally instead of being in 1st and 2nd place as they were for students. In the case of education, top ranking universities were attractions for international students. In the case of tourism, it may be cultural institutions.

A look at the raw data in Table 1 shows that other countries in the top 6 recipients of tourists such as China and France also have a high number of countries in which they operate their cultural institutions. For China operating in one country through its Confucius Institute usually means a dense network of institutional connections.
A few of the causal relationships are illustrated in Figure 5. Culture and economics influence international tourist arrivals as can be seen from the upward slope of all lines for the number of countries engaged with cultural institutions, number of internet users, GDP per capita, and overall GDP. The reason for not including the democracy indicators here will be explained later.

**FIG 4**

EFFECTS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCES ON INTERNATIONAL TOURIST ARRIVALS
The quantitative models deepen the soft power attraction story. The three most important factors are: cultural institutions (model 4), number of Internet users (models 6 & 7), GDP per capita (models 2, 4, 6), and overall GDP (models 5–7).
Internet penetration rates tell a similar story to that of students: tourists go where the internet illuminates the story of that place – from websites of tourist sites to the available infrastructure including online bookings for hotel and transport. Once there, the tourists stay connected with their networks in other countries. Furthermore, citizen diplomacy works here as well. High internet penetration translates into high social media use from the citizens themselves narrating the story of their country.

The level of democracy is significant but the coefficient is very small suggesting that democracy matters for tourists, but only marginally. This makes intuitive sense. Many highly-visited tourist spots in the world are not located in democratic countries.

One of the factors not included in the regressions here is percentage of culture and tourism expenditures from national budgets. This variable was modelled but no statistically significant relationship was found. This may not mean that these expenditures do not matter. Instead, it is likely that the figures countries report on their culture and tourism may not be accurate, or that quantities spent on tourism do not indicate quality.

Overall:

- International tourists tend to visit countries with both overall and citizen prosperity, and those that have placed cultural institutions in their countries.
- Citizen diplomacy is also important in attracting tourists.
- Except for the hard power of overall prosperity, the other factors examined above relate to soft power.

### TABLE 4
**MODELS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCE ON TOURIST ATTRACTION**  
(WITH POLITY DEMOCRACY SCORES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House, political rights restriction</td>
<td>0.17** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.16*** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.10** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.09* (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of countries engaged, standardized</td>
<td>0.51*** (0.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, standardized</td>
<td>1.04*** (0.13)</td>
<td>0.26 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.49*** (0.17)</td>
<td>0.30*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.21 (0.18)</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, standardized</td>
<td>0.66*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.67*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.67*** (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of internet user, standardized</td>
<td>0.66*** (0.18)</td>
<td>0.66*** (0.18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Ranking, ==1 if Top15</td>
<td>0.34** (0.17)</td>
<td>0.34** (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>14.20*** (0.32)</td>
<td>4.17*** (1.38)</td>
<td>12.96*** (3.02)</td>
<td>9.59*** (1.68)</td>
<td>-4.82*** (0.86)</td>
<td>-2.67** (1.18)</td>
<td>-2.55** (1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.786</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Attracting Foreign Direct Investment

The determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) are highly studied. They are complex and multi-faceted. The relationships described here merely offer a preliminary understanding of soft power factors relevant for FDI. Complex modelling is necessary to obtain rigorous results.

FIGURE 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FDI inflow Million USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of Japan</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United States and the United Kingdom account for the highest amounts of FDI, nearly $240 billion and $105 billion respectively on average between 2000–2012. Netherlands and Germany are 3rd and 4th, and China is 5th (See Figure 6).

Being ahead in tourist or student arrivals does not translate to incoming FDI. France receives the highest number of international tourists but sixth highest amount of FDI.

There is a positive relationship between FDI and the overall and citizen (per capita) prosperity of a country. This is to be expected.

The relationship between percentage of internet users in a population and incoming FDI is also not surprising. Internet here can also indicate the overall infrastructural health of an economy. The only surprise here is the role of cultural institutions in receiving FDI (Figure 7). As Table 5 shows, every one percent increase in the number of countries covered through cultural institutions results in almost 0.66 percent increase in FDI for that country.
FIG 7
EFFECTS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

# of countries engaged, standardized

# of internet user, standardized
GDP, standardized

GDP per capita
Apart from the soft power of cultural institutions, there are only two other power determinants of FDI: levels of per capita income (soft power of citizen prosperity) and overall economic strength (hard power of a country’s overall GDP). The democracy indices (Table 5 and Appendix A3) are also significant but the small coefficient shows that the influence is very small.

**TABLE 5**
**MODELS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCE ON FDI ATTRACTION**
(WITH POLITY DEMOCRACY SCORES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Foreign Direct investment inflow standardized</th>
<th>(2) Foreign Direct investment inflow standardized</th>
<th>(3) Foreign Direct investment inflow standardized</th>
<th>(4) Foreign Direct investment inflow standardized</th>
<th>(5) Foreign Direct investment inflow standardized</th>
<th>(6) Foreign Direct investment inflow standardized</th>
<th>(7) Foreign Direct investment inflow standardized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy, POLITY IV</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of countries engaged, standardized</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, standardized</td>
<td>1.20***</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
<td>0.43***</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, standardized</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of internet user, standardized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Ranking, ==1 if Top15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>20.52***</td>
<td>9.92***</td>
<td>17.44***</td>
<td>19.43***</td>
<td>-2.10**</td>
<td>-1.72*</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>0.835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Overall:
- cultural and economic soft power along with economic strength positively correlates with incoming foreign direct investment.
Global Political Influence

The political influence of a country is measured in this study through the effect of soft power resources on the United Nations General Assembly voting data ideal points calculated by Voeten et al (2009). Figure 8 illustrates the affinity scores.

**FIGURE 8**

United States of America
United Kingdom
France
Canada
Australia
Germany
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Turkey
Argentina
Brazil
South Africa
Mexico
India
China
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia

The United States and UK are the farthest away from the ideal point average. The ideal point scores must be interpreted carefully; they reveal a country’s influence in the international system, for example as a great power. This would explain the affinity scores for the U.S. and UK that are away from ideal point. This deviation does not mean, however, that great powers such as the U.S. and UK do not like the ‘average’: one of the strategies of great powers may very well be to pull deviants, especially in the negative digits shown in Figure 8, close to the average.

This reasoning allows for a test of hard and soft power factors to discern if they affect a country’s ideal point. In the case of global political influence the quantitative models are described first for overall patterns.
The three big differences from prior models are that:

1. hard power of economic strength does not translate into global political influence. This is counterintuitive but means that soft power of public and cultural diplomacy might matter more for global political influences.

2. While the democracy index only shows negligible but statistically significant influence, the reduction of political rights restrictions in a country (the freedom house index – see Appendix Table A.4) matters more for explaining global political influences. This means that whereas overall levels of democracy only lead to a negligible increase in global political influence, restrictions on political rights have a greater effect.

3. A country’s cultural rank translates into global political influence. Rankings cannot be modelled as variables and thus the dummy variable used here measures the impact of being in the top 15 culturally ranked countries in the Good Country Index. The overall impact of being in the top 15 culturally ranked country is important: it translates into moving the ideal point of a country by 0.52 points. The impact of a high culture rank is higher than any of the factors in the models presented.

### TABLE 6
MODELS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCE ON UNGA VOTING  
(WITH POLITY DEMOCRACY SCORES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) UN Assembly Voting</th>
<th>(2) UN Assembly Voting</th>
<th>(3) UN Assembly Voting</th>
<th>(4) UN Assembly Voting</th>
<th>(5) UN Assembly Voting</th>
<th>(6) UN Assembly Voting</th>
<th>(7) UN Assembly Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy, POLITY IV</td>
<td>0.09*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.08*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.09*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.10*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.08*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.07*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.07*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of countries engaged, standardized</td>
<td>0.10 (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, standardized</td>
<td>0.24*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.61*** (0.15)</td>
<td>0.50** (0.19)</td>
<td>0.24*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, standardized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of internet user, standardized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Ranking, ==1 if Top15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.18** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.17** (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.46*** (0.05)</td>
<td>-2.63*** (0.28)</td>
<td>-6.18*** (1.57)</td>
<td>-5.33** (1.97)</td>
<td>-2.66*** (0.66)</td>
<td>-1.77** (0.85)</td>
<td>-1.57* (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>156</td>
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<td>156</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
The scatter plots and fitted lines illustrate the positive relationship between moving countries to ideal points with the soft power of overall prosperity (GDP per capita), reduction of political rights restrictions, attainment of culture rank. The scatter plot for the number of countries engaged with cultural institutions also shows that this factor is not important for gaining global political influence.
IN SHORT:
- Great powers may deviate from average ideal point UN General Assembly voting scores but they exercise great influence over other countries scores.
- Great power influence in international diplomacy is less dependent on their hard power and more on their soft power including their cultural rank and lack of political restrictions.
Conclusion

Our statistical findings confirm that democratic pluralism, economic prosperity, and internationally networked cultural institutions provide dividends: they are positively related to incoming international student and tourist arrivals; they result in incoming FDI; and they affect UNGA voting behaviour.

Pluralist democracies follow a diffused soft power strategy that works its way through various levels, including citizen diplomacy, educational and cultural institutions, and the health of their economies. Recent literature, such as that reviewed in Part 1 of this study, has made much of top-down soft power strategies of countries like China. Our study’s quantitative results indicate that China may be an outlier. In other words, China’s soft power strategy does not represent the world on average. It is certainly not replicated in the strategies of other countries in the world with soft power influence. On average, the causal factors outlined above make a difference in soft power attractions.

Joseph Nye (2012) notes:

“But for all its efforts, China has had a limited return on its investment. A recent BBC poll shows that opinions of China’s influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United States and Europe, as well as in India, Japan and South Korea. A poll taken in Asia after the Beijing Olympics found that China’s charm offensive had been ineffective. What China seems not to appreciate is that using culture and narrative to create soft power is not easy when they are inconsistent with domestic realities.

Therefore, this study concludes that the future of soft power is in the hands of Western style democracies. This is perhaps ironic, at a time when many think that Western style democracy and liberalism are under threat.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A  Global Approaches to the Practice of Soft Power
Appendix B  Multiple regression models with Freedom House Political Rights Index
A1  Models of Soft Power Influence on Student Attraction (with Freedom House Civil Liberties Scores)
A2  Models of Soft Power Influence on Tourist Attraction (with Freedom House Civil Liberties Scores)
A3  Models of Soft Power Influence on FDI Attraction (with Freedom House Civil Liberties Scores)
A4  Models of Soft Power Influence on UNGA Voting (with Freedom House Civil Liberties Scores)
Appendix C  Data Codebook (containing variable names and data sources)
Appendix A
GLOBAL APPROACHES TO THE PRACTICE OF SOFT POWER
This section provides a brief overview of soft power in many of the G20 countries. It provides an overview of the following in each country: major government ministries organizations for soft power, relevant conceptual thinking about soft power in selected countries and major soft power resources and activities. This report does not pretend to be fully comprehensive, but summarises the position today.

The report commissioned translations from the original languages, for this section of the report. The source materials for these translations included mostly official web sites containing strategies, policies and official analysis. In a few instances, the translators also consulted academic journal and other articles in reputable media; Parliamentary and other reports; public and cultural diplomacy speeches.

We looked at how the term soft power was understood across the world, and found that with some variations, it was the definition of Joseph Nye that was most commonly used – sometimes due to his work having been rather literally translated into another language (e.g. Arabic) and then used almost as a textbook by soft power authorities and organisations.

Where Nye's definition did not hold was for countries that drew on their own history and traditions and cultural values. These countries included European states that had been practising soft power for many years before Nye, and continue to pursue their own visions. China has a vision for soft power derived from a range of domestic priorities, ideology and traditional cultural values. India's vision draws on its status as a democracy, its traditional culture and its more recent successes in popular media such as cinema.

Regional priorities were very noticeable. Religion played a major role in the Middle East. Soft power as a way of influencing the USA from within a multilateral trade partnership was a strategic feature of both Canada and Mexico.

It was not possible to cover every country in the world, but we looked at a sample of the main practitioners:

- Soft power in the English language: USA; Canada; India;
- BRICs: China; Russia; Brazil;
- South Korea;
- Western Europe: Germany; France;
- Middle East: Qatar; the UAE; Saudi Arabia; Egypt;
- Latin America: Mexico, and Argentina.

SOFT POWER IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: USA; CANADA; INDIA

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The USA was the country where the theory of soft power was developed. The USA devotes a great deal of resource to public diplomacy. In 1961 Congress passed the Fulbright-Hays Act to “increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.” The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the United States Department of State is responsible for 5 agencies engaged in soft power:

- Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Since 1961, the ECA has worked “to build friendly, peaceful relations between the people of the United States and the people of other countries through academic, cultural, sports, and professional exchanges, as well as public-private partnerships.”;

- Bureau of Public Affairs – media communication;

- Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) supports people-to-people conversations with foreign publics on U.S. policy priorities by using digital communications technology;

- Global Engagement Center co-ordinates U.S. counterterrorism messaging to foreign audiences;

In addition:

- **United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD)** appraises U.S. Government public diplomacy activities;

- **US Agency for International Development (USAID)** has two complementary and intrinsically linked goals: ending extreme poverty and promoting the development of resilient, democratic societies that can realize their potential;

- **Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and Health Diplomacy** leads implementation of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).

- **American English** is a resource centre for teaching and learning about American English language and culture.

Today, the mission of US public diplomacy is to “support U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world” (http://www.state.gov/r/index.htm).

**CANADA**

Global Affairs Canada is the authority responsible for Canada’s soft power. Canada’s soft power is focused on the disproportionately large role that the United States has played in the economic, social, cultural and political lives of Canadians, and the very significant commitment that Canada has made to the principles and practices of multilateral diplomacy and multilateral management.

Today, Canada is seen to be “adrift, and has been for over a decade.” Canada’s Image and reputation are low due to budget cuts and perceived incompetence in the management of Canada’s international relations. Challenges to NAFTA within Canada have generated poor perceptions of publics in Canada and USA to each other.

The Trudeau government, however, is leading a revival:

- Comprehensive international policy review, leading to the articulation of a forward-looking grand strategy;
- Emphasis on human rights, peace and security, tackling climate change, helping Syrian refugees and promoting gender;
- Expanding and re-profiling Canada’s representational footprint abroad to overcome rigidity, reduce adherence to convention and reinforce the vital connection to place;
- Outreach to establish new alliances and partnerships – with universities, think tanks, NGOs, diaspora communities and businesses;
- Renewing the Foreign Service through expanded secondments, exchanges and changes in training and recruitment practices.

**INDIA**

3 Government departments lead India’s soft power:

- **Ministry of External Affairs** – is actively involved in promoting India’s image and culture in different countries through representations;

- **Ministry of Culture** – runs the Scheme for Promoting International Cultural Relations and is responsible for entering cultural agreements with foreign countries; and

- **Ministry of Tourism** – works with other Ministries in relation to international cooperation in tourism.

The Incredible India brand promotes tourism, presenting a highly attractive and unified image of a very large and diverse country. India’s brand ambassador is Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India.

The **Indian Council for Cultural Relations** was formally set up in 1950, with the primary objective of establishing, reviving and strengthening cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries. Its aims, as enunciated in the Memorandum of Association, are:

- To participate in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes relating to India’s cultural relations with other countries.
- To foster and strengthen cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries;
- To establish and develop relations with national and international organizations in the field of culture.

The concepts underlying India’s approach to cultural relations are like those of the British Council, but there are specifically Indian features.

- India has several avenues of soft power, ranging from its recognition as the world’s largest democracy and the birthplace of Mahatma Gandhi, the proponent of ahimsa, India’s non-violent struggle for freedom from the British Empire.
- India’s soft power assets are its ancient treasures such as Ayurveda and the widely practised yoga.

Contemporary examples include the mass appeal of Bollywood movies and musicals as well as Indian soap operas that are viewed from Shanghai to Seattle. In addition to this, there is a huge Indian expatriate community in several countries around the world that has helped disseminate and popularise Indian culture, tradition and cuisine.

Prime Minister Modi’s current foreign policy strategy can be termed ‘universal engagement’. India does intend to challenge the status quo, but it plans to do so incrementally, without causing a major disturbance to the current international order. India was always aware that it had potential reserves of soft power in various forms, some more popular than others and has attempted to capitalise on it for a long time, especially economically. However, Mr Modi’s policy may be the first time that the government and the prime minister have been so actively involved in cultivating and spreading India’s influence abroad.

India’s soft power extends well beyond yoga and Bollywood – it has been providing modest amounts of assistance to smaller neighbours such as Nepal and Bhutan ever since independence. India has consistently provided technical assistance, training (of bureaucrats) as well as foreign aid to states in Asia as well as Africa; it is second only to China in terms of developing country donors (Mullen and Ganguly, 2012).

The Modi administration is strategically constructing a positive image of India to help assuage the simultaneous rise in hard power resources by India.

Indian tourism has taken a hit after several incidents of sexual violence against women came to light in the country’s capital, New Delhi, starting in December 2012. By shifting the focus on to yoga and meditation, Modi is trying to reclaim India’s appeal as a spiritual state.
FROM BRICS: RUSSIA, CHINA, BRAZIL

CHINA

China’s lead Ministry for soft power is the Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, and the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China are also active.

In 2011, the “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Deepening Reform of the Cultural System and Promoting the Great Development and Flouring of Social Culture” called for an increase in China’s soft power as part of a mainstream strategy designed to develop the nation. Since then, Xi Jinping has made 3 major speeches in 2013 and 2014 which stressed the role of culture and soft power in the developmental model of China, calling for active participation in international norm-making and the promotion of the national image.

Soft power in China cannot be disentangled from domestic priorities to promote socialist core values alongside traditional culture. Externally, the key initiatives are the global network of Confucius institutes; national image advertisements; and the One Belt One Road project. Internally, the goal is to boost people’s confidence about Chinese culture, value and ideology. Externally, it is to improve China’s national image and positive influence and attraction.

The main official concept of Chinese soft power is Cultural Soft Power (文化软实力). Most Chinese scholars think Culture is the soul of China’s soft power. The focus is to improve what the Chinese see as China’s positive influence in the world. Chinese philosophy on soft power, as revealed in its official discourse, indicates however a belief that soft power is a spill over effect both of a country’s hard power and the attraction of its culture. The Chinese view is that there is no need to shout loud about a country’s merits if it is naturally attractive to people. This view leads to on-going debates as to whether China has soft power in the sense defined by Joseph Nye.

Today, there is a trend in Chinese soft power to promote normative projects such as the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). There is also an increasing awareness of the governmental image as manifested by the first lady diplomacy and the reform of the official discourse style.

RUSSIA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the lead body for Russia’s soft power. Other important agencies are:

- Russki Mir
- Rossotrudnichestvo
- Gorchakov Fund
- Russian International Affairs Council
- Picreadi

Soft power activities:

- The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) is engaged with Russia’s image abroad and with larger émigré-communities. It was established in 2008 and has acted since then as an umbrella organisation for a network of Russian compatriots. It also funds public diplomacy projects.
- Russian World (Russki Mir) aims its activities at foreign audiences all over the world. This body was officially established in 2007 and is engaged with the popularisation and promotion of the Russian language and culture.
- Mass media are playing a crucial role in Russia’s soft power strategy both in its traditional (particularly television) and new (social media) forms. Websites such as Russia Beyond the Headlines and Sputnik and the television station RT are consequently targeting foreign audiences and aim at improving Russia’s image abroad by bringing ‘alternative news’ and promoting Russian culture in the broadest sense possible.
**Soft power concepts:**
Soft power from a Russian point of view is related both to public and cultural diplomacy. The term soft power (literally translated as “myagkaya sila”) was used by President Putin in 2012 who noted that soft power is a matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence.

The major difference between the Russian perspective on soft power and the definition of the British Council is that the Russian concept goes beyond the ‘attraction-factor’ and focuses on informational work.

**Current trends:**
Russia has been pursuing a more pragmatic soft power approach since the outburst of the Ukrainian crisis (2013). This is largely due to the damage to its global image from the annexation of Crimea and its military interference in Ukraine and Syria.

- The media and information sphere is playing an increasingly important role, due to its availability in different European languages and strong appeal to foreign audiences.
- Education is becoming more important with a rise in exchange programs and educational projects aimed at foreign students.
- A range of Kremlin-backed NGO’s such as the Gorchakov Fund, Picreadi, and think thanks such as the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) are organising soft power related events (courses, seminars and conferences) bringing together different foreign audiences within an academic context, while promoting Russia’s image abroad. Countries from the so-called near abroad (Central Asia and the Caucasus) are targeted in this strategy.

**BRAZIL**
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of Culture aims to promote Brazilian culture abroad. It is organised into 5 sections:

- The Divisão de Promoção da Língua Portuguesa (DPLP) promotes Portuguese language as spoken in Brazil. It coordinates Brazilian Cultural Centres throughout the world;
- The Divisão de Operações de Difusão Cultural (DODC) promotes Brazilian culture and art by negotiating and implementing bilateral agreements in cultural cooperation;
- The Divisão de Promoção do Audiovisual (DAV) promotes Brazilian cinema, independent TV productions and Brazilian publicity abroad;
- The Coordenação de Divulgação (DIVULG) broadcasts abroad information about Brazilian life and culture and shares in Brazil information about public policies in other countries which might contribute to the development of national policies;
- The Divisão de Acordos e Assuntos Multilaterais Culturais (DAMC) deals with cultural topics which are the responsibility of multilateral organizations like UNESCO, MERCOSUL, UNASUL, OEA, CELAC e OEI.
- The Divisão de Temas Educacionais (DCE) deals with Education in terms of cooperation protocols shared with other countries, or received from international organizations or foreign agencies.

Soft power is traditionally seen as a diplomatic activity. The main purpose of Brazil’s soft power activities is competition for influence with other BRIC countries (China, Russia, India, South Africa). In addition, because of its geographical and historical position Brazil seeks to have a presence among the developed countries but also as a leader or mediator among South American countries and in Africa.

The current priority is to take advantage of the publicity generated by the 2016 Olympic Games and the 2014 World Cup and sustain a presence in established international festivals, i.e. Back2Black, Globalfest, Rock in Rio. The Government recognises the need for better coordination of public and private initiatives in the areas of trade, technology, tourism and culture.
SOUTH KOREA
The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture, Sports, and Tourism are the lead agencies. The most prominent South Korean soft power initiative was the so-called Korean Wave. This refers to the phenomenon of Korean entertainment and popular culture rolling over the world with pop music, TV dramas, and movies. Also known as “Hallyu”, the term was first coined by the Chinese press in the late 1990s to describe the growing popularity of Korean pop culture in China. The push for cultural power (or Korean Wave) has, however, been stagnant recently in part because the enthusiasm for it from Japan and China has cooled down, but also because it has been drowned out by the current political crisis.

South Korea does not work with a specific theory of soft power. It has tended to use the idea of ‘middle power’ as a guiding principle for its diplomacy, but this is not seen as particularly successful.

Recently, the possibility of the country leveraging its considerable soft-power resources to act as a ‘creative’ or ‘constructive’ power in the region has been promoted as an alternative.

WESTERN EUROPE: GERMANY; FRANCE; SPAIN

GERMANY
Soft power strategies are the overall responsibility of the Federal Foreign Office. Implementation is, however, through many arms’ length (Mittler) organisations including:
- Goethe Institute;
- The Körber Foundation;
- German Cultural Council;
- Institute for Foreign Relations;
- German Academic Exchange Service;
- German Council on Foreign Relations;

After 1945 West Germany and (after 1990) the re-unified German Republic, pursued foreign policy based on the idea of Zivilmacht – a concept of civilised power focused on democartising influence through non-military, multilateral cooperation, trade and incentivisation (Maul 214).

This is consistent with a traditional German post-war strategy of holding back from international affairs and foreign intervention – reflected by a recent survey of the German population, in which 60% of participants were against the idea of Germany increasing its involvement in world affairs.

In 2013, Germany’s Foreign Minister initiated a wide-ranging review of German foreign policy due to global crises such as the Ebola epidemic, conflict in the Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, Syria and Iraq. This strategy aimed to redefine Germany’s global role, to tackle the increasing complexity of international relations due to globalisation, new threats to world peace, a third-wave of postcolonial instability, European division, global power-shifts and rising social inequality. The conclusions demand an increasing focus on foreign affairs, international relations, and strengthening of German and European security and global influence.

As mentioned above, the idea of Zivilmacht is key to Germany’s approach to soft power. The German approach to foreign policy is centred around the easing of strained relations between countries – they prioritise diplomatic influence by way of positive incentivisation and persuasion, rather than sanctions or aggression.

German approaches are often built around a complete, master concept or goal, under which smaller aims or goals are subordinated. This idea is based on structural coherence, logic and transparency. It necessitates a deep understanding of the other culture’s interests and motivations.

Germans tend to categorise military intervention at ‘the bottom of the priority list’, whilst the concept of multilateralism and peaceful cooperation is key to foreign relations – cultural relations being defined as one of the 3 pillars of German foreign policy.

There is a growing perception in Germany, however, that rising far-right populism in
Europe, a possible increase in protectionism, and Russian aggression require Germany to shift from soft/civil-power to ‘define itself more as a world power’. This is reflected in the German government’s promise to raise their military budget from around €8bn to €35bn by 2019.

All of this suggests a shift away from traditional German soft-power strategies, in favour of taking more direct international responsibility. In 2016, German Parliamentary research – archived online as Traditionselle Rezepte ziviler Konfliktbearbeitung sind gescheitert – suggests that a global proliferation of failing states requires a shift of foreign-policy perspective and compromise in ‘getting hands dirty’ to transfer German democratic goals and values in crisis areas abroad.

Aktualisierung 2016 (part of a German popular-opinion survey undertaken by the Körber Foundation) shows gradually increasing interest in foreign engagement, rising perception of the importance of China after the U.S. election, and continued faith in the importance of the EU.

German cultural relations structures are typically more directly focused on political and social questions than their British or French counterparts. A current example is the Goethe Institute’s current European arts-project Actopolis, which aims to use art and culture to change perspectives on Southern European countries, and to creatively rebuild and remodel European institutions – this does still show an on-going willingness from German national organisations to engage in foreign-affairs by employing soft-power strategies.

**FRANCE**

The lead responsibility for soft power is with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development. The main agencies responsible for implementation are at varying arms’ lengths from the Ministry:

- **Alliance Française** – Institution for the promotion of French language and culture abroad;
- **Institut Français** – Institution for the promotion of French culture abroad;
- **Agence Française de Développement** – French Development Agency;
- **Agence pour l’enseignement français à l’étranger** – Agency for French Education Abroad;
- **Business France** – Agency for French Business Development abroad; and
- **Campus France** – Agency for the promotion of higher education, international student services, and international mobility.

The emphasis has traditionally been on French language teaching and the promotion of French culture through IF, AF, and via traditional diplomacy.

New developments include:

- ** Créative France** (part of Business France) has been established to promote French cultural and creative industries abroad and market France as a location of innovative creative and cultural production;
- **“Digital soft diplomacy”** (title is in English) a Digital Communication strategy which aims to:
  - Enhance dialogue with French and foreign civil society;
  - Strengthen the “public service” dimension of French diplomacy;
  - Support the diplomatic network in terms of digital communication – digital technology is considered crucial to policy on disseminating French language and culture, for example through a “large-scale programme of digitisation of cinemas in the French cultural network abroad.
The French concept of Soft power is aimed at promoting France’s image and thus defending France’s economic, linguistic and cultural interests. It also aims to raise public awareness of the French Foreign Ministry’s work. It results from the combined efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ central services and diplomatic network.

Compared with the definition used by the British Council, “soft power” in a French context is defined in much more assertive terms. The emphasis on “linguistic and cultural interests” corresponds to the country’s long history of instrumentalising cultural policies as foreign policies.

The then Minister for Foreign Affairs Jean-Marie Ayrault during his closing speech at the Ambassadors’ Week in Paris (September 2016) said:

“Our soft power helps to promote dialogue among cultures on a daily basis. Our external cultural action has undergone considerable changes, especially over the last few years. In the face of competition, we have developed a comprehensive approach that is part of a new vision of the correlation between cultural, scientific and economic challenges. The remit of our departments and institutes has been expanded to include creative industry exports, gourmet cooking, sports diplomacy and the promotion of France’s appeal to students in collaboration with CampusFrance. Like the conductor of an orchestra your role is to make sure all of our efforts abroad are in harmony.”
Moreover, the frequent use of the term "rayonnement" (which translates as "beam (as of light)" but also as "influence") is interesting in so far as this imagery is still linked to the language of the French colonial project, what was called the "Mission civilisatrice".

Current trends are to move towards new areas of soft power to promote French language and culture, such as:

- The digital sphere including enhancing France’s digital profiles abroad;
- Higher Education (through Campus France): making France a more attractive destination for international students;
- Sports diplomacy – marketing France as a location for excellence in sports abroad, e.g. through UEFA Euro 2016 in France;

**MIDDLE EAST: QATAR; THE UAE; SAUDI ARABIA; EGYPT**

**QATAR**
The responsible authority is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other active organisations include:

- Qatar National Research Fund;
- Qatar Foundation;
- Ministry of Education and Higher Education;
- Qatar Development Fund.

Qatar’s main soft power activities:

- **Aljazeera.** Established in 1996 by Qatar’s ruling family it has become the first pan-Arab satellite TV broadcasting station. Aljazeera has also existed as an English channel since 2006. Aljazeera is the first Arab channel that informs Arabs about a full range of political and social issues. However, Aljazeera is still under control of the Qatari regime and will never express any criticism of it. During the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011, Aljazeera supported the uprisings but then lost influence after the negative aftermath of the Arab Spring.

- **Education goals:** building an efficient system for funding scientific research. The Qatar Foundation currently invests in building the “Education City” campus in Doha, containing branches of different international universities.

- **Sports policy:** In 2022, Qatar will be the first Arab state to host the World Cup. This continues to be a controversial development, with Qatar attracting both praise and criticism for its treatment of migrant workers.

Soft power is literally translated into Arabic as القوة الناعمة and is seen as an opposite concept to hard power, which again is translated literally into Arabic as القوة الصلبة. There are no semantic differences between the definition of the expression ‘soft power’ in Arabic and the British Council definition.

Budgets for humanitarian and development aid – the promotion of education and healthcare services are increasing. However, because of the decrease in oil revenue, restrictions will have to be imposed on Qatar’s plans to develop the infrastructure for the World Cup 2022.

Qatar’s soft power through its media and other instruments does not remain uncontested. Its broadcasts have been banned in various parts of the Arab world and outside. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt cut diplomatic relations with Qatar. While the alleged reason was Qatar’s support for terrorism, these states also cited Al Jazeera broadcasts as a factor. Qatar’s move to restore diplomatic relations with Iran was another factor.

**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)**
The responsible authority is the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation. The main other active agencies are the Governments of Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

Since the country’s formation in 1971, the United Arab Emirates—a federation of seven emirates—has undertaken significant social and political reforms to both demonstrate openness to international intellectual
influence, and become an exemplar of cosmopolitanism in the Gulf region. 

**Abu Dhabi**, in particular, is making ambitious efforts to position itself internationally through culture and innovation. The UAE has put significant investment in culture at the heart of its efforts to position itself internationally. Alongside the rapid modernization of the country, the Emirati leadership has increasingly supported the arts and the cultural sector to the extent that, in 2007, the government announced the construction of three major museums on the Saadiyat Island. The scale of the investment is enormous – Saadiyat Cultural District will be a “live canvas for global culture, drawing local, regional and international visitors with unique exhibitions, permanent collections, productions and performances. Its iconic institutions will be housed in buildings drawing a statement of the finest architecture at the beginning of the 21st century: a Louvre, a Guggenheim, and a National Museum.” The museums are scheduled to open within the next few years, with the Louvre Abu Dhabi making its debut in December 2016.

Also in Abu Dhabi, in 2008, in order to further increase its soft power asset base, the Masdar City project embarked on a journey to develop the world’s most sustainable eco-city. These initiatives aim to build the UAE’s regional and global attractiveness while preserving traditional cultures.

**Dubai** too is very active culturally. Dubai Culture (The Dubai Culture and Arts Authority) was established in 2008 as part of the Dubai Strategic Plan 2021 that aims to position the city as a vibrant global metropolis. Dubai is already the seventh most visited city in the world and will also be hosting the World Expo in 2020.

**SAUDI ARABIA**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the lead soft power agency. Historically, a principal and the most consistent source of Saudi power at the domestic, regional and global levels has not been revenues from oil, but the cultural power that inheres in a Kingdom that is both the capitol of the Muslim and Arab worlds. This soft power accounts for as much, if not more, of Saudi influence than oil itself. To a large extent, this power may explain why Saudi Arabia has resisted the shock waves of the Arab Spring. This soft power also accounts for much of the leverage that the Kingdom holds in its region and the world at large.

Saudi Arabia’s soft power consists primarily of religious and media activities.

**Religion:** Saudi Arabia achieved religious leadership primarily because of the presence in the Kingdom of the two Holy Mosques (AL-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca and al-Masjid al-Nabawi in Medina), which are the two most holy sites in Islam. Religious leadership is one of the most important soft power activities in Saudi Arabia. Through the most holy sites for Muslims in the holy cities of Makkah and Medina, Saudi Arabia has become the destination of over two million pilgrims during the annual hajj (pilgrimage) season, and many more visitors year around. Saudi Arabia is also the host to a plethora of Islamic religious organizations and a prolific donor to Muslim charities and causes all over the world.

The promotion of pan-Islamism has been central to Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and to making the best out of its religious soft power. Broadly understood as an ideology based on the solidarity of the umma, or the Muslim community at large, pan-Islamism contains a normative imperative to help other Muslims in time of crisis and to work toward a sort of unity between Muslims that does not conflict with the new world fabric. In contrast to a secular nationalist political ideology, therefore, the political and social order fostered by Saudi Arabia is derived from a religious precept with religious identity, not culture or ethnicity, at its core.

**Mosque building:** Saudi Arabia’s soft power strategy also includes its mosque building programme in many countries across the world. The Masajid International Organisation, an independent organization, which organizes mosque building programmes, currently has projects under way in Mauritania, Indonesia, Ghana, Togo and Benin. Saudi Arabia’s
mosque building plan is parallel to Turkey’s similar project in countries such as Cuba, the Philippines and the UK, thus creating an element of religious competition between the two. Other charities in Saudi Arabia are also involved in mosque building and Islamic teachings, for example the International Islamic Relief Organization and the Muslim World League.

**Media:** Saudi Arabia has invested in a myriad of media sources, from television to newspapers. They are principally active in Arab nations (thus enhancing the image of the Kingdom among Arabs and Muslims), but Saudi investment has also reached global media sources such as Fox News and Twitter. Indeed, the Kingdom spends generously on commercials and advertisements to bolster its legitimacy as a role-model state.

With the advent of satellite communications and the launching of Arbasat and Nilesat, there is no limit on the ability of Saudi Arabia to reach out to any spot on the globe and relay messages of interest, or broadcast informative pieces through multilingual TV, radio channels, websites, and social networks.

Saudi privately financed broadcasting companies operate satellite radio stations such as MBC, FM (Gulf music), Panorama FM (contemporary Arabic hit music), ART Zikr (Quran recital and religious speeches), and ART Music.

Al Arabiya, a Saudi-owned television channel, is rated among the top pan-Arab stations by Middle Eastern audiences. The channel is engaged in an aggressive soft campaign of public diplomacy, as it is part of concerted efforts to dominate the world of cable and satellite television media in the Arab world. Those satellite stations also reach Arab communities around the world and are carried by Dish network and Direct TV in the USA.

Saudi Arabia is the center of four important worlds: The Middle East, the Arab world, the Muslim world, and global world of energy. Considering the political and economic importance of these four networks, the fact that Saudi Arabia is the lynchpin to all four makes Saudi Arabia one of the most important and influential nations in the world.

This core position in these networks has endowed Saudi Arabia with hard power (i.e., power over material resources), but the Saudis balance this hard power with initiatives to raise and maintain their standing and image among their networks of nations. The foreign policies of Saudi Arabia in the latter half of the 20th century and more recently are a testament to this quest to balance its material resources with a vigorous quest for soft power in its most important networks of international relations, i.e., ultimately a quest for cosmopolitan or smart power.

**EGYPT**

The lead responsible organization is the Arabic Republic of Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other important institutions include: Al-Azhar Mosque, which is considered by the clear majority of Sunni Muslims as the most prestigious school of Islamic law and is a Muslim centre of soft power. In recent years, Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry has engaged in efforts to coordinate the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Mosque. In 2014 he said that Al-Azhar was one of Egypt’s soft powers “at the level of countries of the world.” His vision was that Al-Azhar would play a prominent role in spreading the concepts of moderate Islam and rectifying religious discourse. Despite these statements, the government has recently moved to control Al-Azhar now increasingly critiqued in Egyptian government and media for not controlling militancy.

The main sources of soft power in Egypt are history, civilisation, religious institutions, tourism and education.

History plays perhaps a bigger role in relation to Egypt’s foreign policy than it does elsewhere. Egypt’s own preconceptions, emanating from past cultural, social, and political interactions, similarly define current interests and threat perceptions in dealing with each of her neighbours—particularly those along the Nile or major trade corridors—and such biases continue to shape foreign policy trends.

At the time of the Arab Spring (2012) there was a perceived opportunity for Egypt to engage more positively in its foreign policy.
and the Government was encouraged to make the improvement of cultural relations a priority. Today, however, Egypt has become inward looking and politically marginalized in a way not seen for generations.

Amr Moussa, a former foreign minister and Arab League chief who ran for president in 2012, said he doubted there would be “any more foreign adventures,” given the “major problems we are facing.” That has to change, he added. “The role of Egypt is a must,” he said. “It is a necessity in order to build a balance with Iran and with Turkey.” But the only way to do that, he said, “is the reform of Egypt itself and rebuilding its soft power.”

LATIN AMERICA: MEXICO; ARGENTINA

MEXICO
The lead organisation is the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs. Other organisations involved are the Matías Romero Institute, and the Mexican International Cooperation Agency for Development (AMEXCID).

AMEXCID is an instrument of soft power that facilitates and encourages diplomatic relations between countries by establishing a common ground with shared responsibility, as well as a mechanism of action through which exchanges between the country and the rest of the world are promoted, increased, strengthened and invigorated. Areas of action include: International Cooperation Policy; Technological and Scientific Cooperation; Humanitarian Action; Cultural and Touristic Promotion.

The Matías Romero Institute is the diplomatic academy of Mexico. It was created in 1974 by the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs with the goal of educating and preparing Mexican diplomats. Among its main functions are promoting academic and diplomatic collaboration with national and foreign institutions, and promoting the external policy of Mexico, as well as other international affairs, through conferences, radio, and publications, among others.

Activities
Bilateral agreements:

- The Mexico-United States relationship evolved as the result of an agreement between Presidents Enrique Peña Nieto and Barack Obama, to develop a multi-themed agenda focused on turning North America into the world’s most competitive, dynamic, and prosperous region. It has a strategic and coordinated vision, supported by new mechanisms with concrete plans of action, working towards the welfare of both societies;

- Today, a link between France and Mexico is sought through the concept of “soft power” as Joseph Nye has described it. The Strategic Franco-Mexican Council aims to reach its objective of strengthening this relationship, using cultural diplomacy as a bridge towards this purpose;

- The Mexico-Canada alliance was created on 25 October 2004 with the purpose of strengthening the strategic relationship between Mexico and Canada by linking entrepreneurs, relevant economic actors and public servants charged with the design and implementation of public policies. The alliance meets every year, alternatively in Mexico and Canada, and since its creation has had over 50 joint initiatives.

Factors that drive Mexican soft power are:

- The diversification of Mexican initiatives for international cooperation in all areas;

- The intense promotion of the national brand to attract investments and tourism, which already accounts for 8% of the GDP (World Tourism Organization, 2015);

- The internationalization of higher education institutions, with a growing number of exchange students; and

- The increased quantity of exported foodstuff.

2015 was the Dual Year of the United Kingdom and Mexico. It was an opportunity for unique intercultural collaborations that enriched relationships on all levels of society, the government, the private sectors, and the citizens, with the goal of building a prosperous future for the next generations.
ARGENTINA
The lead authority is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship.

The Secretariat for Foreign Relations contributes to the formulation of strategies and actions relating to foreign affairs, which promote Argentina’s integration into the world through the search for consensus related to:

- Strengthening multilateralism and international law;
- Promoting the values of international peace, democratic rule, and human rights;
- Promoting a democratic approach to the decision systems of international organisations.

Argentina has traditionally given priority to relations within South America. This has generated a certain amount of international power for the country. Because of this, it gives greatest value to this region, and in general terms the country is perceived as having an important influence on cooperation and integration, above all in aspects concerning international peace and the resolution of conflicts between states.

On many occasions, Argentina attempted to gain or amplify its influence through cooperation and integration agreements with similar states. The starting premise was that Argentina had more possibilities of becoming an important actor in the world by exercising joint power instead of isolating itself.

The Argentinian government sees power as relationships, and so has pursued association with other regional states, in this case from South America, principally Brazil and Venezuela.

Current developments: Argentina will preside and host the 11th Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation. In this role, Argentina will aim to fortify multilateralism and facilitate concrete agreements with respect to new laws of global trade.

Argentina is also acting to strengthen its relationship with Asia and the Pacific region, looking towards the future. Among them, the most notable are the relaunch of the National Committee for Asia and the Pacific, and the participation of Argentina in the Pacific Alliance.

Argentina has on occasion leveraged the soft power of the Pope, who is an Argentinian. On 9 September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted in favour of an Argentine initiative establishing basic principles to be followed in cases of debt restructuring. At the time the Buenos Aires Herald wrote that while the UN vote did not guarantee the “true effectiveness” demanded by His Holiness, it might be a step in the right direction. It went on to say that neither the Pope, nor Argentina, have the political, military or financial power to enforce the UN-approved principles, they can exercise their “soft power.” It went on to say that soft power was a given for important states, and is a must for those nations lacking such attributes.

CONCLUSIONS:
- There is no one approach to soft power. Regional considerations shape priorities and soft power strategies increasingly closely follow foreign policy;
- Soft power activities reflect the history of individual countries. The USA has an approach with its origins in the Cold War. France continues to assert the values of its culture sometimes in opposition to globalisation. China’s soft power reflects its desire to promote culture as a way of reconciling traditional Chinese culture with Marxism;
- The implication for the UK from global practice, is that the UK’s soft power can help deliver influence, but that it needs to be closely aligned to foreign and trade policy and the UK’s interests on the one hand, while stressing the UK’s commitment to openness and democracy on the other.
Appendix B
Multiple regression models with Freedom House Political Rights Index
### Table 3: Models of Soft Power Influence on Student Attraction
(With Polity Democracy Scores)

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

**p<0.01,  *p<0.05,  *p<0.1
### Appendix A
Multiple regression models with Freedom House Political Rights Index

#### A1: MODELS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCE ON STUDENT ATTRACTION
(WITH FREEDOM HOUSE CIVIL LIBERTIES SCORES)

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<td>140</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td>0.650</td>
<td>0.651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
## A2 Models of Soft Power Influence on Tourist Attraction
(WITH FREEDOM HOUSE CIVIL LIBERTIES SCORES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of tourists</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House, political rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restriction</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of countries engaged, standardized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(with cultural institutions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, standardized</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
<td>0.30***</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, standardized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of internet user, standardized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Ranking, ==1 if Top15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>14.20***</td>
<td>4.17***</td>
<td>12.96***</td>
<td>9.59***</td>
<td>-4.82***</td>
<td>-2.67**</td>
<td>-2.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.786</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
### A3 MODELS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCE ON FDI ATTRACTION
(WITH FREEDOM HOUSE CIVIL LIBERTIES SCORES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House, political rights restriction</td>
<td>-0.21**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
<td>-0.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of countries engaged, standardized</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, standardized</td>
<td>1.28***</td>
<td>0.76*</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, standardized</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of internet user, standardized</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Ranking, ==1 if Top15</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>21.25***</td>
<td>8.73***</td>
<td>15.08***</td>
<td>18.49***</td>
<td>-2.31**</td>
<td>-2.04**</td>
<td>-1.77*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
## A4 MODELS OF SOFT POWER INFLUENCE ON UNGA VOTING (WITH FREEDOM HOUSE CIVIL LIBERTIES SCORES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House, political rights restriction</td>
<td>-0.27*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.24*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.29*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.32*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.25*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.23*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.22*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of countries engaged, standardized</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, standardized</td>
<td>0.13*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.51*** (0.16)</td>
<td>0.39* (0.19)</td>
<td>0.10** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, standardized</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of internet user, standardized</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Ranking, ==1 if Top15</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.84*** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.48 (0.37)</td>
<td>-3.93** (1.65)</td>
<td>-2.86 (2.03)</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.484</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix C: Code Book

All variables are mean values of their original panel data covering 2000 through 2012.

Exceptions are:
ccode, CountryAbb, country, g20, m_engage, lnengage, and cul_rank

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
1. ccode
umerical country code. Correlates of War (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/)
2. CountryAbb
3-letter country code. Correlates of War (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/)
3. country
Name of country. Based on CIRI data (http://www.humanrightsdata.com/)
4. g20
A dummy variable for G-20 and EU plus Switzerland
=1 if the country is either a member of G-20 or EU or Switzerland
=0 otherwise
4.1 g20x
A dummy variable for G-20
=1 if the country is a member of G-20
=0 otherwise
5. m_culture_exp
5.1 ln_culture_exp
Natural log (ln) of m_culture_exp.
6. m_engage
Total number of countries cultural institutions of a country engage with. Data taken from annual reports and government websites.
6.1 lnengage
Natural log (ln) of m_engage
7. m_media_reg
=0: no regulation
=1: regulation
8. m_p_tv
9. m_p_radio
10. m_fh_pr
Political Rights, Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/freedom_in_the_world_2016_data.zip)
1= most free
7= least free
11. m_fh_cl
Civil Liberty, Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/freedom_in_the_world_2016_data.zip)
1= most free
7= least free
12. m_student
Number of foreign students, or ‘Total inbound internationally mobile students’. Data from (http://data.uis.unesco.org/)
12.1 lnstudent
Natural log (ln) of m_student
13. m_speech
Freedom of speech and press. Data from: CIRI data (http://www.humanrightsdata.com/).
0 = no freedom
1 = some freedom
2 = complete freedom

14. m_physint
Physical Integrity Rights. An additive index constructed from the Torture, extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators.
0 = no government respect for the four rights
8 = full government respect for the four rights

15. m_polity2
Level of democracy. polity2 of POLITY IV dataset (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf)

16. m_gdppc
Original variable name: ny_gdp_mktp_pp_kd
16–1. lngdp
Natural log of m_gdppc
16–2. m_gdp
Original variable name: ny_gdp_mktp_pp_kd
16–3. lngdpp
Natural log of m_gdp.
16–4. gdpb
m_gdp/billion

17. m_fdi_in
Original variable name: bx_klt_dinv_cd_wd
17–1. lnfdi
Natural log of m_fdi_in
17–2. FDI_M
m_fdi_in/million

18. m_fdi_in_gdp
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)

19. m_milex_gdp
Original variable name: ms_mil_xpnd_gd_zs

20. m_export_gdp
Exports of goods and services(% of GDP)
Original variable name: ne_exp_gnfs_zs

21. m_tour_ex
Tourism and culture function expenditure
Original variable name: fc_xpd_tour_cr

22. m_tour_arvl
International tourism, number of arrivals
Original variable name: st_int_arvl
22–1. lntourist
Natural log of m_tour_arvl
22–2. tourist_M
m_tour_arvl/million

23. m_Idealpoint
The affinity between a country’s and the rest of the UN General Assembly’s voting patterns. Data from: United Nations General Assembly Voting Data (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.21233/9FHF.1/12379)
24. m_iliteracy
Adult illiterate population, 15+ years, (number)
Original variable name: uis_lp_ag15199

25. m_education
Original variable name: se_sec_cuat_po_zs

26. m_aid
Original variable name: dc_oda_totl_kd

26.1 lnaid
natural log of m_aid (ln(aid))

27. m_netuser
Number of Internet User per thousand. From World Development Indicator (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators)
Original variable name: it_net_user_p2

27.1 lnnet
Natural log of m_netuser.

28. cul_rank

29. m_education
Original variable name: se_sec_cuat_po_zs
J.P. Singh

is Chair and Professor of Culture and Political Economy, and Director of the Institute for International Cultural Relations (IICR) at the University of Edinburgh. He has authored eight books, and published nearly 100 scholarly articles. His book Globalized Arts: The Entertainment Economy and Cultural Identity (Columbia, 2011) won the American Political Science Association’s award for best book in information technology and politics. His current book project is Development 2.0: How Technologies Can Foster Inclusivity in the Developing World (Oxford, forthcoming). He has advised international organizations such as UNESCO, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, and played a leadership role in several professional organizations. He is the Founding Editor of the journal Arts and International Affairs. Singh was responsible for the overall vision and final execution of the report, including the data analysis.

Stuart MacDonald

is now an independent consultant in international cultural relations. Prior to that, in 2012, he founded the Centre for Cultural Relations (CCR) at the University of Edinburgh. Before 2012, Stuart worked for over 20 years in a wide range of leadership roles for the UK and Scottish Governments, with a focus on international, cultural, educational and digital policy. He often initiated and led the implementation of innovative policy and strategic initiatives. He combined this experience with the development of professional qualifications and expertise in public sector reform, organisational development, research management and professional development. At the time of writing the report, he was the Associate Director of the Centre for Cultural Relations at the University of Edinburgh, and was responsible for the literature review.