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The federal option for the UK

Joachim Schwend is a lecturer in British Studies at Leipzig University.

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Introduction

Federalism is one option in the current debate on bringing government closer to the people. It is controversially discussed and must be seen within the context of the notion of a Europe ofRegions. In the EU terminology the term region is used where a Scottish or Welsh nationalist would prefer the term nation. Things become more difficult when we talk about England proper. The idea ofa British federal system cannot be separated from a movement towards a federal system in the European Union. Federalism in the United Kingdom stands for an end of the strong anglo-centriccentralisation which was a phenomenon under Margaret Thatcher. In May 1997 a new start was made in the United Kingdom with the aim to reduce the distance between the governed and the governors. Butfederalism is not an option envisaged by New Labour, it is the Liberal Democrats who actually talk about the federal option. Federalism is also a system, which seems to be adverse to the politicaltradition of Britain. But I think this is only the case from an English point of view. When we take the British point of view from the periphery rather than from the centre, the idea of a federalpolitical structure does not seem so foreign to British thinking after all.

The federal system has proved useful and valuable in many situations when new states came into being or when a multicultural and multifaceted state was created. Federalism is a political systemwhere you can be a number of things and do a number of things. The test will be in how far diversity within the system is respected and safeguarded by the unit as a whole. The notion of theculturally homogeneous nation state is no longer feasible in an age of globalisation. We have to combine the global and the local, 'think globally, act locally', what is sometimes called'glocalization'. The territorial boundaries of the region should be circumscribed by the following criteria, if not all, then at least by some of them:

• natural, not necessarily national, boundaries,
• unit of market and industry,
• vision of the people living in the region,
• regional self-identity.

Dieter Grimm argues that because of globalization there is an increasing need for localized units, 'kleinräumigere[n] Einheiten mit Selbstgestaltungsrecht' (1997: 15). In the nationalistdiscourse the need to protect a singular national culture is foregrounded. But in a post-nationalist and interdependent world and in the multicultural or cross-cultural society federalism acts as amodel 'for a conception of culture ideally based on difference and the recognition of otherness, rather than on cultural and social identity.' (Frow and Morris, 1998: 346)

The multicultural society existed and still exists in the former white settlers colonies such as America, Canada, Southern Africa and Australia. The German federal system was established by theAllied powers after World War II to remove the strong centre in the newly to be created German state and to prevent the recurrence of militarism. In the federal state 'power would operatehorizontally rather than vertically [and the result would be] a federal community of communities' (Kearney 1994: 138) with horizontal power distribution in so far, as each level within the federalsystem has direct control over its individual power structure. There is no longer the hierarchical pyramid-shaped power structure as in centralised systems. The market economy needs short distancesin the decision-making process to function properly, i.e. quickly.

The idea of a federal system has a long tradition in Europe. Let me start, therefore, with a short historical survey. Special emphasis will be laid on Edmund Burke's conception of the Empire, as Ithink that his notion of a mutually benefiting coexistence within the Empire bears many relevant ideas which could be used for the concept of a Europe of Regions and for the introduction of a federalsystem within the United Kingdom as a first step towards a federal Europe.

History

Towards the end of the 17th century we find first ideas about a federal reorganisation of Europe in the writings of William Penn on the 'Peace in Europe'. As a member of the Society of Friends,starting from a strongly humanitarian, pacifist, and Christian point of view, Penn propagated a sort of European government which could also guarantee liberties to regional authorities. William Pennenvisaged in his essay a European Assembly with: 'sovereign princes of Europe [who would meet regularly] in a general diet, estates, or parliament, and there establish rules of justice for sovereignprinces to observe one to another' (1993: 9). Penn underlined the idea of equal rights applicable to all peoples within Europe. Even before Penn Henry IV of France could be mentioned with hiscomments on a European Parliament.

After Penn in the early 18th century the Scottish nationalist Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun was a proponent of the federalist idea in the negotiations between England and Scotland leading to the Actof Union of 1707. The English wanted an incorporating union, not for economic reasons, Scotland was too poor to be of material interest for England, but for geo-strategic reasons, namely the fear ofa Franco-Scottish invasion into England via Scotland. For the Scots the economic advantages of the English market and the Empire were in the foreground, the English saw above all the political side.The situation was similar as with the negotiations leading to the Act of Union of 1800 between Ireland and Great Britain, after the French invasion into Ireland had in fact taken place in 1798.Scotland was sold for 'English gold', as Burns put it (Burns 1963: 353-54), and after the Union she was only fit to live in for the slaves who had sold it, as Fletcher wrote (cf. Scott 1979: 65).

Edmund Burke is another 18th-century figure who envisaged something in the line of federalism, even though he did not explicitly speak of federalism. His ideas on the Empire and on therelationship between Great Britain and Ireland, however, adhere to the general notion of a federal construction based on 18th-century ideas of toleration and liberty, of rejection of dogmatism orwhat one could call enthusiasm: 'The spirit of that age [18th century] was secular and rationalist, tolerant of the amiable weaknesses of religious men, but scarcely approving them, frightened aboveall of 'enthusiasm'.' (Cobban 1962: 233) The ideas of Burke referring to a constitutional organisation of the state will be discussed in more detail. He was a politician and thinker who wanted topreserve what had proven useful and valuable in the parliamentary tradition, but he was a severe critic of absolutist tendencies, as King George III for instance had shown them. Burke was a strongsupporter of the unified British state, the nation-state, as one could say today. The question of the nation-state within fixed boundaries is almost an anachronism at the turn of the century, but itis still a problem in the contemporary Anglo-Irish relationship. Ireland and the United Kingdom are today the only 'remaining nation-states in the Community of the Twelve with an unresolved conflictof sovereignty claims over the same territory.' (Kearney 1994: 140) This statement was made in 1994. The problem has not yet been solved, but the future does not look too bleak.

Among the keywords Stuart Hall lists for the 18th century are toleration and 'universalism' (Hall 1992: 21), i.e. the idea that general principles and liberties must apply to all people, not onlyto the select few. This idea of universal rights is for instance prevalent in Burke's speeches and writings on America and Ireland and also on the British Empire, especially in relation to the WarrenHastings trial. He was not in favour of what he called a 'general union to the extinction of your local, natural, and just privileges.' ('Address': 367) He envisaged for the American colonies agovernment which would give them the means of control of their own affairs following what Burke called English liberties. The idea of a federal organisation to guarantee for the individual parts ofthe Empire more liberties in their religious, cultural and historical identity becomes apparent in all of his writings. Burke did not adhere to an anglo-centric feeling of superiority and concomitantdenigration of foreign cultures. He was, on the contrary, convinced that cultural particularities of the different members of the Empire could be harmonised with British constitutional principles.But, in spite of all these liberal ideas, the central political role of Great Britain as the decisive legislative power and decision-maker in imperial matters was never questioned by him. In thisrespect of English political supremacy he remained very much a conservative unionist of the old Tory pattern. More so than the Scotsman Fletcher of Saltoun who did not see the dominance of London.Fletcher wanted 12 regional centres within the Union. He definitely went beyond Burke's notion.

The Liberal Democrats talk about splitting England proper into 4 to 6 units which would make a total of 7 to 9 units with Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (cf. Fazal 1996: 200). The individualunits should have a 'separate sense of national identity' (Fazal 1996: 201) which need not to be circumscribed by national boundaries within a European federation. Close cooperation between Frenchand German regions across national frontiers is an example of this idea of deterritorialization of national identity. Ulrich Beck speaks of 'obsessiven Gleichsetzung von Ort und politischem Selbst.'and continues 'Dieses territoriale Apriori des Politischen zerfällt in dem Maße, wie sich die postnationale Gesellschaft herausbildet.' (1999: 13) The federal system could provide asolution to the antagonism between the demand for a strong authority, which leads to centralisation, and the demand for freedom and liberty, which leads to separation of powers by vesting thesepowers in several and separate hands.

What Burke propagated was a British patriotism, not narrow-minded little Englandism. He was a politician, pamphleteer, thinker and historian and thus a typical representative of 18th-centuryEngland who stood for Enlightenment ideas and a humanitarian approach to politics. He stood in the pragmatist tradition of John Locke, or, if we want to slightly strain the idea of the pragmatictradition, of William of Ockham (ca. 1285 - 1349) and the Glorious Revolution, and he was an eloquent defender of the English parliamentary system of the mixed constitution. Burke strictly objectedto any abuse of power by one section of the population, no matter whether this abuse took place in India or Ireland. He wrote on the Irish Protestant Ascendancy:

[...] one set of people in Ireland to consider themselves as the sole citizens in the commonwealth; and to keep a dominion over the rest by reducing them to absolute slavery under a militarypower; and thus fortified in their power, to divide the publick estate, which is the result of general contribution, as a military booty solely amongst themselves. ('Letter to Richard Burke':454)

The Protestant Ascendancy signifies 'pride and dominion on the one part of the relation, and on the other subserviency and contempt - and it signifies nothing else.' ('Letter toRichard Burke': 455) Burke's attitude concerning the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain is one of equal status within the Union. As late as 1997 Anthony Barnett still talks of a 'newcolonialism' in Wales (1997: 63).

In concordance with the English political tradition Burke's strong emphasis on the pragmatic approach to politics is evident in his political dealings and in his rejection of theoretical theses,which becomes above all clear in his writings on the French Revolution. In a letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol on the American affairs he wrote: 'Let experience be your guide; avoid untriedspeculation.' (Bisset, II: 453) In connection with Burke's pragmatism we could also quote a contemporary pragmatist, Tony Blair, who has a similar approach when he writes: 'I was brought up to formmy views on the basis of what I saw around me, what I read, what I learnt from friends and colleagues - in other words to study reality rather than theory.' (1996: ix)

According to Burke, English liberties should gain universal application, and not only in Great Britain. His vision of the British Empire was centralised up to a certain degree, but it also grantedfreedom in the shape of regionally representative and responsible parliaments or assemblies, which justifies the term federalism to be applied. Burke pleaded for a strong central authority in aletter to Sir Charles Bingham: England must have 'the sole right to the imperial legislation: by which I mean that law, which regulates the polity and economy of the several parts, as they relate toone another and to the whole.' (386) Internal affairs, whether for the Irish in Ireland or the Americans in America, should, however, be dealt with by regional authorities.

The guarantee of English liberties in an Empire organised according to federal principles was a central and continuous aspect in Burke's argumentation concerning the relationship of England to hersubsidiaries. The basis of his concept is consent gained in the periphery for a continuing, though limited, rule by the centre. In imperial matters England should be in the role of a benevolent andmagnanimous elder brother, respected by the young ones, who then would also be prepared to help and support their elder kinsman in a time of need. Burke rejected both the incorporating union andcomplete independence for Ireland. The via media could have been what later became known as Home Rule or the federal option. Daniel O'Connell in his fight for the repeal of the incorporating Unionsupported the federal concept in his demand for Home Rule. He did not want complete independence from Great Britain. Burke's approach was not nationalist in the narrow ethnic sense of the 19thcentury, but cosmopolitan by showing respect for national or regional idiosyncracies. Burke did not demand ethnicity as a criterion for people living harmoniously, but a non-ethnic citizenschip. Thestate should be in harmony with the nation.

John Stuart Mill is an author who actually used the term federalism and delineated his ideas about federal governments in the essay 'Of Federal Representative Government'. He argued that theregional parliament laid down 'the general principle of limiting the tyranny of the majority, and protecting minorities by admitting them to a substantial participation in political power.' (442)Mill wrote:

Portions of mankind who are not fitted, or not disposed, to live under the same internal government, may often with advantage be federally united, as to their relations with foreigners: both toprevent wars among themselves, and for the sake of more effectual protection against the aggression of powerful States. (435)

Mill demanded as a precondition for this federal organisation a 'sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations.' (435) This 'mutual sympathy' has diminished - if it ever existed - bynow both in the Anglo-Irish and Anglo-Scottish relationship. The individual parts of the United Kingdom may desire union but not unity (cf. Fazal 1996: 2). Home Rule remained an option in theAnglo-Irish relationship until World War I. As an example for a federal system Mill mentioned Scotland and England.

John Stuart Mill saw the concept of mutual help within the federation as one relevant aspect:

When the conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable Federal Unions, the multiplication of them is always a benefit to the world. It has the same salutary effect as any otherextension of the practice of cooperation, through which the weak, by uniting, can meet on equal terms with the strong. and he continued: A federal government has not a sufficiently concentratedauthority, to conduct with much efficiency any war but one of self-defence, in which it can rely on the voluntary co-operation of every citizen ... (443).

The argument of securing peace by a limitation of central power was used in the case of Germany after World War II, when the Allies wanted to prevent the resurgence of a strong centralised,possibly militarist, country as pre-war Germany had been. Germany was in the lucky position that it had to re-invent itself after the catastrophe of the Third Reich. Britain, or we should maybe talkof England, never was in the position where it had to re-invent and to redefine itself. After 1945 and the disaster associated with the concept of the nation-state, many intellectuals and politicianssaw an alternative in a federal Europe (cf. Monar et al, 148-150). The fathers of the German Constitution created a new system with a central authority, subsidiary regional authorities and anindependent federal law court. Many of the newly created German federal states are completely artificial creations, such as Baden-Württemberg and Nordrhein Westfalen. Others rely more or less ontraditional boundaries, such as Saxony, Schleswig Holstein, Thuringia, Hesse, or Lower Saxony. M.A. Fazal explicitly mentions the German Federation as a sort of model for a possible Britishfederation because of the way the relationship between the federal authority and the individual state authorities was regulated: 'It is in this context that the German experience might prove to bemost valuable.' (Fazal 1996: 72) In contrast to the functionalist approach, in the German case function followed form (cf. Monar et al: 1993). But the Spanish model with varying degrees of autonomyin the individual regions laid down in separate treaties between Madrid and the regional authorities is better adapted to the individual needs of different regions and might be more applicable forthe United Kingdom.

Federalism was applied as a guarantee for peace. One could in this context once again refer to William Penn and his concept of what he called 'European League or Confederacy' (1993: 14). ThisLeague, so Penn, would preserve the sovereignty of the individual states and at the same time reduce the danger of war: 'the war establishment may be reduced.' (1993: 15) The idea of betterpreserving peace is a continuum in many meditations on the introduction of the federal system in Europe and particularly in the 18th century, when reason was uppermost in the argumentation.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argued in 'Zum ewigen Frieden' (1795) that human rights should be based on a federalism of free states, 'Das Völkerrecht soll auf einen Föderalismus freierStaaten gegründet sein.' (Stammen 1997: 254) The three American authors and politicians Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804), John Jay (1745-1829), and James Madison (1751-1836) called for federalismin their collection of articles The Federalist: A Collection of Essays Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed Upon By the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787 (1788) (cf.Stammen 1997: 175-181). They wanted of course to defend the American Constitution and are partisan, but the essays gained importance beyond this topicality and are marked by the enlightened18th-century background, especially by English parliamentary ideas. The argument goes that the survival of the United States can only be safeguarded by means of a federal organisation with a strongcentral power. The conflict between authority and centralisation on the one side, and freedom and individual liberties on the other, is succinctly depicted. But the solution is seen in thepreservation and extension of the Union with a strong central power to prevent the centrifugal tendencies of individual states. The central authority must have the sole say in questions of defenceand security, when the survival of the whole is concerned. Functions and rights between the Union and individual states must be clearly laid down and regulated by checks and balances. The idea ofseparation of powers and Montesquieu's relevant essay is obvious, as in so many 18th-century works on political systems. The Federalist has only within the last few years gained a newrelevance and reconsideration due the problems inherent in European unification (cf. Stammen: 1997, 175-181).

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) discusssed the basic dualism between the demand for a strong authority on the one side and individual liberties on the other (cf. Stammen: 1997). Only a contractbased on the federal system could safeguard mutual coexistence of authority and freedom. Such a contract Proudhon sees as the opposite to hierarchy and centralisation. The central authority islimited to a few fields, such as defence, and separate from the judicature. The model for his system Proudhon sees in Switzerland which established the federal system in 1848.

The question of sovereignty is still a bone of contention, especially when it is being dealt with in a European framework. Penn's idea of preserving sovereignty is no longer the Europeanperspective towards the end of the 20th century. But the United Kingdom has by now reached a state where the discussion about a written constitution has become dominant (cf. Barnett) and the time isripe to establish a new system based both on the respect for European and British particularities.

Present Situation

After this short and fragmentary historical survey, let us look more into the present situation and more general notions of what the federal system of government could achieve for a country,especially for a country such as the United Kingdom with a multifaceted culture. We can no longer talk of the nation-state in which the fact of 'one culture, one state' (Gellner 1997: 45), i.e. thecongruence of the political and the ethnic, still exists. So I will try to detach the discussion from the limited nationalist discourse and place it in a more general framework of mutual respect andcoexistence of cultures within a political unit. Bruce Frohnen uses the term of 'trusteeship' (1997: 130) to describe the correct relationship between the imperial government and the individual partsof the Empire. Frohnen emphasises the idea of consent which he sees safeguarded in 'a kind of federalism' (1997: 141). Tony Blair also emphasises the notion of trust in his vision of a new Britain:

We need to build a relationship of trust not just within a firm but within a society. By trust, I mean the recognition of a mutual purpose for which we work together and in which we all benefit.It is a stakeholder economy, in which opportunity is available to all, advancement is through merit, and from which no group or class is set apart or excluded. (1996: 292)

Blair refers to the image of a team working together. The notion of trusteeship could also be applied in a federal system and it is more or less comparable to Burke's image of the elder brotherand his kinsfolks. Burke argued according to the principle of subsidiarity: '... a seasonable extension of rights is the best expedient for the conservation of them.' (Mahoney 1960: 208) More freedomto the regional assemblies or parliaments will keep the union together. Or, as Enoch Powell formulated, 'power devolved is power retained'. Blair expresses a similar idea when he says: 'Powerdevolved is more accountable.' (1996: 260) The problem of accountability or rather the lack of it under Thatcher and the quango-state was a continuous subject of political discussion. The lack oftrust between the authorities and the people was obvious up to May 1997.

Trusteeship means respect for the other and for relevant laws regulating the trusteeship. It is symptomatic that Burke underlined the contrast between the institutions of British parliamentarismand the wicked practice of authorities such as the Dublin Parliament of his time which cast a shadow on these institutions. Burke argues in the 'Appeal' from his pragmatic approach as follows: 'Whatin the result is likely to produce evil, is politically false; that which is productive of good, politically true.' ('Appeal': 96) As politically false in the Anglo-Scottish relationship one couldfor instance name the introduction of the poll tax which caused severe problems and widened the gap between the two peoples. The poll tax fulfilled a certain Conservative function as far as theelimination of potential voters from electoral registers is concerned (Margaret Thatcher is supposed to have said after the 1992 election: 'The Poll Tax worked after all.' Barnett 1997: 179), but onthe whole the poll tax was considered unjust by the majority of the Scots.

Legislation by the central authority must not be seen as an arbitrary act of some remote and oppressive power, but as an integral part of one's own developments and supported by regionalauthorities. Burke claims: 'laws made against a whole nation were not the most effectual methods of securing its obedience.' ('Conciliation': 204) As he later continued in the same speech: '...freedom, and not servitude, is the cure of anarchy.' ('Conciliation': 206-7) Burke considered the welfare of the whole political body, not only of some particular and as a rule domineering part ofit: 'The good of the commonwealth is the rule which rides over the rest; and to this every other must completely submit.' ('Langrishe': 172) This corresponds to Blair's vision of the stakeholdersociety. Even though Burke accepted the strong part played by England or London, he was not in favour of an incorporating union between England and Ireland, because he believed 'it would not be forthe mutual advantage of the two kingdoms.' ('Langrishe': 203) He likewise rejected complete independence for Ireland. So what remains? Home rule, the federal option with a representative andresponsible Parliament in Dublin as well as one in London.

The federal system would ensure close cooperation between regional representative bodies and the central authority in London. It cannot be in the interest of the whole when the centre decides andsimply informs the periphery on what has been decided upon without giving the periphery a say in the decision-making process. Under Thatcher only one view, the Westminster, or even theDowining-Street-10 view, was acceptable. This has changed since 1997 and this would not be the case in a federal structure. The West Lothian question would not arise in a federation, as the federalgovernment would only decide on federal matters (cf. Fazal: 3. Cf. Edwards 1989: 21). Burke always endeavoured to prevent the falling apart of the Empire, to achieve an inner harmony among itsmembers. He did not see England as the only power to profit from mercantilist policies, but he saw the profit of the whole Empire as one unit of mainland and colonies.

The federal system was accepted by Scottish nationalists until the early 20^th century, as Keith Webb argues: 'In general, federalism was the most extreme alternative considered. Onlyafter the decline of John MacCormick's Scottish Covenant Association in 1954 did the call for separation begin to dominate.' (Webb 1978: 46-47) This reticence towards separation and finallyindependence and the reliance on the federal model could be explained by the fact that the Scottish Home Rule Association was 'in the main a Liberal organization, and [...] it tended to act as aginger group within the Liberal Party.' (Webb 1978: 61) The Liberal Democrats today are still in favour of a federal solution. But the decline of the Liberal Party as a leading political forcedefinitely began after the Great War and Scottish nationalism on federal lines had to reorientate itself (cf. Harvie 1994: 22).

Burke's vision harmonizes more or less with what New Labour and Tony Blair described as bringing government closer to the people, the whole complex concept of decentralisation. Anthony Barnettclaims that the United Kingdom has no 'politics of place' (1997: 182), meaning that there is no local representation worth mentioning because of the extreme centralisation. Burke's point of view wasanglo-centric, however, not from an ethnic background, but rather from an administrative one. He defended English constitutional traditions and wanted to see them introduced and then applied in allparts of the Empire and above all in Ireland, which, so Burke, was denied these basic English liberties by a corrupt Parliament in Dublin which represented only a tiny minority of the population.Burke demanded representative and responsible local or regional administrations and assemblies to deal with regional problems. This is the notion of horizontal distribution of power.

So what Burke suggested for America and its relationship to the motherland, was a federal system with a strong central power dealing with imperial legislation. His idea of an Empire iscircumscribed in 'Conciliation' as follows:

[...] an Empire is the aggregate of many States under one common head; whether this head be a monarch, or a presiding republick. It does, in such constitutions, frequently happen [...] that thesubordinate parts have many local privileges and immunities. Between these privileges and the supreme common authority the line may be extremely nice. [...] But though every privilege is an exemption(in the case) from the ordinary exercise of the supreme authority, it is no denial of it. (193)

Burke had realized that the benefits of English law, the English constitution, was not extended to Ireland, which resulted in the tension between the two peoples. As a consequence Burke admonishedthat not military force but English liberties would reform Ireland. 'It was not English arms, but the English Constitution, that conquered Ireland.' ('Conciliation': 202) He severely criticized theDublin Parliament as a corrupt body of placemen interested only in their own privileges. George Foulkes talks of 'the dynamic tension inherent in a federation.' (Foulkes 1989: 65) and thus sees asimilar constitutional relationship between the centre and the periphery. He sees this tension, which rests on mutually recognized principles, as soemthing positive and invigorating, because itresults in equal treatment of all members of the political unit.

Burke, the pragmatist, realized that vast empires have also a communicative problem in so far as the executive force of the central authority decreased as a rule with the growing distance to thecentral power. 'In large bodies, the circulation of power must be less vigorous at the extremities.' ('Conciliation': 184) Sir Walter Scott described a similar idea in his novel The Heart ofMid-Lothian (1818) about English laws and the long way they had to go until they reached Scotland, rather weakened once they arrived in Scotland and consequently no longer respected by the Scots.In a contemporary European context communication is no longer a problem, but the term of subsidiarity describes a similar notion of handing down power to regionally representative bodies. Thedistance between the decision-makers and those who are confronted with these decisions has to be reduced: government closer to the people is Tony Blair's relevant soundbite.

Burke's vision of the Empire, and this includes the Anglo-Irish relationship, was an Empire where English liberties would be granted not only to the subjects in the motherland, Great Britain, butalso to the people who lived in the different parts of the Empire and who might not even be of English stock, as the Warren Hastings case proved.

He saw England in relation to the other parts of the empire not as a shepherd to his sheep whom he can feed, shear, or slaughter as he so desires, but rather as the oldest brother who guards thefamily possession for a number of younger brothers on whose help he, too, depends. (Mahoney 1960: 312-13)

The Empire in Burke's view was 'a system of mutual help, as he once called it in the Annual Register, and it was to the interest of the whole to see to it that all parts of the empire werefairly treated.' (Mahoney 1960: 313)

A federal system, as envisaged by Fletcher and John Stuart Mill explicitly, and implicitly by Burke, could guarantee the citizens of the contemporary UK and of the EU universally enjoyedliberties. The regions would have their own representative bodies with plenty of regional administrative power. In a letter to his son Richard, Edmund Burke wrote: '... are we not rather to providefor the several parts according to the various and diversified necessities of the heterogeneous nature of the mass?' (457) He thus recognizes implicitly the cultural diversity which has to be takeninto consideration. The several individual parts make up a diversified unit to the mutual benefit. This is very much the notion of the multicultural nation, of the multicultural mosaic or the saladbowl in contrast to the melting pot and certainly in contrast to the notion of one state, one culture. Cultures are no longer singular but hybrids. Jan Nederveen Pieterse talks of 'Europe'scontemporary multi-cultural realities' (1993: 225) and expresses a similar idea. Burke was of the opinion that Britain should pass on power to regional assemblies as 'the gifts of a generous donorand not as claims recovered against a protesting litigant.' (Mahoney 1960: 104) Henry Dundas, the Home Secretary, wrote in a letter to Lord Westmorland, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, that 'it would bebetter to concede now gracefully what was likely to come about through force later.' Blair's concept and promise to establish regional authorities follows the same principle.

Terry Eagleton argued in the New Statesman in July 1997 that Burke, who is so often considered a conservative, would probably have welcomed the change to New Labour under Tony Blair. A lineof liberal minds is usually drawn from Locke via Burke to Gladstone, who supported the federal solution for Ireland (cf. Crick 1989: 155), and I think one could add Tony Blair in this line. All fourof them follow a pragmatic approach towards politics and see both the moral rights and the duties of the citizen or subject. As the German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) wrote inhis essay, 'Wort und Begriff der Humanität': 'Der Name Menschenrechte kann ohne Menschenpflichten nicht genannt werden; beide beziehen sich aufeinander und für beide suchenwir ein Wort.' (Bahr 1996: 37) Herder emphasised the important role of the individual and of individual cultural phenomena, of diversity among cultures. Burke, a contemporary of Herder, alsohad a moral approach to the rights and duties of a citizen towards his country and he lacked the touch of the Machiavellian schism between morals and politics. In this attitude we find parallels tothe Christian approach of Tony Blair who calls himself 'an ecumenical Christian' (1996: 61) which is comparable to the broadly based and tolerant attitude of Edmund Burke as an 18th-century Anglican.Blair also sees the combination of rights and duties in his notion of modern citizenship (cf. 1996: 246). Both Blair's and Burke's attitudes are shown in their understanding of the civic society, intheir religious tolerance, and in what Blair calls 'inclusion' and 'the religious pluralism of this country.' (1996: 61) Blair argues:

But there is a big idea left in politics. It goes under a variety of names - stakeholding, one nation, inclusion, community - but it is quite simple. It is that no society can ever prospereconomically or socially unless all its people prosper, unless we use the talents and energies of all people rather than just the few, unless we live up to the ambition to create a society where thecommunity works for the good of every individual, and every individual works for the good of the community. (1996: x)

Blair does not propagate the extreme individualism of Margartet Thatcher, 'there is no such thing as society, there are only individuals' (Barnett 1997: 5). For if there are only individuals left,such conservative ideals as loyalty towards the state and national identity will be lost once and for all. Blair underlines the close cooperation of individuals working to a common good. This impliesalso close cooperation between different levels of government, the supra-national, perhaps the national, and the regional or local level. Blair does not want 'two Britains - one on welfare; the otherpaying for it.' (1996: 65), on the contrary, he demands 'one-nation politics: that social cohesion and fairness to all are essential conditions of both a decent and an efficient country.' (1996:128)This approach tries to overcome dogmatism and to rely on English pragmatism. Insofar it is very much a Burkean approach. And it is a further step towards the federal principle in the UK, eventhough New Labour does not like to use the term federalism.

Blair's approach to bring government closer to the people, to grant rights and demand duties, must be seen as a new start in the tradition of Burke and it allows for hope that 'there is now atleast a general acceptance that these [animosities and inequities] represent not an eternal order but a historical experience whose end, or at least partial abatement, may be at hand.' (Said 1995:354) But Blair still underlines the relevance of the nation-state: 'New Labour is about exactly these two ideals - devolution within nation-states and cooperation between them.' (1996: 259) AnthonyBarnett sees the developments within Europe as clearly federalist: 'More than this, it is liquidationist so far as nation states are concerned, for it implies a never-ending process of dismantlingdifferences.' (1997: 209) I am not so sure about his idea of 'dismantling differences'. What nobody wants, is the homogeneous European super-state which crushes regional differences. The loss ofvariety is linked with highly centralised political systems.

Accountability stands opposed to the quango-state under the Conservatives. Walter Bagehot saw in his study the English Constitution (1867) also the necessity of control and the solutionlies for him in a second house as powerful as the House of Commons. Bagehot wrote: 'a second chamber of an opposite sort, differently composed, in which that interest [which dominated the lowerHouse] in all likelihood will not rule.' (1997: 60) Bagehot saw the tendency of absolute power vested in the House of Commons 'when sure of the popular assent, and when freshly elected, it isabsolute, it can rule as it likes and decide as it likes.' (1997: 124) This latter statement would apply both to the contemporary House of Commons and to that under Margaret Thatcher. Accountabilityis better safeguarded once there is an influential second chamber, which could well be a regional representative body. In 1911 the idea of substituting for the House of Lords as a hereditaryinstitution a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of a hereditary basis was first mentioned in the Preamble to the Representation of the People Act of this year. Fazal suggests a Senateas second chamber, 'The Senate will be represented by the Regions on the basis of equality while the House of Commons will be elected on the basis of population.' (1996: xxii) Again one could arguethat this kind of duality between two houses is guaranteed in the federal system between national and regional authorities. Blair recognizes the necessity to grant power to the Celtic Ring, no doubtabout that, he propagates more or less the federal model, but he calls it devolution; the unity of the United Kingdom must be preserved. What he wants is 'sensible democratic reform' (1996: 261)which is exactly in line with Burke's differentiation between development and change.

Blair's argument against federalism is the domineering size of England (cf. 1996: 270). An argument which was also made by Churchill in his important speech in Dundee in 1911, when he claimed

[...] that a complete federal system in the United Kingdom would be difficult to achieve, since English internal party politics would not easily be separated from imperial politics. Thus, what todo about England, with her vast numerical preponderance, was an additional problem. (Webb 1978: 61.

This statement is still remarkable when we consider Churchill's conservative attitude and outlook. But he was a politician with a vision. Blair's argument about the restricting size of England isnot really convincing. The problem is, rather, a mental one. The English 'think that they have an English parliament already and [they] have never shown much enthusiasm for any kind of federalism.'(Scott 1992: 54) George Foulkes speaks of 'phased federalism, incorporating within it reform of the Second Chamber.' (1989: 67) The reform of the Second Chamber is under operation and an increasingregional consciousness in England will, let's hope so, bring about a 'phased federalism' in a couple of years, all very much in the evolutionary tradition of Edmund Burke. England could be dividedinto smaller units, or the German system of mutual assistance among the regions could be introduced to deal with the problem of imbalances between the regions of the federation. As Fazal argues: '...a transfer of resources to the backwards regions within the United Kingdom federation for their rapid economic advancement would at first ease the problems and then bring about their finalsettlement.' (1996: 124) The 'final settlement' appears a bit of utopian wishful thinking, but it should not really be difficult to find a solution for economic discrepancies between the regions.Models for how to deal with the problem are manifold. One feature of federalism will help with this problem: ideally, there is no longing for hegemony within a federally organized unit (cf. Nidegger(a) 1992: 3). The ideal is federalist cooperation instead of nationalist antagonism.

The strongly centralised system so far could not prevent that certain regions were getting richer and others poorer. So a fresh start within a federal framework and with what Fazal calls the'Distributable Pool' (1996: 131) could be made with probably more success as far as even distribution of wealth is concerned. The recent problems and relevant discussions about avoiding imbalanceswithin the Federal Republic of Germany have shown, that complete equality is not possible. Regional disparities must be taken seriously as they have frequently been the reason for destabilisationwithin states. On the other hand the rival regional centres have contributed a lot to a general confidence in Germany and the state authorities have had great freedom to further their own economicand cultural revival. Bavaria is an example for a comparably recent economic upswing from a rural to a high-tech area. We could also mention the four motors of the European Union as successfulexamples for regional development.

Conclusion

The present discussion in Britain, so it appears from the outside, is more about terminology and less about contents. When Blair aims at a system that 'brings power closer to the people and ispart of a wider process of decentralisation which allows the centre to concentrate on the strategic needs of the whole country.' (1996: 270), then he talks in fact about federalism. The powerstructure and distribution of rights and duties between the two layers of power have to be regulated in some way acceptable to both parties.

Burke's approach was in the federal tradition, or in the tradition of granting more rights to regional authorities and to break up the strong centralisation which had always been a conservative orTory approach, in a clear line from George III and the Earl of Bute via Disraeli and leading on to Margaret Thatcher. Burke, as in so many things, proved to be a politician with a vision who canstill teach us a lesson about practical politics which respect human freedom and English, or rather, universal enlightenment liberties. Mahoney argues:

[...] there can be no doubt that the future of Ireland would have been vastly different if Burke had been heeded. He had tried desperately to show that Catholic Emancipation was quite consistentwith the retention of Ireland within the empire and that both justice and expediency made emancipation mandatory. (Mahoney 1960: 322)

Burke did not see the reason for occasional Irish violence in politics or Catholicsim, but in economics. As he wrote to his son: 'It is not about Popes but about potatoes that the minds of thisunhappy people are agitated. It is not from the spirit of zeal, but the spirit of whiskey that these wretches [the common people] act.' (Mahoney 1960: 322) The debate about North Sea Oil and the cry'It's Scotland's Oil!' links the economy with politics. The economy has been in the forefront during the beginnings of European unification ever since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Only since the last10 years or so has a political union come closer. The European Union started off as the European Economic Community and developed from this mainly economic organisation into an increasingly politicalorganisation. The then British alternative, the EFTA, was based exclusively on economic cooperation and died a peaceful death some time ago. It is the mixture of economics and politics which provessuccessful. The federal United States of Europe might be on the horizon, even though Blair warns of a Europe in the shape of a 'federal superstate' (1996: 265) or raises fears about Europe rushingheadlong 'into some federalist morass' (1996: 285). The Conservatives express similar fears of a federal Europe and see the loss of British sovereignty, 'nothing less is at stake than the freedom ofBritain as a self-governing nation.' (Barnett 1997: 37) Blair believes in a Europe that will preserve the concept of the nation-state and he will definitely be a part of this type of Europe (cf.1996: 287). He does not give a clear-cut definition of this Europe of nation-states, but it will probably be something in the line described by Barnett as 'emphasis on inclusion, high-quality publiclife and dignified levels of social support.' (1997: 94) The more we are confronted with supranational dangers and problems, the more we will need supranational authorities and supranationaldecision-making, and only a federal system will guarantee the necessary control of these supranational authorities. We are living in an age of hitherto unknown transnational mobility which has to betaken into consideration when we talk about nation-states. Germany is a post-national state with MPs and police-officers with Turkish names. Or let's look at German soccer teams - hardly the majorityof the players can claim national German background. A post-national society means globalisation from the inside and the ius sanguinis is a concept of the past.

The concept of national sovereignty has to be completely reconsidered. As Sir Geoffrey Howe said in his Reed Lecture in 1994: 'Sovereignty 'is not like virginity, now you have it, now you don't'.'(quoted in Brittan 1998: 15) Anthony Giddens also refers to the newly formulated notion of sovereignty. He argues: '[Sovereignty] must mean something different today: a nation sure enough of itselfto accept the new limits of sovereignty.' (1998:130) Europe must be seen as a unit, 'developing social, political and economic institutions that stretch above the nation-state and reach down to theindividual.' (Giddens 1998: 142) Within the European Union it must be safeguarded that decisions are only taken at a European level when there is additional value gained in doing so: 'Decisionsshould be made at their most appropriate level.' (Brittan 1998: 23) If Europe talks with one voice, it will be a powerful global player. Yves Nidegger sees in the federalist revolution in Europe aharmonious linkage between 'small is beautiful' and 'big is necessary' (1992 (b) 1992: 1). Ernest Gellner observes a similar trend in the same direction

in which effective political units will be either larger or smaller than 'national' units based on similarity of high culture. Just as, once upon a time, city-states were sub-ethnic and empireswere super-ethnic, so the agencies preventing nuclear and ecological disaster, controlling the drugs and arms trades, and so on, will have to be super-ethnic, while the agency administering theschool and welfare system may become sub-ethnic. This is a hope rather than a prediction, but it is not an unreasonable hope. Finally, there is the development of non-territorial culturalassociations, which would in some measure separate patriotism (love of one's culture and its carriers) from obsession with territory. (1997: 107)

Gellner finally gives recommendations for the re-organisation of the world and further coexistence of people: 'a preference for stability, an avoidance of destabilisation without strong cause andwithout provision for an orderly passage to a successor regime; affluence; centralisation of major order-maintaining functions and a cantonisation of social ones; cultural pluralism, de-fetishisationof land.' (1997: 108) Burke would have loved that. Burke would also have loved Sir Leon Brittan's vision of a 'Europe for the Individual.' (1998: 79) People work and live in the generalized nowhereand everywhere of television and internet, 'im generalisierten Nirgendwo des Fernsehens und Internet.' (Beck 1999: 13) By means of modern telecommunications with their independence from nationaltraffic and territory, the idea of national territory dissolves more and more. Territory is no longer relevant, it is rather a question of access to the Internet of world-wide communication. Therights and duties of the individual and the harmonising of the interests of the individual with those of authority is an 18th-century concept and but it will still be relevant in the new Millenium.Federalism raises a lot of problems, but it also offers solution to existing problems and we have successful examples on which we can draw so that past mistakes can be avoided.

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darin: 'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs', 1791, 1-135.

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